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Parliamentary Sovereignty in the European Communities -
The Developing Doctrine 
Abstract 
The doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty is a unique feature of the 
British constitution. No other parliament within the European Commu-
ni ty can claim legislative omnipotence. Put simply, the concept 
describes the relation of the UK Parliament to the judicature. The 
courts accept that every Act of the Westminster Parliament has the 
force of law and that there is no higher source of law. By its very 
nature (which can best be explained with Kelsen's theory of the 
grundnorm), the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty enjoys a pecu-
liar status: i t forms the basis of the whole legal system and can 
therefore not be altered by statute. In other words, Parliament 
cannot impose limitations on its own sovereignty or on that of future 
Parliaments. 
Historically, the doctrine developed to its present form in the 19th 
century, when the United Kingdom enjoyed external sovereignty on an 
unprecedented scale<—To^iay, the situation of the United Kingdom is 
characterized by (nn^ual^economic and political interdependence with 
other states. The strongest challenge yet to the doctrine of Parlia-
mentary Sovereignty has resulted from membership of the European 
Communities and the claim of Community law that i t must prevail over 
norms of the national legal systems, whether prior or subsequent. 
This cannot be reconciled with the idea of legal sovereignty of a 
national parliament. The practical solution offered by sec. 2 of the 
European Communities Act has helped to avoid actual conflicts, but 
the theoretical problem remained unsolved. 
However, some recent cases suggest that a fundamental change to the 
grundnorm which underlies the concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
may be imminent. 
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A. Introduction 
The United Kingdom Government has seated Parliament on two 
horses, one straining towards the preservation of Parlia-
mentary Sovereignty, the other galloping in the general 
direction of Community law supremacy.1 
When British politicians discuss 'sovereignty1 with their partners in 
the European Communities, they cannot always be certain that they are 
fully understood. At least this is so whenever they employ the word 
'sovereign' to describe the powers of their Parliament. 
The doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty is a unique characteristic 
of the British legal system. Put very simply, i t denotes the 
unfettered competence of the United Kingdom Parliament to make laws. 
This power has been praised as "the very keystone of the law of the 
constitution"2 or "the fundamental law"3 of the British Constitution. 
Even the formidable efforts devoted to criticising or refuting the 
concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty by its outright opponents4 
underline its constitutional weight. 
Historically, the sovereignty of Parliament developed to its modern 
form in the 18th and 19th century, when Great Britain enjoyed 
external sovereignty on an almost unprecedented scale. 
Today's scenario is different. The only single-nation superpower on 
earth is the United States of America and even the US are much more 
economically and politically dependent on other (industrial) nations 
1 S. de Smith/ R. Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 
p. 82. 
2 A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitu-
tion, p. 70. 
3 I . Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, p. 65; also 0. Hood 
Phillips/P. Jackson, Constitutional and Administrative Law, p. 25. 
4 See e.g. J.D.B. Mitchell, Constitutional Law, pp. 63 - 91; or, to 
give some more recent examples, M. Upton, Marriage Vows of the 
Elephant: The Constitution of 1707. C. Dike, The Case Against 
Parliamentary Sovereignty; P.A. Joseph, Beyond Parliamentary Sove-
reignty. 
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than was Britain in the last centuries. 
The European Communities were built not least on the insight of the 
founding member states that national interests could be better 
pursued on the world stage i f sovereignty was shared, pooled and 
transferred to a unified central authority. When the United Kingdom 
entered the Common Market in 1973, many were concerned about the 
implications membership would entail for the legal sovereignty of the 
Westminster Parliament. The discussions have never really stopped 
since. 
Recently, the problem has become very topical again due to the 
ongoing negotiations on Economic, Monetary and (especially) Political 
Union. Whatever the precise final outcome of the two Intergovern-
mental Conferences will be, i t seems almost certain that even more 
powers will be given to the Communities and that the already existing 
federal structures will be strengthened. 
The present thesis will attempt to answer the question what impact 
membership of the European Communities has had so far on the doctrine 
of Parliamentary Sovereignty. A clearer understanding might help to 
assess the possible consequences of proposals that are currently put 
forward in connection with the negotiations on the future of the 
Communities. 
The paper is divided into three main chapters. 
The first chapter (B.) will closely examine the doctrine itself from 
different angles. 
Part I discusses the nature of Parliamentary Sovereignty. It will 
explain the specific meaning of the sovereignty of Parliament as 
opposed to political or state sovereignty. Particular attention will 
paid to the problem whether Parliament itself can limit and/or 
transfer its own power, a question of obvious importance in relation 
to membership of the EC. 
A proper understanding of present developments requires that they are 
seen in their historical context (part II). Just as the doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty evolved under certain historical condi-
tions, i t is conceivable that i t might change or even disappear i f 
the conditions change substantially. 
Part III tries to determine the legal foundations of the doctrine. 
Any statement or prediction about changes must take into considera-
tion not only the historical background but also the roots in legal 
theory. It will be argued that due to the peculiar nature of the 
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concept the courts must play a key role in its further development. 
In chapter C. discussion turns towards the Community's legal system. 
It will show in what respects the EC is different from other 
international organisations (part I) and why i t is so difficult to 
reconcile membership with the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
This is followed by a detailed analysis of the case-law of the 
European Court of Justice on the principles of direct effect and 
supremacy of Community law and its consequences for the member states 
(part II and HI). This reveals that many incompatibilities with the 
national legal systems are caused by the (monist) approach employed 
by the Community to bind national courts into its own structure and 
to assign to them the task of ensuring that Community law always 
prevails over conflicting national law. 
Part IV looks at the constitutional positions in other member states 
and their reactions to the specific problems caused by membership. 
Having established in the first two chapters the nature of Parliamen-
tary Sovereignty and the challenge posed by Community law, the final 
chapter deals with the constitutional developments in the United 
Kingdom. It starts by pointing out the interrelations between the way 
Community law is given force by a British statute, the views of 
Parliament itself on its legal sovereignty and the (ultimately 
decisive) attitudes of the British courts (part I). 
Thus, part II examines the provisions of the European Communities Act 
1972 which deal with the problems of direct effect and supremacy of 
Community law. Part III scrutinizes political views and statements on 
the question of sovereignty. 
Finally, in the light of the previous findings, an analysis of 
relevant cases before British courts shows how far constitutional 
theory has undoubtedly/be ^ adapted to accomodate the facts and also 
suggests that there are^ndications that even more fundamental 
changes are imminent (part IV). 
B. The Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
Opinion as to the existence and the importance of the doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty is almost unanimous. The picture changes, 
however, when i t comes to its precise nature and origin. 1 
There is an "orthodox view' of Parliamentary Sovereignty and also a 
fair number of varieties of a 'new view'. There are different notions 
as to the relationship of Parliamentary Sovereignty to the rule of 
law or to the sovereignty of the people. Some people say that 
Parliamentary Sovereignty is 'continuous', other writers are of the 
opinion that i t is 'self-embracing'. 
Considering these distinctions i t is vital to bring out the precise 
sense in which the term 'Parliamentary Sovereignty' is used within 
this thesis in order to avoid misinterpretations. 
Since the aim is to demonstrate the influence of the European 
Communities legal order on this particular principle of British 
constitutional law, the ideal starting point must be a concept of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty which does not yet try to Incorporate 
developments in connection with Britain's membership of the European 
Communities. 
Notwithstanding the fundamental historic developments in the last 100 
years, Albert Venn Dicey's traditional exposition on the nature of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty sti l l dominates modern legal thinking. 
The Diceyan definitions of Parliamentary Sovereignty in his magiste-
r ia l 2 'Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution' have 
the advantage of being the most unequivocal and rigid and are 
1 For surveys of the variety of opinions see D.N. Clarke/ B.E. 
Sufrin, Constitutional Conundrums: The Impact of the United King-
dom's Membership of the European Communities on Constitutional 
Theory, p. 32; H.G. Petersmann, Die Souveranitat des Britlschen 
Parlaments in den Europalschen Gemelnschaften. p. 165; T.R.S. 
Allen, The Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty, p. 615; G. Winter-
ton, Parliamentary Supremacy: The British Grundnorm Re-Examlned. 
p. 591; H.R.W. Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, pp. 177 et 
seq. 
2 C. Turpin, British Government and the Constitution: Texts, Cases 
and Materials, p. 23. 
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therefore ideally suited as initial working hypothesis.3 
I. The Nature of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
A number of modern writers on the subject have argued that the term 
'sovereignty' today is not altogether adequate in connection with the 
law-making power of Parliament and are therefore using 'Parliamentary 
Supremacy' instead.4 As De Smith has rightly pointed out, neither of 
the two terms is ideal, but "we shall use the phrase 'Parliamentary 
Sovereignty', but to denote a legal concept or rather a group of 
concepts which do not necessarily carry any implication about the 
effective seat of political power within the state"8 
This last brief mention takes us directly to Dicey's methodical 
approach to sovereignty. 
1. Dicey's Distinction between Legal and Political Sovereignty 
Dicey was not the first to elaborate on the idea of sovereignty. The 
foundations had long been laid in the philosophical essays of writers 
like Bodin, Hobbes, Bentham, Blackstone and Austin 6. 
Dicey, in his 'Introduction' attempts a consistent application of 
Austin's doctrine of sovereignty, which was the prevailing legal 
theory in Great Britain in the 19th century.7 
Generalising from what he observed in England, Austin had deduced 
that in every legal system there must be a person or a group of 
persons with the ultimate power to change every existing law. 
However, he was hesitant to tie himself down as to who precisely was 
3 Interestingly enough, a lot of textbooks on constitutional law 
seem to adopt a similiar approach: they devote a chapter to the 
description of the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty, mainly 
based on the Diceyan body of thought, and deal with the implica-
tions of Community law separately: see e.g. Turpin, chapters 1, 3 
b) and 5, 5 d). 
4 See e.g. Hood Phillips/ Jackson, p. 41. 
9 De Smith/ Brazier, pp. 64-65. 
6 For details see Petersmann, pp. 252 - 260. 
7 Petersmann, pp. 258 and 260; Hood Phillips/ Jackson, p. 41. 
Chapter B. page 6 
the sovereign in England. According to Austin, the sovereign power is 
vested in the King, the House of Lords, and the Commons or the 
electors.8 
This vagueness went against Dlcey's sense of accuracy. He pointed out 
"that the term 'sovereignty', as long as i t is accurately employed in 
the sense in which Austin sometimes [italics added] uses i t , is a 
mere legal conception, and means simply the power of law-making 
unrestricted by any legal limit." 9 
From that he inferred that under the English constitution, the 
sovereign must be Parliament, or, to be more precise, the King in 
Parliament. But 'sovereignty' was sometimes also used by Austin to 
describe the political fact that ultimately i t is the electors who, 
through their votes (and their readiness or unreadiness to obey!), 
will ultimately enforce their will . 
Consequently, Dicey distinguished between 'legal' and 'political' 
sovereignty10 and accused Austin of confusing those two distinct 
meanings: "The political sense of the word 'sovereignty' is, i t is 
true, fully as important as the legal sense or more so. But the two 
significations, although Intimately connected together, are essen-
tially different, and in some part of his work Austin has apparently 
confused the one sense with the other."11 
Thus, 'Parliamentary Sovereignty' In Dicey's terminology by no means 
comprises effective political power. It only serves to denote the 
legislative omnipotence of Parliament. 
In fact, Dicey went even one step further. Analysing the 
constitutional implications of the 1715 Septennial Act, he denied the 
existence of any legally relevant link between the political 
sovereign 'electors' and the legislative sovereign 'Parliament'. 
Parliament In 1716 had prolonged Its own period of office 1 2 from 
three to seven years. The validity of the Septennial Act was 
questioned on the ground that Parliament's power to legislate must 
expire with the end of the elector's mandate. 
8 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses 
of the Study of Jurisprudence, pp. 251 - 255. 
9 Dicey, Introduction , p. 79. 
1 0 According to Petersmann, p. 265, this distinction had earlier been 
made by J. Bryce. 
1 1 Dicey, Introduction, p. 74. 
1 2 So did the Parliaments In both World Wars. 
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Dicey objected that "Parliament is, in a legal point of view, neither 
the agent of the electors nor in any sense a trustee for its 
constituents."13 
He thus held that the 1715 Septennial Act was not only valid but at 
the same time proved the most significant illustration of legal 
omnipotence. 
2. The Relationship between State Sovereignty and Parliamentary 
Sovereignty 
At this stage i t must be observed that there is a third sense in 
which the term 'sovereignty' is used. Sovereignty can also mean the 
more extensive notion of state-sovereignty, which is a concept of 
international law. 
As Turpin has pointed out, "Parliamentary Sovereignty and the 
sovereignty of the United Kingdom as a state are different things, 
although they are not altogether unrelated."14 
Basically a state is said to be sovereign when i t has a territory, 
people, government and Is not under any foreign control. 1 0 
Supreme legislative authority is not an indipensible component of 
state sovereignty. But the (internal) legal sovereignty of a 
parliament can only exist within the framework of the (external) 
sovereignty of the state.1 6 
3. The Positive and the Negative Side of Legal Sovereignty 
Dicey defines Parliamentary Sovereignty through a positive and a 
complementing negative aspect. The positive side is that Parliament 
"has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any 
1 3 Dicey, Introduction, pp. 47/48. 
1 4 Turpin, p. 346. 
1 3 Cf. A. Verdross / B. Simma, Unlverselles VcUkerrecht. pp. 223 et 
seq., §§ 378 - 389. 
1 6 For further thoughts on that relationship cf. K. Thelen, Die Ver-
elnbarkelt des Vertrages zur Gtindung der Europalschen Wlrtschafts-
gemelnschaft mlt der Brltlschen Verfassung. p. 34. 
law whatever"17, a law being "any rule which will be enforced by the 
courts"18. Parliament in Dicey's definition is the two Houses acting 
jointly with the monarch (hence, he sometimes refers to i t as 'the 
King in Parliament'). 
The courts, however, do not enjoy discretion as to which rules they 
will enforce: "Any Act of Parliament [...) which makes a new law, or 
repeals or modifies an existing law, will [italics added] be obeyed 
by the courts."19 
The negative side of the same principle is expressed thus: ".. no 
person is recognised by the law of England as having a right to 
override or set aside the legislation of Parliament."20 
These few sentences are sufficient to illustrate the paramount 
importance of the role of the judiciary: whether there is any truth 
in the concept of legal sovereignty ultimately depends on the 
unconditional allegience of the courts. This coherence has been 
expressed most clearly by Sir Ivor Jennings: "[Parliamentary Sove-
reignty] is a legal concept, a form of expression which lawyers use 
to express the relations between Parliament and the Courts."21 
They must never recognise a rival legislative power and, when 
deciding i f an Act of Parliament is valid, they must be content to 
ask whether or not the right people have acted together in the 
appropriate manner to create an Act of Parliament. They are not 
allowed to take into account any "higher" principles that might be 
thought of as ranking above man-made law. 
4. Potential Legal Limitations on Parliamentary Sovereignty 
The absoluteness of the claim for legal supremacy provokes the 
question as to possible legal limitations. There are a number of 
possible restrictions of different character which should be given 
1 7 Dicey, Introduction, pp. 39/40. 
1 8 Dicey, Introduction, p. 40. 
1 9 Dicey, Introduction, p. 40. 
2 0 Dicey, Introduction, p. 40. 
2 1 Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, p. 149; Allan, The Limits 
of Parliamentary Sovereignty, p. 621; only recently, this view has 
been affirmed by Lord Lowry, speaking for a unanimous House of 
Lords in Harrison v. Tew, [1990] 1 All ER 322 at 329. 
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a) Territorial Restraints 
It would seem natural to assume that the law-making power of the 
British Parliament is confined to the UK and subordinated 
territories. In the orthodox view, however, there is no reason to 
suggest that Parliament cannot attribute legal consequences to events 
in independent foreign countries involving solely foreign 
nationals.22 
I . Jenning's well known illustration of this fact is the extreme 
hypothetical example of the British Parliament making i t an offence 
for Frenchmen to smoke in the streets of Paris.23 This would be a 
valid English law. But the fact that according to a domestic 
constitutional doctrine Parliament can legislate for all places and 
persons does not mean that the enactment will be applied by foreign 
courts. It is safe to assume that the French criminal courts would 
not be very impressed by the British smoklng-ban. They owe loyalty 
not to English law but to French. 
So, although i t is true that Parliament Is free to legislate on any 
matter anywhere in the world, its legislative will is enforceable 
only where the courts are paying attention to English law.2 4 
In the sense that the essence of Parliamentary Sovereignty is 
obedience by the courts, i t could therefore be said that there are 
territorial limitations. 
In practice, the British courts presume that Acts of Parliament apply 
only in the United Kingdom, unless stated otherwise: "Every Parlia-
mentary draftsman writes on paper which bears the legend, albeit in 
invisible ink, 'This Act shall not have extraterritorial effect save 
to the extent that It expressly so provides.' The courts know this 
and they read i t into every statute."28 
2 2 In fact, i t has repeatedly done so, a recent example being the 
Aviation Security Act 1982. 
2 3 Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, pp. 170 -171. 
2 4 So in Jennings' example, the French offender has to spend a few 
hours In Folkestone in order to be prosecuted, p. 171. 
2 8 Donaldson L.J. in R. v. West Yorkshire Coroner ex p. Smith, [1983] 
Q.B. 326 at 358. 
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b) International Law 
Ever since the evolution of the traditional ius gentium the nature of 
International law as law has been doubted. In a different context, 
Dicey referred to a befriended colleague who was a Professor of 
international law as "a teacher of law which is not law, and [..] 
accustomed to expound those rules of public ethics which are 
miscalled international law."26 
Today i t is commonly accepted that International law Is a form of law 
flowing from different sources. These sources are normally quoted 
following the pattern in Art. 38 sec. 1 l i t a - c of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice: 
International treaties (which are normally relevant only inter par-
tes), international customary law and the general principles of law 
of the civilized nations are generally recognized as the (only) 
sources of international law.2 7 
Whether a national legislature Is in any way fettered by Internatio-
nal Law depends on the status which international law holds within 
the legal order of a sovereign state. 
Some countries, like the BENELUX-states, have in recent years conce-
ded complete or partial supremacy of International law over national 
legislation. 
In the UK, this is fundamentally different. Treaties, which are made 
under the prerogative of the Crown, do not automatically become a 
part of English law. 2 8 To have force in domestic law, they must be 
transformed by an Act of Parliament. 
The general principles of international law (customary International 
law, on the other hand, are regarded as part of the common law of 
England.29 As such, they undlsputedly rank below statute law. 
Therefore, the British Parliament can legislate contrary to Interna-
tional law i f i t wishes to do so, and any such law would prevail over 
principles of international law before the British courts. 
2 6 Dicey, Introduction, p. 22. 
2 7 Verdross / Simma, pp. 321 et seq.; Buergenthal, T./ Doehring, K./ 
Kokott, J./ Maier, H. G., Grundztige des VSlkerrechts, pp. 18 et 
seq. 
28 McWhirter v. Att.Gen, [19721 CMLR 882 at 886,per Lord Denning M.R. 
2 9 See Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 
[1977] 1 All ER 881 at 888/9, per Lord Denning M.R. 
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The unabridged supremacy of Parliament over International law has 
often been confirmed by the courts: "What the statute itself enacts 
cannot be unlawful, because what the statute says and provides is 
itself the law, and the highest form of law that is known to this 
country. It is the law which prevails over every other form of law, 
and i t is not for the court to say that a parliamentary enactment, 
the highest law in this country, is illegal." 3 0 
Thus Judge Ungoed-Thomas dealt with the complaint of a taxpayer who 
had argued that part of the income-tax which was levied under the 
Finance Act 1964 would be used for the construction of nuclear 
weapons, which was, in the taxpayer's opinion, contrary to Interna-
tional Law.31 
When confronted with a case involving international law, the courts 
again apply a rebuttable presumption that Parliament does not intend 
to legislate contrary to the UK's obligations from International 
treaties or inconsistent with general principles of International 
law. 
c) Natural Law 
Towards the end of the 18th century, there was stil l among lawyers 
the notion that Acts of Parliament contrary to any reason could be 
void. Sir William Blackstone claimed that "the law of nature being 
coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course 
superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the 
globe, in all countries and at all times: no human laws are of any 
validity i f contrary to this." 3 2 
30 Cheney v. Conn, [19681 1 WLR 242 at 247 per Ungoed-Thomas J. 
3 1 For further examples see Mortensen v. Peters, 11906] 14 S.L.T. 
227 at 231 et seq.; R. v. Jordan, [1967) Crim. L. Rev. 483. 
3 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, p. 41. On the 
other hand, Blackstone also wrote : "True i t is, that whatever 
Parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo" (pp. 160-161). 
Over the years, he seems to have adapted to the tendency in 
professional opinion favouring parliamentary instead of judicial 
supremacy; cf. also Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, pp. 
319 - 321, and A.F. Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament, p. 220. 
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From the preceding paragraphs i t should be clear that such a view can 
not peacefully co-exist alongside a claim of Parliamentary Sovereign-
ty. The existence of a law of reason which has to be applied and put 
into concrete form by the judges33 means supremacy of the judiciary 
rather than of Parliament. 
Consequently, Dicey reconstructed Blackstone's statements as aids to 
statutory interpretation. He said that the judges, when trying to 
expound on the meaning of an act, will presume that Parliament would 
not Intentionally violate the ordinary rules of morality. But, over 
and above this, there was "no legal basis for the theory that judges, 
as opponents of morality, may overrule Acts of Parliament."34 
The courts accept this view and have on several occasions disclaimed 
of any right to interfere with Acts of Parliament.38 
d) Parliamentary Self-Limitation 
aa) The Problem: Continuing or Self-Embracing Omnipotence ? 
The question about the possibility of self-limitation is 
substantially different in nature from the objections that were 
discussed previously under a)-c). 
Confining the scope of Parliamentary Sovereignty to a certain ter r i -
tory or subordinating i t to natural or international law are attempts 
to qualify the absoluteness of the doctrine from outside. The 
starting-point for raising the problem of self-limitation is the 
Inherent logic of the doctrine. 
Does Parliament's omnipotence embrace the choice to limit that very 
power for the future? Can the will of the present legislator be 
effectively entrenched by Act of Parliament against future repeal? 
3 3 For arguments in favour of the idea see A.P. d'Entreves, The Case 
for Natural Law Re-examined. 
3 4 Dicey, Introduction, p. 62. For a modern attempt to show that the 
doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty is (or should be) subject to 
judicial disobedience on the ground of 'political morality' see 
Allen's The Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
3 8 See e.g. Manuel v. Attorney General, [1983] Ch. 77 at 86 per 
Megarry V.C., or Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1969] 1 A.C. 645 
at 723 per Lord Reid. 
Chapter B. page 13 
As H.L.A. Hart has rightly pointed out, a view of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty which would answer these questions in the affirmative 
would probably deserve the name 'sovereignty' better than any other. 
"This is the principle that Parliament should not be incapable of 
limiting irrevocably the legislative competence of its successors, 
but, on the contrary, should have this wider self-limiting power. 
Parliament would then at least once in its history be capable of 
exercising an even larger sphere of legislative competence than the 
accepted doctrine allows to i t . The requirement that at every moment 
of its existence Parliament should be free from legal limitations 
including even those imposed by itself, is, after all, only one 
interpretation of the ambiguous idea of legal omnipotence. It in 
effect makes a choice between a continuing omnipotence in all matters 
not effecting the legislative competence of successive Parliaments, 
and an unrestricted self-embracing omnipotence, the exercise of which 
can only be enjoyed once."36 
To a logician, this matter would only be another interesting example 
of what is known as self-reflecting riddle or proposition. 
In terms of actual politics, the answer to the question bears Immense 
practical implications. If, for example, Parliament were to enact a 
Bill of Rights in order to guarantee the citizens a core of 
fundamental rights, this Bill would not be deemed to provide much 
security under a doctrine of continuing sovereignty. It would at any 
time be threatened by the prospect of being extinguished at the 
discretion of a new legislature. Public opinion would be the sole 
(and non-legal) safeguard to make a subsequent Parliament feel bound 
to the pledges of its predecessor. 
In the past, the question of entrenchment has arisen in different 
contexts. A number of well known precedents stil l provide the basis 
for vigorous constitutional debate. One of these Is the European 
Communities Act 1972, which will be given a detailed examination in 
the next chapters. 
We shall look at the Acts of Union with Scotland (1706) and Ireland 
(1800)(examples given by Dicey to prove the Inconceivability of 
parliamentary self-limitation) and the Northern Ireland Constitution 
Act 1973. 
3 6 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 146-146. 
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In 1707 the Kingdom of England united with the Kingdom of Scotland to 
form the United Kingdom of Great Britain and in 1800 Ireland joined 
the United Kingdom. In both cases, certain portions of the accom-
panying Acts of Union passed by Parliament were phrased 
in a way ("for ever","for all time" etc.) clearly aimed at protecting 
these provisions against repeal by a future Parliament. 
The Union with Scotland Act 170637 embodied provisions for preserving 
the Protestant religion and the Presbyterian Church governments in 
Scotland. Section 2 of this Act made i t compulsory for every 
Professor at a Scottish university to subscribe to the confession of 
fai th 3 8 . Section 4 found the strongest possible language in order to 
entrench this provision. It stated that the Act and its contents 
"shall be held and observed in all time coming as a fundamental and 
essential condition of any treaty or union to be concluded betwixt 
the two Kingdoms without any alteration thereof or derogation thereto 
in any sort forever." 
Yet, notwithstanding this remarkable effort to l i f t the Act above the 
ordinary, the obligation to subscribe to the Confession of Faith was 
revoked in 1853 by the Universities (Scotland) Act 3 9. The validity of 
this Act has never been questioned before a court, but the argument 
put forward against i t (mainly by Scottish lawyers), is that the Acts 
of Union (on the English and on the Scottish side taken together) 
were constituent Acts. Both the English and the Scottish Parliament 
ceased to exist and a new sovereign body, the Parliament of Great 
Britain, was created. This new body is limited in Its power to alter 
the Acts of Union by the same legal authority i t owes its existence 
to. 4 0 
3 7 6 Anne, c . l l . See also A.V. Dicey/ R.S. Rait, Thoughts on the 
Union between England and Scotland. 
3 8 A religious test. 
3 9 16 & 17 Vict. c. 89, s. 1. 
4 0 See e.g. Mitchell, Constitutional Law, pp. 69 - 73; Upton, pp. 85 
- 91. Cf. also the statement of Lord Cooper in MacCormlck v. Lord 
Advocate, (1953) S.C. 396 at 411 et seq. 
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English constitutional lawyers have generally rejected this view4 1, 
claiming that the Parliament of Great Britain has inherited and 
further developed complete sovereignty from the English Parliament. 
In a similiar way as the Universities Act, the Irish Church Act 1869 
swept aside regulations of the Act of Union with Ireland 180042 whose 
language had clearly intended to bind subsequent Parliaments.43 
cc) The Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 
The Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 is given by some44 as an 
example of Parliament binding its successors. In s.l the Act provides 
that "in no event will Northern Ireland or any part of i t cease to be 
part of Her Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom without the 
consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting In a 
poll held for the purposes of this section (...)." 
The question is whether or not Westminster can unilaterally revoke 
this provision, In which case there would be no obstacle to change 
the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of 
the people. 
There are mainly two arguments which have been put forward in favour 
of a self-limiting effect: 
First, i t has been suggested that s. 1 may be construed as a 
procedural fetter, restricting Parliament from legislating on the 
status of Northern Ireland before its people have consented. 
There are severe objections against this view. As will be shown in a 
moment43, the courts in the UK do not recognize form requirements on 
legislation. But even i f this were different, s. 1 of the Northern 
4 1 R.F.V Heuston, Essays in Constitutional Law, p. 10; Hood 
Phillips/ Jackson, pp. 65-66; Wade, The Basis of Legal Soverelgn-
ty_, pp. 173 et seq., esp. pp. 183-184. 
4 2 39 & 40 Geo. I l l , c.67. 
4 3 Cf. Dicey, Introduction, p. 66; for more examples In connection 
with the Acts of Union see Hood Phillips/ Jackson, pp. 62-66. 
4 4 See, e.g., B. Hadfleld, Learning from the Indians? The Consti-
tutional Guarantee Revisited, pp. 351 - 365 (with further referen-
ces). 
43 Infra, pp. 17 et seq. 
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Ireland Constitution Act i tself has not been made subject to a 
particular legislative procedure. In fact, no attempt at a l l has been 
made to entrench the provision against future repeal. 
The second argument is that Parliament has redefined i tself for the 
purposes of legislating on the future status of Northern Ireland by 
adding a fourth 'estate', namely the people of Northern Ireland. This 
sounds plausible unt i l one looks at the Act in i ts historical 
context. Let us for a moment assume that Parliament has indeed 
redefined itself for this particular purpose. This would mean that no 
decision on the substantive issue could be taken by the Commons, the 
Lords and the Queen alone. Only with the consent of the people of 
Northern Ireland could such authority be restored to the 'old' 
Parliament. 
Now, i f we look at s. 1 (2) of the Ireland Act 1949, we f ind that i t 
contained an identical provision to that of the 1973 Act, except that 
changes in the status of Northern Ireland had been made dependent 
upon the consent of the Northern Ireland Parliament. I f i t is 
accepted that in 1973 the UK Parliament redefined i tself by Including 
the people of Northern Ireland, then i t is fa i r to say that in 1949 
i t did the same by including the Northern Ireland Parliament. Thus, 
any legislation on Northern Ireland should have required the 
cooperation of the Irish Parliament. 
Yet, Westminster unilaterally abolished the Northern Ireland Parlia-
ment by s. 31 of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act and replaced 
the old provision on changes with the one now in force. 
The only conclusion to be drawn from this is that the 'guarantee' in 
s. 1 of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act could just as easily be 
withdrawn in law as was s. 1 of the Ireland Act 1949. 4 6 
Parliamentary practice in these cases obviously supports the orthodox 
view that Parliamentary Sovereignty is continuing and not self-
embracing. The courts, too, assume that every Parliament exercises 
the same amount of legislative power as its predecessor and thus 
cannot be bound by earlier legislation. As early as 1686. Herbert 
C.J. held in Godden v. Hales*7 that " i f an Act of Parliament had a 
clause in i t that i t should never be repealed, yet without question, 
4 6 See Hood Phillips/ Jackson, p. 63; also E.C.S. Wade/ A.W. Bradley, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law, p. 81. 
4 7 11 St.Tr. 1165 at 1197 (KB). 
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the same power that made i t , may repeal i t . " 
The same conclusion was reached in Ellen Street Estates Ltd. v. 
Minister of Health40 and, extrajudicially, Lord Reid observed: "It is 
good constitutional doctrine that Parliament cannot bind its succes-
sors."4 9 
dd) The Manner-and-Form-School (New View) 
Finally, i t has been suggested that although no Parliament has the 
power to determine the subject-matter of future legislation, i t can 
set permanent rules about the "manner and form". This theory is based 
on the fact that the courts must have some scheme of authenticating 
Acts of Parliament. Once a court Is satisfied that i t is dealing with 
an Act of Parliament, there is, under the orthodox view, no way to 
refuse judicial obedience. But, logically prior, there must be 
criteria for the judges to identify the instrument before them as an 
Act of Parliament. This was an issue long ago in The Prince's Case00, 
where i t was made clear that an instrument, although entered on the 
Parliament Roll, "be penned, that the King, with the assent of the 
Lords, or with the assent of the Commons, i t is no Act of Parliament, 
for three ought to assent to i t , scil. the King, The Lords and the 
Commons or otherwise, i t is not an Act of Parliament." 
The advocates of the 'manner-and-form-school' or 'new view 1, as i t is 
also called, suggest that Parliament i tself can alter these formal 
criteria by effectively providing that certain categories of Acts 
might be created or existing Acts be amended or repealed only In a 
specified way. 8 1 This could mean e.g. the requirement of a 2/3 
majority in both Houses, the approval of the electorate in a 
referendum or the use of a special verbal formula (like in sec. 4 of 
the Statute of Westminster 1931). 
The new view mainly relies on Commonwealth cases like Harris v. 
4 8 (1934] 1 KB 590. 
4 9 The Judge as Law-Maker, p. 25. , ^ 
8 0 [1606] 8 Co. Rep. la . / ^ 
8 1 See e.g. Jennings, p. 153; /critical Wade{ The Basis of Legal 
Sovereignty, pp. 186 - 187. 
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Minister of the Interior02, Attorney General for New South Wales v. 
Trethowan*3 or Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe*4. 
In the Harris case for example, the court held that a parliament, 
although sovereign, could be subject to requirements of form and 
manner to effectively express its legislative wi l l . 
However, there are peculiarities in this case as well as in the 
other cases, which do not allow the ratio decidendi to be uncr i t ica l -
ly applied to the United Kingdom Parliament. Unlike the United 
Kingdom Parliament 5 3, the South African Parliament owed its existence 
to a constituent act, namely the South Africa Act 1909 (an Act of the 
UK Parliament!). I t can therefore be said that only when acting in 
accordance with the procedural requirements of the constituent act 
the South African Parliament is enacting valid laws. 
The same is true for the other cases mentioned. The limiting 
provisions derive their authority from the fact that they are part of 
the constituent instrument that bestowed legislative power on the 
respective parliament in the f i r s t place. 
Since there is no comparable constitutent act for the United Kingdom 
Parliament, i t is hard to see why a provision in an 'ordinary' Act of 
Parliament should be considered to have the same special authority as 
in the Commonwealth cases.06 This is, unless i t is argued that with 
every such provision Parliament is effectively redefining i tself as 
law-making body for certain purposes. 
The second objection against the manner-and-form theory is that i t is 
almost impossible to uphold a clear conceptual distinction between 
9 2 [19521 1 TLR 1245 (Appelate Division of the Supreme Court of South 
Africa). 
8 3 [19321 A.C. 526. For a detailed discussion of this case and 
thoughts on the Harris case see Wade, The Basis of Legal 
Sovereignty. 
8 4 [19651 A.C. 172. 
3 8 With the possible exception of the Act of Union with Scotland; see 
above. 
3 6 This sqares with Dicey's distinction between sovereign and non-
sovereign legislatures, Introduction, chapter I I . 
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procedural limitations and limitations on subject-matter. 9 7 
I f the procedural hurdles are set high enough (e.g. a requirement of 
total unanimity in both Houses of Parliament plus 95% of the votes in 
a national referendum) i t is v i r tual ly unthinkable that the substance 
of law thus protected can be lawful ly altered by a future legislator. 
In practice, the manner-and-form provision would then have the same 
effect as an entrenchment of a certain subject-matter. 
For the purpose of this thesis, i t wi l l be assumed that Parliament 
cannot bind i ts successors as to the manner and form of the 
legislation. 
The orthodox view receives encouragement from the statements in Ellen 
Street Estates v. Minister of Health. Maugham LJ reaffirmed that 
"[t]he legislature cannot, according to our constitution, bind i tself 
as to the form of subsequent legislation, and i t is impossible for 
Parliament to enact that in a subsequent statute dealing with the 
same subject-matter there can be no implied repeal. I f in a 
subsequent Act Parliament chooses to make i t plain that the earlier 
statute is being to some extent repealed, effect must be given to 
that Intention just because i t is the wi l l of the legislator." 3 8 
5. Transfer of Sovereignty 
Results so far seem to indicate that Parliament can under no 
circumstance divest i tself of its legislative power for the future. 
Dicey himself was anxious to make clear that this would be a 
misunderstanding and that limitation and abdication of sovereignty 
were two total ly separate issues: "[T]he impossibility of placing a 
l imit on the exercise of sovereignty does not in any way prohibit, 
either logically, or in matter of fact, the abdication of 
sovereignty." 3 9 
In Dicey's view, there are two (and only two) ways in which a 
surrender of legislative sovereignty can be brought about. 
3 7 For an analysis of this problem and for suggestions for practica-
ble delimitations cf. W. Friedmann, Trethowan's Case, Parliamenta-
ry Sovereignty and the Limits of Legal Change, p. 105; see also 
Petersmann, pp. 291 et seq. 
3 8 [1934] 1 KB 590 at 597. 
3 9 Dicey, Introduction, p. 68 (in the long footnote). 
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The f i r s t could be called the 'suicide-method': i f Parliament dissol-
ved itself without leaving a means whereby a successor could be 
legally summoned, this would be the end for Parliament and everything 
that goes with i t , including Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
There is not much point in expounding on this alternative. The self-
elimination of Parliament would leave a political and functional 
vacuum which would have to be f i l l ed and would be f i l led somehow.60 
Whether the new body entrusted with making laws would be a parliament 
or a single person, or whether i t would have supreme legislative 
power would be absolutely open. But at least for the time being legal 
sovereignty would have ceased to exist. 
The second alternative is more interesting. According to Dicey, 
Parliament may also transfer its sovereign power to another person or 
body of persons. Unfortunately, he doesn't pursue this matter much 
further and fails to explain exactly how such an transfer can be 
achieved. Can i t be done by an Act of Parliament or is there a 
special method? Does 'transfer' mean that Parliament has to give up 
everything, the entirety of its legislative power? Or is i t also 
possible to transfer parts of sovereignty? I f so, what is the 
difference between a valid partial surrender and an Invalid attempt 
of self-limitation? 
At least one thing is certain: 'transfer' by definit ion means that 
the transferred powers are irrevocably lost. Anything else would not 
be a transfer but rather a form of delegation with Parliament s t i l l 
retaining the ultimate authority to restore the status ante. 
At this point, i t is useful to recall that the essence of Parliamen-
tary Sovereignty is the polit ical relationship between two separated 
powers in the state: Parliament as law-making body on the one side 
and the judges who have to apply the law in the cases before them on 
the other. Although this is not necessarily self-evident in a 
political system of separation of powers6 1, the courts in Great 
Britain play a subordinate role to Parliament. They do enjoy a 
certain extent of discretion in the process of Interpretation, but at 
the end of the day they wi l l apply every parliamentary enactment, 
whatever its contents. 
So, i f Parliament wanted to transfer i ts sovereign power (or parts of 
6 0 See Winterton, p. 600. 
6 1 As any democracy with judicial review over parliamentary statute 
shows; e.g. in the United States or in Germany. 
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i t ) to another person or body of persons, what should prevent a 
subsequent Parliament (or, in fact, the same Parliament) from 
reversing the process by a later Act? 
The answer is obvious: a genuine transfer of sovereignty must include 
a cut of the bond of loyalty between the old sovereign and the 
courts. The transfer of the power to legislate must be accompanied by 
a shif t of the courts' allegiance towards the new sovereign; the 
judges must be expressly or impliedly released from the pledges of 
obedience they may feel bound to. 
Once this l ink is destroyed 6 2, the break is permanent; Parliament 
wi l l have burnt i ts boats, there is no way back. 
I t should be evident that the obedience of the courts concerned 
cannot simply be restored by repealing the Act that ini t iated the 
process or by 'ordering' these courts to r e - sh i f t their loyalty back 
to the United Kingdom Parliament. 
Now i t is also clear that Parliament does not have to give up its 
legal sovereignty in its entirety. I t is perfectly possible to 
confine the changes to a certain terr i tory (e.g. a former colony). 
In this case Parliament could always repeal the statute v i s - a -v i s the 
English courts (and of course any other courts which s t i l l owed 
their allegiance). As far as these courts are concerned, Parliament 
would regain supreme power. 
But, v i s - a -v i s the courts in the terr i tory concerned (for whom i t is 
to decide who is actually the sovereign legislative force 6 3) such a 
repeal would not be binding 6 4 . This position is clearly expressed by 
Stratford ACJ (South Africa) in Ndlwana v. Hofmeyei60: "Freedom once 
conferred cannot be revoked." 
On the whole, any repeal therefore could amount "to no more than a 
statutory reaffirmation of a power to legislate with extraterri torial 
effect, and thus would change nothing." 6 6 
6 2 I t may be noted here that this l ink could also be destroyed 
without the consent of Parliament, in the way of a legal revolu-
tion, overthrowing the old older. 
6 3 Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, p. 196. 
6 4 Cf. de Smith / Brazier, p. 77. 
6 9 [1937J AD 229 at 237. Cf. also Wade, The Basis of Legal Soverelgn-
ty_, pp. 190-192. 
6 6 Mitchell, Constitutional Law, p. 80. 
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In the light of these conclusions i t is now possible to examine a 
special category of parliamentary enactments: the various Acts of 
Independence. 
Until the middle of this century, a large number of countries were 
dependencies of the United Kingdom in the sense that 
a) the respective parliaments could legislate only by virtue 
of delegated authori ty 6 7 and 
b) appeal from their courts lay to the Privy Council. 
In reaction to the growing desire and pressure for independence in 
these countries, the United Kingdom Parliament f i r s t enacted the 
Statute of Westminster and later a number of single Acts of Indepen-
dence68. 
In al l these instances i t may be asked whether the Acts involve an 
irreversible transfer of sovereignty or whether they may be subject 
to future reconsideration. The question, in other words, is, whether 
Parliament as a matter of abstract law could continue to legislate 
for present or former members of the Commonwealth which have been 
granted independence. 
The general answer to this must be: i t depends on the intent of 
Parliament and on how the courts in the relevant terri tory could 
reasonably understand the provisions of the Act. 
An appropriately thorough appreciation of these crucial aspects must 
not exclusively rely on the wording of the statute. 6 9 I t has to take 
into account the whole complexity of political and historical c i r -
cumstances under which the Act was passed. 
To attempt this assessment for every single Act of Independence would 
go far beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Yet, i t is worthwhile to look briefly at two examples in order to get 
a rough idea of the problems. 
6 7 Cf. Hood Phillips/ Jackson, p. 738. 
6 8 E.g. Independence Act for Ceylon (1947), Ghana (1957), Nigeria 
(1960), Zimbabwe (1979). 
6 9 Something which Mitchell apparently does by simply comparing sec. 
4 of the Statute of Westminster with an 'equivalent provision' of 
the Independence Act for Ceylon, Constitutional Law, p. 79. 
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The Statute of Westminster 1931 altered the existing legal (and 
conventional) rules for the exercise of legislative authority in 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, New Foundland 7 0, South Af r i c a 7 1 and 
the Irish Free State 7 2. Sec. 4 of this statute provided that unless a 
subsequent Act expressly declared that a Dominion had requested, and 
consented to, its enactment, i t shall not extend or be deemed to 
extend to this Dominion. 
In 1982, the United Kingdom Parliament passed the Canada Act, which 
altered the Canadian Constitution. Robert Manuel and 127 other 
Canadian Indian Chiefs went to court and challenged the val idi ty of 
this Act on the ground that Parliament had violated Indian rights 
confirmed under a Royal Proclamation made in 1763 (and reaffirmed in 
the British North America Acts) without acting in accordance with the 
requirements of sec. 4 of the Westminster statute. 7 3 
They argued that in 1931 Parliament had given up part of its 
sovereignty by providing that any future legislation on specified 
Commonwealth subjects made without obtaining the prescribed specified 
consents should be void. The pla int i f fs were of the opinion that the 
Canada Act 1982 needed the approval of the Indian people of Canada. 
Since i t was enacted without this consent, i t had to be ultra vires. 
The Court of Appeal did not follow this kind of reasonlng."X)nly for 
the sake of argument the court assumed that Parliament can bind its 
successor by requiring consents for legislation. Then i t went on to 
say that even i f Parliament had been forced to comply with sec. 4 of 
the Statute of Westminster in the process of enacting the Canada Act 
1982, i t had in fact done so. Slade LJ explained: "Section 4 i tself 
does not provide that no Act of Parliament shall extend to a Dominion 
as part of the law of that Dominion unless the Dominion has In fact 
requested and consented to the enactment thereof. The condition that 
must be satisfied is quite a different one, namely, that i t must be 
'expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion has requested, and 
consented to, the enactment thereof.' [...] I f an Act of Parliament 
7 0 Now a province of Canada. 
7 1 South Africa became a republic and seceded from the Commonwealth 
in 1961. 
7 2 Now Republic of Ireland or Eire (1937). Eire seceded from the 
Commonwealth In 1949. 
7 3 Manuel v. Attorney General, (19831 Ch. 77. 
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contains an express declaration in the precise form required by 
section 4, such a declaration is in our opinion conclusive as far as 
section 4 is concerned."7 4 
In an earlier judgment, Lord Sankey in an obiter dictum with 
reference to section 4 of the Statute of Westminster had expressed 
the view that " i t is doubtless true that the power of the Imperial 
Parliament to pass on its own ini t ia t ive any legislation that i t 
thought f i t extending to Canada remains in theory unimpaired; indeed, 
the Imperial Parliament could, as a matter of abstract law, repeal or 
disregard s.4 of the Statute." 7 8 
So what had gone wrong for the Indian chiefs? 
First of a l l , they in fact did not argue that the UK Parliament had 
transferred sovereignty to Canada but they claimed (although the 
difference was probably not realised) that Parliament had set manner-
and-form conditions for its own legislative actions. But, as shown 
above 7 6, i t is generally believed that procedural se l f - l imi ta t ion is 
impossible. 
Second, the Chiefs should not have ended with-their complaint before 
an English court instead of an Canadian court. 
Had Parliamentary Sovereignty actually been transferred to Canada as 
a result of the Statute of Westminster 1931, this would also have had 
included disentanglement of the judicial structures of the two 
countries. Not much is won i f lower courts are released from their 
duty to carry out Parliament's wi l l but an appeal w i l l lead to a 
court that is bound to apply English laws (including any law 
reversing a previous 'transfer' of sovereignty 7 7). 
Thus an attempt to challenge the legislative authority of Parliament 
before an English court was unlikely to succeed from the start. 
Considering this, the statement of Vice-chancellor Sir Robert Megarry 
was hardly surprising: "On the authority of Parliament the courts of 
a terri tory may be released from their legal duty to obey Parliament, 
but that does not trench on the acceptance of the English courts of 
all that Parliament does."78 And later he went on to say: "The Canada 
Act 1982 is an Act of Parliament, and si t t ing as a judge in an 
7 4 ibid., at 106. 
7 9 British Coal Corporation v. The King, [1935] AC 500, 520. 
7 6 See supra, pp. 17 et seq. 
7 7 See supra, pp. 20/21. 
7 8 [19831 Ch. 77 at 89. 
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English court I owe f u l l and dutiful-obedience to that Act ." 7 9 
But even apart from the 'bad luck'_)with the court, i t is submitted 
that although the Statute of Westminster 1931 in sections 1-3 
considerably enhanced the legislative rights of the Dominions (thus 
giving the force of law to constitutional conventions which had 
governed the relations to the Dominions before 1931 8 0), i t was at the 
time not intended to confer complete sovereignty 8 1 and could not have 
been interpreted in that way by Canadian courts. 
So, at least 'as a matter of abstract law' i t would have been 
possible for the UK Parliament to restore a status of unfettered 
legal authority over the countries concerned v i s - a -v i s the courts in 
those countries! 
The second example is the Zimbabwe Act 1979. Section I (2) provides: 
"on and after Independence Day Her Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom shall have no responsibility for the government of Zimbabwe; 
and no Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall extend or be 
deemed to extend, to Zimbabwe as part of i ts law." 
In this case, there was an unqualified surrender of legislative 
competence. There was no 'on request and with consent' clause as in 
the Statute of Westminster. The legislative shi f t was accompanied by 
a f u l l transfer also of governmental powers.8 2 To emphasize that 
there was a total ly fresh start ing-point for Zimbabwe these changes 
took effect on a special 'Independence Day'. Immediately after 
gaining independence, Zimbabwe became a member of the United Nations. 
A l l these signs indicate that in 1979 Parliament irrevocably 
transferred sovereignty to Zimbabwe. 
Whatever bonds of loyalty existed between the courts in Zimbabwe and 
the United Kingdom Parliament were untied and even as a matter of 
abstract law there is no means l e f t by which this process could be 
reversed. 
7 9 Ibid., at 87. 
8 0 De Smith / Brazier argue that this view is not entirely correct. 
I t would be more precise to speak of 'supercession' of the 
conventions, p. 47. 
8 1 Cf. Hood Phillips/ Jackson, p. 758. 
8 2 Hood Phillips/ Jackson, p. 70, comment on the significance of this 
circumstance. 
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A political scientist wi l l object that the mechanisms outlined above 
in some cases do not adequately explain what is actually happening. A 
close look might in fact reveal that often the allegiance of the 
judiciary in a dependent country had been withdrawn without the prior 
consent by Parliament as a result of developments on the political 
level. So, any attempt by Parliament to 'transfer' sovereignty can 
only serve to reconcile the law with rea l i ty . 8 3 
But history shows that even i f Parliament did not legalise such a 
'technical revolution', legal theory could not indefinitely ignore 
the changes in rea l i ty . 8 4 Revolutions by definit ion are unlawful 
under the legal order which they seek to remove. But with time 
progressing, they can become a source of legal change.8 3 
6. Parliamentary Sovereignty as Legal Fiction 
a) The Importance of Relating the Facts to Legal Fiction 
The Swiss author J.L. De Lolme once remarked that the British 
Parliament could do anything except make a man into a woman and vice-
versa. For this he was scolded by Jennings: "(...J like many of the 
remarks which De Lolme makes, i t is wrong. For i f Parliament enacted 
that all men should be women, they would be women so far as the law 
is concerned. In speaking of the power of Parliament, we are dealing 
with legal principles, not with facts. Though i t is true that 
Parliament cannot change the law of nature, i t is equally true that 
i t cannot in fact do al l sorts of things. The supremacy of 
Parliament is a legal f ic t ion, and legal f ic t ion can assume any-
8 3 Cf. Hood Phillips/ Jackson, p. 69. 
8 4 As De Smith / Brazier put i t : "Legal theorists have no option but 
to accomodate their concepts to the facts of political l i fe ." , p. 
68; see also Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, p. 196 bottom. 
8 8 See Petersmann, pp. 47 - 51, and de Smith / Brazier, pp. 67-69; 
The German lawyer Georg Jellinek once called this "die normative 
Kraf t des Faktischen". 
The most str iking examples for British history are probably the 
processes in which the United States and Southern Rhodesia gained 
independence. 
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thing." 8 6 Although he acknowledges the existence of actual l imi t a -
tions, Jennings does not bother to investigate them further. 
In the same fashion, Petersmann mentions casually that Parliament's 
natural restraints are so obvious that they do not deserve any 
attention. 8 7 But this sort of attitude which completely disregards 
the actual problems of exercising legislative authority carries with 
i t a potential danger. 
The concept of absolute legal sovereignty is indeed legal f i c t i on . 8 8 
But what purposes does legal f ict ion serve? 
One of the most basic motivations conceivable for employing legal 
f ic t ions 8 9 is a desire for (scientific) simplification. The reality 
of l i fe and human affairs is much too complex to be squeezed into any 
legal doctrine. So sometimes lawyers have to single out part of the 
t ru th for the sake of clarity. 
Fiction is an instrument of science that is not only used in 
jurisprudence. 9 0 I t Is an expedient and powerful tool, but i t carries 
some risks when not used responiivel^. Responsible use should "force 
upon our attention the relation between theory and fact, between 
concept and reality, and remind us of the complexity of that 
relation." 9 1 
So when a Lawyer employs a f ic t ion that serves as a manageable 
fi l tered picture of a certain part of reality, i t is Important to 
keep the facts from which the f ic t ion emanated in the back of his 
mind. By this he makes sure that the f ic t ion (as a pure creation of 
the mind) does not become total ly detached from what Is actually 
going on and starts leading an ar t i f ic ia l l i f e of i ts own. 
Only a constant examination of these interrelations ensures that the 
8 6 Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, p. 170. 
8 7 Petersmann, p. 166. 
8 8 L. Fuller describes legal fictions as statements by lawyers who 
know that they are false, Legal Fictions, p. 1; Similiarly, H. 
Vaihinger calls f ic t ion an "expedient, but consciously false, 
assumption, Die Phllosophie des Als Ob, 4th ed. 1920, p. 130, as 
cited by Fuller, p. 7. 
8 9 For a thorough analysis see Fuller, pp. 49 - 92. 
9 0 In physics, for example, light is sometimes regarded as corpuscu-
lar and sometimes as wavelike, according to the respective 
purpose. 
9 1 Fuller, p. IX. 
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time is not missed when the theory should be (re-)adjusted to the 
changed facts . 9 2 
b) Actual Restraints on Legal Sovereignty 
Dicey recognized and acknowledged a discrepancy between legal theory 
and reali ty and spoke of the "coexistence of Parliamentary Sove-
reignty with the fact of actual l imitations." 9 3 
I t would have seemed consistent with his whole constitutional theory 
to put the 'actual limitations' down to his earlier distinction 
between legal and political sovereignty (the political sovereign 
being the people). However, he did not take this logical step, but 
divided the actual limitations into 'external' and 'internal' limits. 
This distinction between ' i n - ' and 'external' is obviously to be 
understood from the point of view of Parliament. The internal 
limits he saw in the character, education and political experience of 
the individuals of which Parliament was composed. The external limits 
he described as (with reference to David Hume94) the likelihood or 
even certainty that the people wi l l refuse to obey a law whose 
contents violates general and fundamental moral convictions. 9 3 
Although there is nothing logically wrong with this distinction, i t 
is not quite clear what ends i t serves. 
I f one really wanted to classify actual limitations today, i t would 
seem more appropriate to distinguish a domestic and an international 
level. 
The most obvious and embracing l imitation, as Jennings r ight ly 
remarked, is the fact that Parliament cannot change the course of 
9 2 See C. Rix-Mackenthun, Die Funktion des Britischen Parlaments und 
die Mitgliedschaft in den Europalschen Gemelnschaften , p. 7. 
9 3 Dicey, p. 76. 
9 4 Ibid., referring to D. Hume, Essays. Moral Politic and Literary, 
ed. 1875 vol. I , pp. 109 - 110. 
9 3 The resistance to the Community Charge (or pol l - tax) shows that 
even lesser causes can trigger this mechanism. 
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nature. 9 6 
But there are more practical limitations to Parliament's theoretical 
omnipotence. 
On the international level, Parliament does not want to disturb the 
comity of nations and wi l l therefore not make use of i ts power to 
legislate with extraterri torial effect unless i t has good reasons to 
do so. At the moment (1991), the United Kingdom is signatory to 
hundreds of multilateral and bilateral treaties. Parliament wi l l 
avoid legislating contrary to the obligations under these treaties in 
order to preserve respect and credibility in the international 
community. 9 7 For the same reason, i t wi l l also be anxious to comply 
with general principles of international law. 
Being a trading nation, Great Britain must also pay tribute to 
economic pressures. I t could for example not afford to introduce 
protectionist measures98 as the countries concerned wi l l take re ta-
liatory steps. 
On the domestic level, the scope of feasible policies is limited by 
the available recources, financial or otherwise. 
Parliament wi l l take into account 'public (or rather publicised?) 
opinion'. The members of (any) parliament, even i f they lack a 
character determined by high moral standards, at least have a f i n e -
tuned antenna for actions that could spoil their chances for r e -
election. 9 9 
Decision-making is also influenced by well-organized private groups 
of people pursuing narrowly defined interests ('pressure groups'). 
The government, which is formed by the majority party in Parliament, 
is expected to carry out the policies they presented to the 
9 6 Parliament could for example decree that i t wi l l never rain 
again!? I f Parliament enacted that a l l men should be women, this 
would mean a lot of complicated surgery, i f taken l i teral ly. To 
treat men exactly like women, as Jennings suggests in his riposte 
to De Lolme, is something quite different. 
9 7 On the other hand, compliance is less certain where positive 
action is required: see e.g. the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
9 8 As far as they are not already prohibited by GATT or EC-Law. 
9 9 Cf. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, p. 148. 
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electorate during their election campaigns.1 0 0 
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Many of the actual limitations (especially the vast number of 
treaties) that bridle Parliament's power today did either not exist 
or were less noticeable a century ago. Concerning foreign policy, the 
United Kingdom In the time between between the end of the Napoleonic 
wars and the beginning of the First World War was on the peak of Its 
power. The Parliament of Westminster was hardly vulnerable from the 
Inside or from the outside. 
So, without drawing any further conclusions at this stage, one could 
say that Dicey's constitutional doctrine was more in accord with the 
political and historical realities of the 19th century than i t is 
with the post-industrial , interdependent and international society of 
the late 20th century. 
I I . A Brief Outline of the History of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
Although the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty is deeply rooted 
in English history, neither Parliament as an inst i tut ion nor the 
political concept of sovereignty has existed from the beginning of 
time. 
To trace back the origins of the inst i tut ion is comparatively easy. 
Any endeavour to pinpoint a specific moment in history from which on 
Parliament was sovereign in the sense outlined above is much harder. 
Though there are a number of single Instances of particular 
importance (from which the Glorious Revolution of 1688 stands out), 
legal sovereignty was no ad-hoc creation. 1 0 1 There was never a 
constitutional assembly that conferred ultimate power to the English 
Parliament. Instead, sovereignty had steadily grown over a long time, 
and for considerable periods of Its growth i t rested with the monarch 
or was divided between the monarch, Parliament and even the common 
law courts. 
1 0 0 In the opinion of some writers this expectation even has the 
status of a constitutional doctrine ('doctrine of the mandate') 
which is, according to Hood Phillips/ Jackson, p. 56, "rather 
vague"; also cri t ical : De Smith/ Brazier, p. 83. 
Also cf. Mitchell, p. 68; Petersmann, pp. 244 - 245. 
1 0 1 Cf. A.F. Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament, p. 216 et seq. 
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This development was also closely linked to events which were not 
confined to England. The Reformation in the 16th century challenged 
the un t i l then recognized claim of papacy to hold kings or 
terr i tor ial princes responsible for the violation of certain rules of 
conduct. Thus the Reformation was a pre-condition for the evolving of 
the Modern State. 
1. The Origin of Parliament 
'Parliament' comes from the french word for ' talk' (parler) and this 
was the original function of the 11th century curia regis102 (from 
which Parliament evolved): to talk and give counsel to the King. 
In the 12th century, the boroughs and cities began to sent represen-
tatives with petitions, mainly in judicial and financial matters. 1 0 3 
These men also became involved in the judicial process. Although they 
did not act as judges, they sat in jo int sessions with the courts 
(High Court of Parliament 1 0 4) where they could give their opinion on 
d i f f i cu l t cases.1 0 5 
The legislative function of Parliament emerged from the practice of 
simple petitions which was extended to the presentation of f u l l y 
formulated drafts (bills). 
Under the Lancastrian and Yorkist Kings, Parliament consolidated the 
rights i t had won in earlier contests with the Crown, namely 
examining public accounts, controlling the internal administration, 
voting taxes ('no taxation without representation') and participating 
in legislation. 1 0 6 
The latter two were of particular importance. During the reign of 
Henry VI Sir John Fortescue wrote: "...nor does the King himself, or 
by his ministers, impose tallages, subsidies, or any other burdens 
102 The curia regis consisted of the King's feudal vassals who were 
under a duty to appear in the Great Councils (magna consllla) when 
summoned by the monarch. 
103 T . F . T . Plucknett, Taswell-Langmead's English Constitutional Hlsto-
ry., pp. 134-136. 
1 0 4 The word 'parliament' comes from the french parlement {parler = to 
talk) . 
1 0 8 Pollard, p. 112. 
1 0 6 Plucknett, p. 184. 
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whatever on his subjects, nor change their laws, nor make new ones, 
without the concession or assent of his whole realm expressed by 
Parliament."107 
2. Parliament Under the Tudors (1485 - 1603): A Time of Co-operation 
The period of 1485 - 1603 stands for a remarkable juxtaposition of a 
formal assertion of Parliament's constitutional rights and the exer-
cise of de-facto absolute monarchical despotism which culminated in 
the long reign of Henry VIII (1509-1547).108 
Under Henry's rule Parliament's "privileges were consolidated, its 
personnel was improved, its constituency enlarged, its political 
weight enhanced in foreign eyes, its authority increased, its 
sessions made more frequent and prolonged."109 In the words of 
Theodore Plucknett, "Henry VIII liked to regard Parliament as adding 
lustre to his already glittering majesty, and thus employed i t for 
the purpose of impressing his brother monarchs. [..J Parliament was 
no cypher, but an active part in the Tudor adventure - unwilling, 
perhaps, critical and sometimes recalcitrant, but st i l l an essential 
partner which had to be hectored or humoured into collaboration."110 
The skill with which Henry did just that is illustrated by an address 
which he delivered to the Commons in connection with the well-known 
Ferrers' Case (1543).1 1 1 Reportedly he said: "And further we be 
informed by our judges that we at no time stand so highly in our 
estate royal, as in the time of Parliament; wherein we as head, and 
you as members, are conjoined and knit together in one body politick, 
so as whatever offence or injury, during that time, is offered to the 
meanest member of the House is to be judged as done against our 
1 0 7 In: De Laudlbus Legum Angliae. as cited by K. Lowenstein, Per 
britische Parlamentarismus: Entstehung und Gestalt, p. 31. 
1 0 8 Cf. Plucknett, pp. 228 et seq.; Petersmann, p. 231; Pollard, p. 
215. 
1 0 9 Pollard, p. 215. Henry VIII's predecessor Henry VII summoned 
Parliament only seven times during his twentyfour years of reign. 
1 1 0 Plucknett, p. 242. 
1 1 1 George Ferrers was a member of the House of Commons who had been 
arrested as surety for the debt of another, by process out of the 
King's Bench. 
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person and the whole Court of Parliament."112 
Henry was even able to talk a reluctant Parliament into passing the 
Statute of Proclamations 1537113 which gave the King the power to 
make proclamations with the force of statutes. Although the Act was 
repealed in the first year of the reign of Edward V I 1 1 4 , Queens Mary 
and Elizabeth I continued the practice of making and enforcing 
proclamations on matters of lesser importance.119 
The balance of powers was also greatly changed by the effects of the 
Reformation in England. On the 31st of October 1517 Martin Luther 
nailed his 95 theses to the door of the SchloBkirche in Wittenberg in 
Germany. Henry VIII was initially opposed to the Lutherian ideas and 
even received the title Defender of the Faith from Pope Leo X for his 
polemic treatise Assertlo Septem Saeramen tor urn adversus Martinum 
Lutherum. On the other hand, Henry was annoyed by the excess of 
clerical power116 and its abuse by the church. 
The relations to Rome were irreparably damaged when on March 23, 1534 
the Pope required the King under the threat of excommunication to 
take back Catherine of Aragon as his wife (by then, Henry had already 
celebrated his marriage to Anne Boleyn). But even before this 
incident, the King had begun to cut the ties with papacy in Rome with 
the help of the 'Reformation Parliament', which met in London on Nov. 
4, 1529 and was (unusual in that time) not dissolved before April 14, 
1536. 
Within those seven years, Parliament abolished papal supremacy in 
England (thus establishing royal supremacy) and totally reformed the 
Anglican Church. The Act of Appeals to Rome117 forbade all appeals 
from the spiritual judges in England to the court of the pontiff. 
After the news of Pope Clement VH's annulment of the divorce to 
Catherine arrived, Henry issued a Royal Proclamation ordering "all 
manner of prayers, orations, rubrics, canons, or massbooks, and all 
other books in churches, wherein the Bishop of Rome is named, or his 
presumptions and proud pomp and authority referred, utterly to be 
1 1 2 As quoted by Plucknett, p. 250. 
1 1 3 31 Hen. VIII, c.8. 
1 1 4 (1547), 1 Edw. VI, c. 12. 
1 1 8 Hood Phillips/ Jackson, p. 42. 
1 1 6 For a description see Pollard, pp. 221 et seq. 
1 1 7 24 Hen. VIII, c. 12. 
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abolished, eradicated and rased out." 1 1 8 And Parliament decreed in 
the Supremacy Act 1534119 that the King was "the only supreme head in 
earth of the Church of England called Anglicana Ecclesia, and shall 
have and enjoy, annexed, and united to the imperial crown of his 
realm, as well as the title and style thereof, as all honours, 
dignities, pre-eminences, jurisdictions, privileges, authorities, im-
munities, profits, and commodities, to the said dignity of supreme 
head of the same church belonging and appertaining." 
Summing up, the time between 1486 and 1603 saw two important 
developments that in the long run contributed to Parliament's supreme 
power. 
First, the Tudors had freed themselves from the papal claim to 
supremacy. 
Second, there was a 'fusion of powers'120 of the monarch and of 
Parliament. The growth of interdepence began to promote the idea that 
omnipotence rested in the 'King-in-Parliament' rather than in the 
King acting alone. 
It must be noted, however, that the break-up with Rome only ended the 
accountability of the King to the Pope, but not necessarily to divine 
law. Opinion on this question is quite controversial. Some authors 
thinks that Parliament had already established supremacy over the 
Common Law1 2 1. But the more convincing arguments support the view 
that the King-in-Parliament as legislator was not (yet) considered to 
be above the law and thus sti l l had a rival for power in the common 
law courts.1 2 2 
3. Parliament under the Stuarts (1603-1688): A Time of Confrontation 
Whereas the Tudors had sought to use and manipulate Parliament for 
their own purposes, James I (James VI of Scotland) soon after the 
1 1 8 As quoted by Plucknett, p. 280. 
1 1 9 26 Hen. VIII, c. 1. 
1 2 0 C.H. Mcllwain, The High Court of Parliament and its Supremacy, p. 
385. 
121 see e.g. F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England, p. 
251 et seq. 
1 2 2 See Mcllwain, pp. 126 et seq. 
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beginning of his reign in 1603 encountered severe collisions with the 
House of Commons. Not being familiar with the English system, he 
lacked the expertise of pragmatically exercising his power through 
Parliament. Instead, he and his successors openly claimed supremacy 
of the King-out-of-Parliament over the King-in-Parllament. He con-
stantly asserted a theory of his divine right to the throne and 
enunciated a doctrine according to which the Commons derived all 
matters of privilege from him and also attempted to manipulate 
parliamentary elections.123 
Naturally, this provoked resistance by the Commons. They presented 
James with a protestation of their rights and liberties. In i t they 
expressed their desire "to remove from the King's mind certain 
misinformations under which he appeared to be labouring, namely: 
First, that the privileges of the Commons were not held 'of right, 
but of grace only, renewed every Parliament by way of donature, upon 
petition' [..] - assertions against which, as 'tending directly and 
apparently to the utter overthrow of the very fundamental privileges 
of our House, and therein of the rights and liberties of the whole 
Commons of the realm of England which they and their ancestors from 
time immemorial have enjoyed1, they protest, 'in the name of the 
whole Commons of the realm of England, with uniform consent.'"124 
The King also annoyed the Commons by his extensive employment of 
Royal Proclamations. But in this matter the Commons found an ally in 
the courts. James I had prohibited by proclamation the building of 
new houses in London in order to control the rampant growth of the 
capital. Against this, the Commons appealed to Chief Justice Coke and 
three of his colleagues. In their judgment in the famous Case of 
Proclamations120 the judges denied James the power to create new 
offences by proclamation.126 
This was all the more a serious blow against the royal prerogatives 
as the courts had previously supported the King with great vigour, 
123 Ibid., p. 332. 
124 Ibid., pp. 334 - 335. 
1 2 8 (1610) 12 Co.Rep. 74. 
1 2 6 30 years later, in 1641, the so-called 'Long Parliament' also 
abolished the Court of the Star Chamber ( created 1487, Star 
Chamber Act, 3 Hen. VII, c. 1) which was a special court for the 
enforcement of proclamations (Star Chamber Abolition Act, 16 Car. 
I , c. 10); cf. Plucknett, p. 397. 
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e.g. in the important Case of Impositions (or Bates Case, 1606). 
John Bates was a Levant merchant who refused to pay an import duty on 
currants that James I had imposed without the consent of Parliament. 
The court of the Exchequer unanimously held in favour of the King 
that foreign affairs, and therefore all measures relating to foreign 
trade, were part of the absolute (!) power of the King. 1 2 7 
After his defeat in the Case of Proclamations, James I tried to 
govern as long as possible without summoning a new Parliament. Only 
in 1614 his financial difficulties forced him to call in Parliament, 
but he soon found himself in conflict with the Commons again, 
dissolved Parliament and even sent some of the members to the tower. 
The King was now at open war with the Commons. 
But, s t i l l worse, also his relations to the judiciary deteriorated. 
The key-figure in this process was the Chief Justice of the King's 
Bench, Sir Edward Coke, who was not easily intimidated by the 
Crown128 and on all occasions sturdily asserted the supremacy of the 
common law. But he held this principle also high against the 
legislative power of Parliament.129 
The most frequently cited example is Dr. Bonhams Case130 where Coke 
said obiter that "when an Act of Parliament is against common right 
and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common 
law will control i t and adjudge such an Act void." 
The constitutional struggle between the Crown and the House of 
Commons followed the same pattern for the rest of James1 reign: the 
King boasting of absolute power and the Commons vigilantly rebuffing 
1 2 7 Cf. Plucknett, p. 338. 
1 2 8 Highly illustrative for this fact is an account of the ecents in 
connection with the Case of Commendams (1616, reported as Colt and 
Glover v. Bishop of Coventry, Hobart 140) In Plucknett p. 360 -
352. 
1 2 9 Hood Phillips/ Jackson maintain that Coke was inconsistent in his 
statements on sovereignty. As a Law Officer he supported the 
prerogative, as a judge the supremacy of the common law and as a 
parlamentarian the sovereignty of Parliament; p. 48 note 41. 
Petersmann thinks that In spite of Coke's ambiguous writings i t 
can be shown that his real conviction was the supremacy of the 
common law, pp. 252 et seq. 
1 3 0 [1610] 8 Co.Rep. 114; cf. S.E. Thome, Dr. Bonham's Case. 
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every attempt to curtail their privileges, and in between the courts, 
exposed to pressures from both sides.131 
James was succeeded in 1625 by his son Charles I . If anything, 
matters got worse with the new King who had been brought up to 
believe in his divine right to absolute despotic power. Charles was 
not particular in the choice of his methods; scheming and intriguing 
on his side embittered the conflict. He even provoked a quarrel with 
the House of Lords.1 3 2 
Desperate to raise the money he needed to carry on the war with 
Spain, Charles invented all sorts of illegal ways of extracting money 
from his citizens, including a general loan from every subject. 
People who refused were impressed into the army or the navy. 
Financial necessities forced him to summon his third Parliament in 
1628. Although the King tried to threaten the Commons into co-
operation with menacing language133, the Commons formed a committee 
to discuss "the liberty of the subject in his person and in his 
goods". 
They drew up a Petition of Right which also passed the Lords and to 
which the King finally (and grudgingly) gave the Royal Assent.134 In 
return Parliament granted a number of subsidies. In the years that 
followed, the King dishonoured the provisions of the Act. 
He was all the more determined to govern without the interference of 
the national council and between 1629 and 1640 did not summon 
Parliament again. 
But in 1640 Charles had brought the country to the brink of ruin and 
met a humiliating military defeat against the Scots. The f i f t h 
('Long') Parliament he summoned in his despair swiftly took the 
oppurtunity to pass the Triennial Act 1641 1 3 8 ("Act for the preven-
ting of inconveniences happening by the long intermission of Parlia-
ments") providing that Parliament should assemble even without the 
summons of the King after three years had passed since the last 
1 3 1 Especially the King exerted severe pressure by his habit of 
consulting the judges extra-judicially. 
1 3 2 Plucknett, p. 364. 
133 Ibid., p. 367. 
1 3 4 (1628), 3 Car. 1, c . l . The fu l l text is printed in Plucknett, pp. 
370 et seq. 
1 3 8 16 Car. 1, c. 1. 
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Parliament. It also abolished the controversial Ship-money136 and a 
number of other long-contested royal prerogatives.137 
In November 1641, Parliament took (with a majority of only 11 
votes) the most daring step in drafting The Great Remonstrance, in 
which they challenged the idea of the King's absolute powers. 
The King's attempt to arrest five members138 who had signed was the 
cause for the Civil War that started in 1642 and ended three years 
later with the defeat of the King who was executed in 1649. 
The revolutionary period between 1642 and 1660 broke with every 
constitutional tradition, but most of the ordinances carried out 
under Cromwell were reversed in the Restoration. 
What remained was a conviction among revolutionists and royalists 
alike that the days of absolute royal power were over and that the 
country was best served by a mutual interdependence of kings and 
parliaments. Apart from that, the House of Commons had now firmly 
established its predominance over the House of Lords. 
In 1660 Charles II ascended the throne. Parliament industriously 
exercised its legislative authority during the next years. 
The first record of the Whig and Tory parties is shown for the year 
1679.139 The tories were loyal supporters of the Crown and of the 
royal prerogative, the Whigs were more concerned with the welfare of 
the people. Charles II exploited the differences between the two 
parties and in spite of the Triennial Act did not summon a Parliament 
in the last four years of his reign. 
In 1685 Charles was succeeded by James II who had "a fixed design to 
make himself an absolute monarch, and to subvert the established 
church."140 
Soon after the dissolution of his first (and only) Parliament, James 
began to carry out his plans to re-Instate Roman Catholic faith in 
England. In direct defiance of the Act abolishing the High Commision 
1 3 8 16 Car. 1 c. 8. The King had in 1637 won the famous Case of Ship-
Money at the Court of the Exchequer, R. v. Hampden, 3 St.Tr. 825 
VI, 48-50. 
1 3 7 For details see Plucknett, pp. 396 et seq. 
1 3 8 For an account see Plucknett, pp. 402 - 412. 
139 Ibid., p. 436. 
140 Ibid., p. 438. 
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Court1 4 1 he created a Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical 
Causes. 
He eliminated from other courts the judges who he thought would not 
act according to his wishes and appointed others in their place. Then 
he thought the time f i t to procure judgments to establish the 
disputed royal prerogatives of dispensing and suspending laws1 4 2. In 
Godden v. Hales143 the courts of law recognised the dispensing power 
which James II thenceforth systematically exercised. 
But the turning-point was to come when the King tested the even more 
embracing power to suspend laws. 
In the Seven Bishops Case144 the jury decided against him "amidst the 
enthusiastic rejoicings of the whole nation" 1 4 8. 
James, having aroused the anger of his people and finding himself 
cornered with hardly an ally left eventually fled from England. 
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 marks the final victory of Parliament 
in its constitutional battle with the Crown. 
4. The Revolution Settlement (1688) 
The rapid developments in the revolution year 1688 left England in a 
sort of legal vacuum. For three years there had been no Parliament 
and now there was no monarch either who could summon a new parlia-
ment. Even the Great Seal had been lost. 
The constitution had not forseen an emergency like this. In this 
situation an assembly of the Lords spiritual and temporal met with 
those who had been members of the House of Commons under Charles II 
and asked Prince William of Orange to assume provisional government 
of the country. Furthermore, all the constituent bodies of the realm 
were summoned to send representatives to a Convention Parliament 
1 4 1 16 Car. l , c. 11. 
1 4 2 The dispensing power enabled the monarch to exempt certain persons 
from the operation of penal laws. 
By employing the suspending power i t was even possible to tempora-
rily suspend the entire operation of any statute (or number of 
statutes); cf. Petersmann, p. 236. 
1 4 3 (1686), 11 St.Tr. 1165. 
1 4 4 (1688), 12 St.Tr. 183. 
1 4 3 Plucknett, p. 443. 
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which met in January 1689. This Convention passed a resolution 
condemning the unlawful conduct of James and offered William and his 
wife Mary the vacant throne. Unlike in 1660, when the beginning of 
the reign of Charles II was backdated to the death of Charles I , the 
new joint reign was officially dated from February 13, 1689. The 
constructed 'abdication' of James II took place December 12, 1688. 
So i t was clear that the kingship was solely given by the will of the 
people represented in the Convention Parliament and not by any divine 
hereditary right. 1 4 6 
It is important to note that this assembly, too, could not derive any 
legitimacy from the existing legal order. Whether Itself could 
subsequently become a new source of legitimate power also depended on 
the attitude of the judges. It soon emerged that the courts had 
completely and unconditionally transferred their loyalty to the new 
Parliament. The revolutionary character of the overthrow of the old 
legal order was probably psychologically mitigated by the facts that 
i t was not very violent and that the original assembly consisted 
largely of the same persons as the last regular Parliament. 
The Glorious Revolution permanently established a number of princi-
ples which had been the subject of clashes with the Stuart Kings. The 
predominance of the Commons over the Lords was sti l l more a political 
fact than a legal one, but i t has never been challenged since. 
In the famous Bill of Rights1 4 7 the suspending and dispensing powers 
were taken away and legal sovereignty de-iure given to the King-in-
Parliament. The King's prerogative of imposing taxes was abolished 
and likewise his right to raise an army. Free parliamentary elections 
and unhindered debate in Parliament were laid down. The provisions of 
the Triennial Act were confirmed. 
Further constitutional restrictions were imposed on the Crown (or 
rather for Queen Anne's Hanoverian heirs) by the Act of Settlement 
1701. 1 4 8 
1 4 6 Plucknett, p. 449. 
1 4 7 (1689), 1 Wil. I l l and Mary, sess. 2, c. 2. Text printed in 
Plucknett, pp. 449 et seq. 
1 4 8 12 & 13 Wil. I l l , c. 2. 
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5. Parliament since 1714 
Page 41 
Since the Glorious Revolution the principle of Parliamentary Sove-
reignty has not undergone any drastic changes. However, some pol i t i -
cal developments must be mentioned which stand in close connection 
with the doctrine as i t presents itself today. 
a) The Establishment of Cabinet Government149 
One of the most pressing problems in the beginning 18th century was 
to redefine the political conventions governing the relation of the 
royal ministers to Parliament. Until then, the ministers of the 
Crown, who had taken the place of the Privy Council as consulting and 
executive body,180 were men of confidence of the monarch to whose 
free discretion their appointment and dismissal was le f t . 1 0 1 
A new parliamentary law of succession enabled George I of Hanover to 
ascend the throne in 1714. With the shifts of power from the monarch 
to the House of Commons and the succession of a new foreign 
dynasty1 3 2 the role of the ministers changed from an agent of the 
King to an instrument of government of the House of Commons. 
The appointment of the Prime Minister is s t i l l today a royal 
prerogative1'3 but there exists a constitutional convention to the 
effect that the Crown is obliged to appoint the leader of the 
149 For detailed Information cf. I . Jennings, Cabinet Government. 
1 0 0 K. L5wenstein, Staatsrecht und Staatspraxls von Grofibrltannien, p. 
15. 
1 5 1 LSwenstein, Staatsrecht und Staatspraxls von Grofibrltannien, p. 
15; Petersmann, p. 258. 
1 8 8 George I did not speak English very well and often showed a lack 
of interest in current developments. After a short while he ceased 
to attend the Cabinet-meetings (and since that time i t has been 
the practice that Cabinet discusses matters in the absence of the 
monarch). The firm establishment of the principle of Cabinet 
government was assisted by the fact that in the following years 
the monarchs lacked the personality and the prestige to exercise a 
strong influence in government business; see LSwenstein, 
Staatsrecht und Staatspraxis von Grofibritannien. pp. 16 and 17. 
1 3 3 Turpin, p. 146. 
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majority party in the Commons. Likewise, the monarch appoints the 
other state ministers according to the suggestions of the Prime 
Minister. 
As Cabinet depended on the support of a majority in the House, i t 
soon emerged that a Cabinet which consisted only of members of one 
party 1 3 4 had better chances to co-operate with the majority in 
Parliament.133 
The political influence of Cabinet was enhanced further during the 
19th century. Although i t is technically correct to say that Cabinet 
is nothing but a parliamentary committee this hardly reflects the 
importance i t has gained within the political system. H. J. Laskl has 
pointed out that today i t is more apt to think of Parliament as a 
governmental instrument of Cabinet and of the respective Prime 
Minister than vice-versa. 1 3 6 
It must be noted, though, that this change of roles is confined 
solely to the political level and does not in any way fetter the de-
lure sovereignty of Parliament.187 From the point of view of the 
courts, Parliament alone is the ultimate authority in the British 
legal system. 
b) The Reform Acts 1 8 8 
Another important development on the political level was marked by 
a number of so-called Reform Acts. Although they didn't have a direct 
Influence on the principle of legal sovereignty, they provided 
Parliament and its powers with a broader basis of democratic legit i-
macy by improving the representation of the people in Parliament. 
They broke with the obsolete idea that the electorate should consist 
1 9 4 For a long time this was the Whigs. 
1 8 3 L6wenstein, Staatsrecht und Staatspraxls von Grofibritannien. p. 16. 
1 8 6 H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics, has described Parliament as a 
'machine for registering decisions arrived at elsewhere'. 
1 8 7 From a lawyers point of view, LSwenstein is not correct in saying 
that the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty has given way to 
the sovereignty of the people as a result of the general election 
of 1868, Staatsrecht und Staatspraxls von Grofibritannien, p. 20. 
188 p o r historical details see Plucknett, pp. 560 - 580. 
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of selected persons who bore the main burden of taxation. 
The Reform Act 1832139 restructured the constituencies and redistri-
buted a large number of seats. It also extended the franchise to some 
groups of people who had until then been excluded. An even further 
extension of electoral rights was achieved by the Reform Act 1867160. 
The newly won franchise of workmen and tenants could hardly be 
genuinely exercised as long as they had to vote under the scrutiny of 
their landlords and employers. Secret ballots were therefore intro-
duced by the Ballot Act 1872161. The Representation of the People Act 
1884162 increased the electorate by some 2 million new voters, namely 
industrial workers (mainly miners) and rural labourers. Two member 
constituencies were abandoned by the Redistribution of Seats Act 
1885163. 
Suffrage for women was introduced in 1918164 but the basis of their 
qualification was different from that of men until 1928169. 
c) The Deprivation of Political Power of the House of Lords 
Whereas the curtailment of the powers of the Crown were brought about 
as a result of custom and political conventions, the legislative 
functions of the Upper House were undermined by legislative reform. 
The first Parliament Act of 1911 1 6 6 ended the equal standing of the 
two Houses. These severe constitutional changes were Initiated by the 
crisis following the election win of the Liberals in 1906 and the 
progressive policies of the Chancellor of the Exchequer Lloyd George 
which the peers sought to Impede. With the help of the monarch who 
threatened to create 400 additional peers, Prime Minister Asquith 
and a vast majority in the Commons forced the Lords to collaborate in 
1 0 9 2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 45. 
1 6 0 30 & 31 Vict., c. 102. 
1 6 1 35 & 36 Vict., c. 33. 
1 6 2 48 & 49 Vict., c. 3. 
1 6 3 48 & 49 Vict., c. 23. 
1 6 4 Representation of the People Act 1928, 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 64. 
1 6 8 The Representation of the People Act 1928, 18 & 19 Geo. 5., c. 12, 
placed women on an equal footing with men in respect of the 
franchise. 
1 6 6 1 und 2 Geo. 5, c. 13. 
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their own devaluation. Any possibility for the House of Lords to veto 
Money Bills was abolished altogether and the veto against other kinds 
of bills was reduced to a suspensive right. 1 6 7 The Upper House could 
only delay parliamentary enactments for two years at the end of which 
a bill gained the force of law even without the assent of the 
Lords.1 6 8 
The second Parliament Act of 1949169 shortened this period to one 
year. 
Considering the the predominance of the Lower House in the 
legislative process i t can be said that the legal sovereignty of 
Parliament is in fact the sovereignty of the Commons. 
1 6 7 See Lowenstein, Staatsrecht und Staatspraxls von Grofibrltannien, 
pp. 258 et seq. 
1 6 8 Some think that Parliament has redefined itself for certain 
purposes by the 1911 Act, see e.g. de Smith / Brazier, p. 88; 
others think that Parliament (consisting of both Houses plus the 
monarch) has delegated legislative authority to another body 
(House of Commons plus monarch), e.g. Wade, The Basis of Leal 
Sovereignty, p. 172. 
1 6 9 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 103. 
I I I . What are the Legal Foundations of the Doctrine of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty? 
In 1971, Stanley de Smith expressed his expectation that as a result 
of the forthcoming British membership of the European Communities, 
the legal concept of Parliamentray Sovereignty may "drift away into 
the shadowy background from which i t emerged."170 
In order to understand in which ways the EC could possibly influence 
a British constitutional doctrine, i t is Important to illuminate the 
legal side of that 'shadowy background'. Only i f one knows what the 
foundations of legal sovereignty are 1 7 1 i t becomes clear what mecha-
nisms are at work in the interrelations of the national and the 
Community's legal order. 
Having defined the (pre-Community) nature of Parliamentary Sovereign-
ty and against the outlined historical background we can try to 
assign the doctrine to one (or several) of the recognized sources of 
British constitutional law. 
1. The Recognized Sources of the British Constitution 
It has often been pointed out that the absence of a comprehensive 
written document does not help to clarify the precise contents of the 
British constitution 1 7 2 and i t can sometimes be difficult to distin-
guish principles of the constitution from 'ordinary' law 1 7 3. 
These difficulties are caused more by the necessity to determine 
whether a rule is sufficiently connected with questions of the 
creation and regulation of power within the state to be regarded as 
1 7 0 S.A. de Smith, The Constitution and the Common Market: A Tentative 
Appraisal, p. 614. 
1 7 1 Unfortunately, one must resist the temptation to follow the 
charming explanation by Charles Dickens's Mr. Podsnap to a foreign 
gentleman: 'We Englishmen are proud of our constitution...It was 
bestowed upon us by Providence'; in: Our Mutual Friend. 
1 7 2 Turpin, p. 3; Thelen, p. 7. 
1 7 3 Or indeed from mere political theories; see Mitchell, Constitutio-
nal Law, p. 5. 
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part of the constitution 1 7 4 than by an uncertainty about the sources 
of constitutional law. 
There is a far-reaching consensus that the sources of constitutional 
law are principally the same as of other branches of the law. 1 7 3 The 
two most important pillars are statute law and judicial decisions 
(common law). A further source is called 'the law and custom of 
Parliament' (lex et consuetudo parlamenti) and some writers also 
count books of authority as a source of constitutional law. 1 7 6 
Finally there is a special category of political understandings of 
obligatory nature, called constitutional conventions, which form part 
of the constitution in its broader sense. 
We will f irst briefly look into those last three sources which seem 
less likely to provide an answer. 
a) Books of Authority 
As a rule, textbooks on the law, however qualified and knowlegdeable 
their authors, are not regarded as authorative by English courts.1 7 7 
Even the works of some earlier writers which have been treated by the 
courts as conclusive evidence of the author's contemporary law 1 7 8 are 
only 'auxiliary' sources of the constitution, not a primary ones179. 
1 7 4 Mitchell. Constitutional Law, p. 3; similarly Jennings, The Law 
and the Constitution, p. 14, according to whom the British 
constitution consists of 'the rules determining the creation and 
operation of governmental institutions'. 
1 7 0 Mitchell, Constitutional Law, pp. 18 et seq.; Turpin, p. 80 et 
seq.; see also Hood Phillips/ Jackson, p. 21; Jennings, The Law 
and the Constitution, p. 66. 
1 7 6 Cf. e.g. Hood Phillips/ Jackson, p. 24; Mitchell, Constitutional 
Law, pp. 19 and 25. 
177 Cordell v. Second Clanfield Properties Ltd., 11969] 2 Ch. 9, 16 
per Megarry J. 
1 7 8 Among these works are e.g. Coke's Institutes of the Laws of 
England and Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law of England (cited 
for example in Thomas v. Sawkins, (1935) 2 K.B. 249 at 254 and 256 
or R. v. Chancellor of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich Diocese, (19481 
1 K.B. 195 at 208 et seq.). 
1 7 9 Likewise de Smith/ Brazier, pp. 27 and 28: 'persuasive authority'. 
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Hence, the sovereignty of Parliament cannot be based on books of 
authority. 
b) The Law and Custom of Parliament180 
The law and custom of Parliament have evolved as a separate source of 
rules concerning the procedures, functions, privileges and immunities 
of the Houses of Parliament181 
As they are concerned only with the internal organisation of 
Parliament and not with a definition of its external powers, these 
rules obviously cannot be the source of the doctrine of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty. 
c) Constitutional Conventions182 
"The short explanation of the constitutional conventions is that they 
provide the flesh which clothes the dry bones of the law; they make 
the legal constitution work; the keep i t in touch with the growth of 
ideas." Thus Sir Ivor Jennings183 vividly described the immense 
importance of constitutional conventions for the British 
constitution. 
In Great Britain, four major and significant sectors of political 
life are governed by conventions. 
First, there is a group of conventions controlling the relationship 
between parliament/government and the Crown and especially the 
exercise of the royal prerogatives184 (for example dissolving parlia-
ment or appointing ministers including the prime minister). 
180 p o r a detailed treatise on this subject see T.E. May, Erskine 
May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of 
Parliament. 
1 8 1 De Smith / Brazier, p. 26; for details see also Thelen, p. 18. 
1 8 2 Treated at great length by G. Marshall, Constitutional Conven-
tions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability, Oxford 
1984. 
1 8 3 The Law and the Constitution, pp. 81/82. 
184 Thelen, p. 20; Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, pp. 87 -
89; de Smith / Brazier, p. 28. 
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Second, there are conventions relating to the system of cabinet 
government188 which deal for example with such important and actual 
questions as ministerial responsibility1 8 6. 
A third group of conventions regulates the relations between the two 
Houses of Parliament as far as they are not determined by the 
Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949. An example is the rule that Money 
Bills must be introduced into the House of Commons.187 
Finally, conventions were and are still employed (though to a lesser 
extent) to govern the mutual relations of Britain with other 
Commonwealth countries.1 8 8 
It therefore seems justified to treat conventions as a part of the 
constitution since excluding them would "give a grotesquely 
misleading picture of the rules actually observed"189 
There is also a recognised link between the doctrine of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty and constitutional conventions. One function for 
conventions is to control the exercise of theoretically untrammelled 
legal power and to keep i t within the boundaries of general public 
acceptance.190 Furthermore, i t has also been suggested even before 
Britain's accession to the European Communities that constitutional 
problems in connection with the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
arising from her forthcoming membership could be circumvented by the 
development of special conventions.191 
The question remains i f the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
could itself be based on a constitutional convention. The answer must 
1 8 0 Jennings, The Law and the Constitution,pp. 85 - 86; Thelen, p. 21. 
1 8 6 Cf. de Smith / Brazier, p. 28 as well as Turpin, p. 428. In 
contrast, Thelen thinks that the principle of ministerial respon-
sibility is based on a rule of law, not on convention, p. 21. 
1 8 7 De Smith / Brazier, p. 28. There is obviously a close relation 
between this group of conventions and the 'custom of Parliament'. 
1 8 8 For a detailed account see Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 
pp. 96 et seq. 
1 8 9 De Smith / Brazier, p. 29. 
1 9 0 See Marshall, pp. 201 - 209. Also compare supra, B.I.6.b). 
1 9 1 A. Martin, The Accession of the United Kingdom to the European 
Communities: Jurisdictional Problems, pp. 23-25. 
For convincing reasons against this approach see Petersmann, pp. 
208 - 213. 
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clearly be 'no'. Strictly speaking, i t is not entirely correct to 
count conventions among the sources of constitutional law. In con-
trast to statute law or common law, conventions of the constitution 
are non-legal rules which are not enforced by the courts. In spite of 
the controversy about the distinction between law and convention192 
there is no doubt that the law-making power of Parliament is a legal 
rule 1 9 3 which is 'enforced' by the courts simply by applying every 
parliamentary enactment and by not tolerating rival law-making bo-
dies. The courts, too, see obedience to acts as a strictly legal 
duty 1 9 4 and not as one based on an informal understanding. Hence, 
Parliamentary Sovereignty is not based on constitutional conventions. 
1 9 2 Opinion as to whether 'enforcement' is an apt criterion for 
distinguishing conventions of the constitution from rules of law 
is divided. One view, on which again Dicey had a forming influen-
ce, makes a sharp distinction between strict law and conventions. 
The decisive criterion is whether or not the common law courts 
will sanction a breach of the rule. Conventions, according to 
Dicey, are not "'laws' in the true sense of that word, for i f any 
or all of them were broken, no court would take notice of their 
violation" (Introduction, p. 27). 
The validity of this plain distinction has been vehemently denied, 
notably by Jennings (The Law and the Constitution, chapter 3; see 
also Mitchell, Constitutional Law, pp. 26 - 39). In short, 
Jennings argues that i t is arbitrary and misplaced to define the 
relation between the law and conventions solely from the point of 
view of the courts (pp. 103/104). Often 'enforcement' of the law 
is entrusted to administrative authorities and sometimes, when a 
law obliges the government to act in a certain way, this can not 
even be enforced by the courts. The decisive question is not the 
sanction, but why conventions are obeyed. In this respect, Jen-
nings sees no fundamental difference between law and convention. 
For a subtle defence of Dicey's distinction see 0. Hood Phillips, 
Constitutional Conventions: A Conventional Reply, or C. Munro, 
Studies in Constitutional Law, ch. 3. 
1 9 3 J. Salmond, Salmond on Jurisprudence, pp. I l l et seq. (esp. 117). 
1 9 4 See e.g. Megarry V.C. in Manuel v. Attorney General, [1983] Ch. 
77 at 89: "...legal duty to obey'. 
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The most important single source of constitutional law is legisla-
t ion. 1 9 3 Although generally held in high esteem, even the most famous 
'constitutional' laws are technically not different from any ordinary 
statute. Some of the outstandingly significant statutes have already 
been mentioned: The Bill of Rights 1689, the Act of Settlement 1701, 
the Acts of Union with Scotland 1707 and Ireland 1800, the Reform 
Acts 1832 and 1867, the Statute of Westminster 1931, the Parliament 
Acts 1911 and 1949 and of course also the European Communities Act 
1972 have all played a major part in he development of the constitu-
t ion. 1 9 6 
Some of the above mentioned statutes are also undeniably connected 
with the initial establishment of Parliament's unlimited law-making 
power (especially the Bill of Rights 1689). But is there a case to 
say that Parliamentary Sovereignty is ultimately a creation of 
statute law? 
In my view, there is a compelling argument of logic against this 
assumption. This argument has been convincingly formulated by Sir 
John Salmond. Expounding on the question why acts of Parliament have 
the force of law Salmond set out: "No statute can confer this power 
upon parliament, for this would be to assume and act on the very 
power that is to be conferred."197 
Indeed, i f Parliament had not already had the power to legislate, the 
self-empowering act would not have been a law at all. And i f 
Parliament had acted on an existing but limited legal authority, 
whence came the extra amount of power? Such a deus-ex-machina effect 
could not be plausibly explained with legal constructions. In this 
respect legal authority is similar to energy in physics: i t can be 
used and transformed but i t can not increase itself. Likewise no 
limited legal authority can breed unlimited legal authority. 
1 9 0 De Smith / Brazier, p. 22. 
1 9 6 This list is by no means comprehensive. An enumeration of more 
than 300 constitutional statutes of the UK (date: 1982) is 
presented by A.P. Blaustein and G.H. Flanz (eds.), Constitutions 
of the ountries of the World, ranging from Magna Charta 1216 to 
the British Nationality Act 1981. 
1 9 7 Salmond on Jurisprudence, p. 111. Supported by Wade, The Basis of 
Legal Sovereignty, p. 187. 
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Statute law can therefore not be the source of the legal sovereignty 
of Parliament. 
e) Common Law 
A substantial part of constitutional law is common law. Before we 
take a look at the cases relating to Parliament's legal omnipotence, 
i t is useful to remember some of the principles of the common law. It 
is now commonly accepted that the reported cases are more than simply 
evidence of existing customs and of the law derived from those 
customs. Judicial precedence is itself authorative; i t is a source 
and not only a proof of the law. 
One may distinguish between 'authorative' and 'persuasive' prece-
dents. Only authorative precedents are binding on the courts. Persua-
sive precedents198 may be given consideration i f such a course of 
action seems reasonable to the judges. 
A further distinction can be made between 'creative' and 'declarato-
ry' precedences. The latter applies an existing rule of law, the 
former creates and applies a new rule at the same time. Their legal 
authority is equal. Both establish the applied rule as law for the 
future. 
As for the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, the courts assert 
this principle in two different ways. The first way may be called 
'negative' or 'indirect' and is possible only due to the peculiarity 
of this special rule of law 1 9 9: The courts a) simply apply every act 
of Parliament without questioning its validity and b) do not recog-
1 9 8 Persuasive precedents can flow from different sources: 
1) decisions of foreign courts (esp. American courts) 
2) decisions of higher courts in certain Commonwealth 
countries 
3) decisions of the Privy Council acting as a Court of Appeal 
for the colonies 
4) obiter dicta. 
1 9 9 Namely, that i t is the courts themselves who are required to act 
in accordance with that rule. 
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nise other law-making bodies200 unless they derive their authority 
from Parliament. But this is only supportive evidence and not case-
law. What we need to look for is solid authorative precedent. 
As we have seen201, in 1610 Sir Edward Coke remarked obiter in Dr. 
Bonham's Case202 that the common law courts reserved the right to 
examine acts of Parliament and declare them void when necessary. Four 
years later i t was said in Day v. Savadge20* that "even an Act of 
Parliament made against natural equity, as, to make a man judge in 
his own case, is void in itself; for iura naturae sunt immutabilia, 
and they are leges legum." 
Over 250 years later, this statement was referred to in Lee v. Bude 
and Torrington Junction Railway Co.204 This case had been concerned 
with the validity of a private Act (on the grounds that the promoters 
of the Act had fraudulently misled Parliament). 
Willes J set out: "It was once said, - I think in Hobart, - that, i f 
an Act of Parliament were to create a man judge in his own case, the 
court might disregard i t . That dictum, however, stands as a warning, 
rather than an authority to be followed. We sit here as servants of 
the Queen and of the legislature. Are we to act as regents over what 
is done by parliament with the consent of the Queen, Lords and 
Commons? I deny that such authority exists. If an Act of Parliament 
has been obtained improperly, i t is for the legislature to correct i t 
by repealing i t : but, so long as i t exists as law, the courts are 
bound to obey i t . " 2 0 3 
The attitude of the courts has obviously changed completely in the 
time between these two judgments, but the exact moment is hard to 
determine as the validity of Acts of Parliament has only rarely been 
challenged before the courts. 
2 0 0 See for example Bowles v. Bank of England, [1913] 1 Ch. 57: The 
House of Commons by means of a resolution had attempted to empower 
the Crown to levy income tax. The court held that only an Act of 
Parliament could authorize taxation and that resolutions of nei-
ther House of Parliament had the force of law. 
201 Supra, p. 36. 
2 0 2 8 Co. Rep. 114a. 
2 0 3 [1614] Hob. 87. 
2 0 4 [1871] L.R. 6 CP. 576 at 582. 
2 0 0 A similar reasoning was given by Lord Campbell in Edinburgh and 
Dalkeith Railway Co. v. Wauchope, [1842] 1 Bell 252 at 278. 
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One example is Ex parte Canon Selwyn206 in which the validity of the 
Irish Church Act 1869 was questioned. Cockburn C.J. observed: 
"[TJhere is no judicial body in the country by which the validity of 
an act of parliament could be questioned. An act of the legislature 
is superior in authority to any court of law." 
In spite of the unambiguous ruling in Lee's case, there was another 
attempt to bring down a private Act in British Railways Board v. 
Pickin. But the court confirmed that there is no difference in 
legal status between a public and a private act and also addressed 
the question of judicial review of parliamentary legislation: "The 
idea that a court is entitled to disregard a provision in an Act of 
Parliament on any ground must seem strange and startling to anyone 
with any knowledge of history and law of our constitution." 2 0 7 
An even stronger reaffirmation of Parliament's legal sovereignty can 
be found in Megarry V.C.'s statement in Manuel v. Attorney Gene-
raPm: "[Ojnce an Instrument is recognised as being an Act of 
Parliament, no English court can refuse to obey i t or question its 
validity." 
Other cases have looked at the principle from the angle of possible 
legal limitations: Mortensen v. Peters209, Salomon v. Commissioners 
of Customs and Excise210 and Cheney v. Conn211 all assert the 
supremacy of Acts of Parliament over international law. 
R. v. Jordan212 made clear that any individual common law right can 
be taken away by statute. 
Finally, there is also a line of authority for the view that 
Parliamentary Sovereignty is continuing rather than self-embracing; 
see British Coal Corporation v. The King13, Vauxhall Estate Ltd. v. 
Liverpool Corporation2™ and Ellen Street Estates Ltd. v. Minister of 
Health2™. 
2 0 6 [1872] 36 J.P. 54. 
2 0 7 [1974] A.C. 765 at 782 per Lord Reid. 
2 0 8 [1983] Ch. 77, 86; also see supra, p. 24. 
2 0 9 [1906] 14 SLT 227. 
2 1 0 [1967] 2 QB 116. 
2 1 1 [1968] 1 All ER 779. 
2 1 2 [1967] Crim. LR 483. 
2 1 3 [1935] AC 500; especially the dictum by Lord Sankey at p. 520. 
2 " [1932] 1 K.B. 733. 
2 1» [1934] 1 K.B. 590. 
Chapter B. page 54 
2. The Non-legal Part of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
The cases mentioned seem to support the view that the principle of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty has evolved from the common law and indeed 
this is the opinion of many writers. 2 1 6 On the other hand, the last 
three cases shed some doubt over precisely that conclusion. H.R.W. 
Wade put i t like this: "At the heart of the matter lies the question 
whether a rule of common law which says that the courts will enforce 
statutes can itself be altered by statutes."217 Under normal circum-
stances this shouldn't be a question at all since statutes as the 
higher form of law can change the rules of the common law at any 
rate. 2 1 8 But the continuing nature of Parliamentary Sovereignty means 
that the courts will disregard any attempt by Parliament to detract 
from its own legal power or from that of future parliaments. In other 
words, Parliament may not tell the courts what to regard as a valid 
Act of Parliament. 
Like Wade I am inclined to think that Sir John Salmond has given a 
clear and satisfying answer to that question. He explained219: "All 
rules of law have historical sources. As a matter of fact and history 
they have their origin somewhere, though we may not know what i t is. 
But not all of them have legal sources. Were this so, i t would be 
necessary for the law to proceed ad infinitum in tracing the descent 
of its principles. It is requisite that the law should postulate one 
or more first causes, whose operation is ultimate and whose authority 
is underived. [. . .1 Whence comes the rule that Acts of Parliament 
have the force of law? This is legally ultimate; its source is 
historical only, not legal." 
This coincides with Hans Kelsen's model of the grundnorm (basic 
norm).2 2 0 Kelsen starts by asking why a norm of a certain legal order 
is valid, i.e. determining in a binding way how an Individual ought 
to behave. According to Kelsen, the fact that a norm exists cannot be 
the reason for its validity. The reason for the validity of a norm 
2 1 6 De Smith/ Brazier, p. 83. 
2 1 7 Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, p. 186. 
2 1 8 Halsbury's Laws of England. Vol. 8, No. 811. 
2 1 9 Salmond on Jurisprudence, p. 111. 
2 2 0 See H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, pp. 193 et seq.; also, by the 
same author, General Theory of Law and State, pp. 110 - 122. See 
also Salmond, p. 112. 
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can only be another (higher) norm.2 2 1 However, the quest for the 
reason of the validity of a norm (unlike the quest for the cause of 
an effect) must be terminated at some point by a norm the validity of 
which cannot be derived from a superior norm. Such a norm "must be 
presupposed, because i t cannot be "posited", that is to say: created, 
by an authority whose competence would have to rest on a st i l l higher 
norm. This final norm's validity cannot be derived from a higher 
norm, the reason for its validity cannot be questioned. Such a 
presupposed highest norm is referred to (...) as basic norm."222 
This corresponds largely to what Hart has called the 'rule of 
recognition'223: [...] older constitutional theorists wrote as i f i t 
were a logical necessity that there should be a legislature which was 
sovereign, in the sense that i t is free, at every moment of its 
existence as a continuing body, not only from legal limitations 
imposed ab extra, but also from its prior legislation. That parlia-
ment is sovereign in this sense may now be regarded as established, 
and the principle that no earlier Parliament can preclude its 
'successors' from repealing its legislation constitutes a part of the 
ultimate rule of recognition used by the courts in identifying valid 
rules of law." 2 2 4 
Hence, notwithstanding the fact that there is ample justification to 
say that Parliamentary Sovereignty is a principle of the common law, 
there is a part of this rule so fundamental that i t has no legal 
basis and is thus out of the reach of the legislator. 
Wade put It like this: "The role of judicial obedience is in one 
sense a rule of the common law, but in another sense - which applies 
to no other rule of common law - i t is the ultimate political fact 
upon which the whole system of legislation hangs. Legislation owes 
its authority to the rule: the rule does not owe its authority to 
2 2 1 Kelsen, Pure Theory, p. 193; General Theory, p. 111. 
2 2 2 Kelsen, Pure Theory, p. 195. Kelsen maintains that the grundnorm 
of a legal order does not predetermine the contents of the norms 
based on i t (he calls this a 'static norm system'). It only 
contains a rule stipulating how and by whom valid new norms can be 
created ('dynamic principle'), ibid., at pp. 196 and 201. 
2 2 3 Also see supra, pp. 12 et seq. 
2 2 4 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 145/146. 
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legislation."2 2 3 
However, although the rule of recognition cannot be altered by 
statute, i t is by no means immutable. As this rule has evolved as a 
product of certain historic conditions, i t is well conceivable that 
i f these conditions cease to exist or change substantially the courts 
might adapt the old rule to the new functional requirements of the 
changed political contexts.2 2 6 
From the foregoing i t follows that for any indication of changes to 
the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty as a result of Britain's 
membership of the European Communities we have to look at the 
judgments of the British courts. If there is any change in the 
attitudes of the judges towards the rule of recognition, i t will 
become apparent in the case law. 2 2 7 
IV. Summary 
The doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty describes the relation 
between the judicature and the legislature in Great Britain. 
Parliament may enact whatever laws i t likes and the courts will apply 
these laws. 
Although Parliament can be expected to act in accordance with 
political conventions and practical necessities, there are no legal 
2 2 3 Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, p. 188; see also O. Dixon, 
Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation, pp. 240 -
245. 
2 2 6 De Smith / Brazier, p. 69, put i t this way : "The doctrine (of 
absolute parliamentary sovereignty] grew out of a particular state 
of affairs. A fundamental change of a political nature may bring 
about a fundamental change in legal doctrine". This is also the 
evaluation of Turpin, p. 36: "The rule of recognition, which 
affirms the sovereignty of Parliament, may change over time; 
political developments may eventually cause the courts to give 
obedience to a modified or new rule of recognition". 
See also Kelsen, Pure Theory, p. 210: "The change of the basic 
norm follows the change of facts that are interpreted as creating 
and applying valid legal norms". 
2 2 7 The political preconditions for such a change are discussed infra, 
chapter D. I . 
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restrictions on Parliament's law-making power. The following analysis 
of the influence of Community law will be based on the orthodox view 
that Parliament's omnipotence is 'continuing'. Parliament cannot 
limit its own power or that of its successors as to subject-matter or 
manner and form of legislation. 
A transfer of sovereignty can be achieved i f legislative power is 
surrendered by the UK Parliament to another body and the courts 
concerned shift their allegiance to the new 'sovereign'. 
The concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty is deeply rooted in the 
Emglish history. Historically, i t is the result of a long-lasting 
struggle between Parliament and the monarchs. The supremacy of the 
King-iJ7-Parliament was de facto established with the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688. 
The doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty is "at once historical 
reality, theory of the constitution and a fundamental principle of 
the common law." 2 2 8 Because of its unique character i t cannot be 
changed by statute, but due to changed political conditions the 
courts may decide to modify the underlying rule of recognition.2 2 9 
2 2 8 Turpin, p. 24. 
2 2 9 See also infra, chapter D., IV. 
C. The Supremacy and Direct Effect of Community Law 
In 1964, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared in the famous 
case Costa v. ENEU that "(b]y contrast with ordinary international 
treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which, on 
the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the 
legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound 
to apply." The Belgian Cour de Cassation was the first high national 
court to assert this notion. In a historic decision i t said: "... the 
treaties which have created Community law have instituted a new legal 
system in whose favour the member states have restricted the exercise 
of their sovereign powers in areas determined by those treaties."2 In 
the words of the German Federal Constitutional Court, "Community law 
is neither a component part of the national legal system nor 
international law, but forms an independent system of law flowing 
from an autonomous legal source."3 
In anticipation of a detailed examination of the relevant case-law of 
the European Court of Justice, we shall look at some of the 
characteristics which distinguish the Community's legal framework 
from 'ordinary' international treaties. 
I . The Special Nature of the Community's Legal Order - Comparison 
of the Community with other International Organisations 
The European Communities were established by three separate founding 
treaties. The Treaty concerning the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSCT) was signed on 18 April 1951 and came into force on the 23rd 
of July 1952. The European Atomic Energy Community Treaty (Euratom 
Treaty) and the European Economic Community Treaty (EEC Treaty) were 
both finalized on the 25th of March 1957 and entered into force on 
1 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per L'Energia Elettrica 
(ENEL), [1964] ECR 585 at 593. 
2 Minister for Economic Affairs v. S.A. Fromagerie Franco-Suisse 'he 
S k f , [1972) CMLR 330 at 373 paragraph 10. 
3 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle 
fiir Getreide, [19741 2 CMLR 540 at 549 para 19. 
Chapter C. page 59 
the first of January 1958.4 
At a first glance, nothing suggests that there is anything special. 
The form of the founding treaties, the amending treaties (for example 
the Merger Treaty8 or the Single European Act6) and the treaties of 
accession are not different from other International treaties.7 
Neither is the fact that Art. 210 EECT8 confers legal personality on 
the EEC a novelty. The United Nations, for example, are also 
recognised to have a legal personality wich is distinct from that of 
its members9 and there are plenty more examples. 
Yet, there are aspects in which the EC is different from other 
organisations established by international treaties. Most of these 
differences are matters of degree rather than principle. 
1. Wide Scope of the (EEC) Treaty1 0 
The EEC Treaty, which is the most important of the three founding 
treaties, stands out from most other international treaties in the 
broadness of its objectives. Its general aims are set out in Art. 2: 
"The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common 
market and progressively approximating the economic policies of 
the member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmo-
nious development of economic expansion, an Increase in stabili-
ty, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer 
4 All three Communities will be referred to as the 'European 
Community' (EC) or simply 'the Community'. 
3 Officially known as the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a 
Single Commission of the European Communities; signed in Brussels 
on 8 April 1965; entered into force 1 July 1967 (OJ No. L 162, 13 
July 1967, p. 2). 
6 Cmnd. 9758, Bull. EC, suppl. 2/86. 
7 Petersmann, p. 57. 
8 Art. 6 II ECSCT and Art. 184 EuratomT respectively. 
9 So decided by the International Court of Justice in the Reparation 
for Injuries case, 1949 ICJ Rep. 174. 
1 0 See B. Bieber/ R. Beutler/ J. Pipkorn/ J. Streil, Die Europaische 
Gemelnschaft - Rechtsordnung und Polltik. pp. 45 et seq. 
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The activities by which the Community intends to achieve these aims 
are listed in Art. 3, ranging from the elimination of customs duties 
and of quantative restrictions on the trade of goods between member 
states to the association of the overseas countries and territories 
in order to increase trade and to promote jointly economic and 
social developments. 
Some of these principles are elaborated in further provisions of the 
Treaty. The scope of the EEC Treaty has been enhanced by the Single 
European Act (SEA). It has added the objectives economic and monetary 
co-operation, protection of the environment, regional policy, 
research and technological development. In its Art. 30 the SEA has 
also provided a formal framework for political co-operation of the 
member states. 
All of this has to be seen in the light of the extensive perspective 
laid down in the preamble of the EEC Treaty: "Determined to lay down 
the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." 
This political dimension has been reaffirmed by Art. 1 of the SEA. 
Summing up, the EEC, although (as the name indicates) i t was 
primarily aimed at economic integration, goes far beyond the scope of 
other organisations with economic objectives like the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or the European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFTA). It is also concerned with encouraging a greater sense of 
European awareness, identity and common purpose: to create a people's 
Europe. Today, the activities of the Community comprise many areas 
which are only loosely connected with economic questions, like 
education (e.g. the ERASMUS program) social policy (e.g. the transfe-
rability of social security, pension and health care rights) or 
cultural policy and sti l l shows a tendency to widen the issues.12 
1 1 This is not merely rethoric, but has direct legal implications: 
Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Inc. v. 
Commission, (19731 CMLR 199 at 223 - 225, paragraphs 23 - 26. 
1 2 The President of the Commission of the EC, Jaques Delors, predic-
ted in a speech before the European Parliament in July 1988 that 
"in ten years, 80 per cent of economic legislation - and perhaps 
tax- and social legislation- will be directed from the Communi-
ty.", Official Journal of the EC, Annex, Debates of the European 
Parliament, 1988-9, no. 2-367/140. 
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Another peculiar feature of the Community and its legal order is its 
dynamic nature. Although there have been phases of evident stagnation 
in the political impetus of the member states on the way to closer 
integration, the Community has hardly ever stood sti l l . I t is more or 
less in a constant progress of redefining itself or being redefined, 
examples being the Single European Act 1986 or, at present, the 
Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC)13 on Economic and Monetary Union 
and on Political Union. 
There is also a continual flow of new, volume-filling secondary 
legislation to remind us of the important role that the Community 
plays in everyday life. 
The dynamism of Community law was in particular fuelled by the 
courageous and innovative fashion in which the EC J (esp. in the 1960s 
and 1970s) adopted the spirit of the preamble of the EECT and 
introduced principles which gave the Treaty some characteristics of a 
constitution.1 4 
In this context i t should also be pointed out that the EEC Treaty has 
been expressly concluded for an unlimited period, Art. 240. The 
Treaty does also not envisage the possibility of the withdrawal of a 
member.18 
The Community can thus be more adequately understood as a 'process' 
1 3 For details see infra, 6). 
The member states are acting outside the Community when they 
negotiate in the IGCs, not as a Community institution. 
1 4 This view is held by many distinguished writers on Community law, 
see e.g. G.F. Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, p. 
596; J. Temple Lang, European Community Constitutional Law: The 
Division of Powers Between the Community and Member States, p. 
209; T.C. Hartley, Federalism, Courts and Legal System: The 
Emerging Constitution of the European Community; Beutler/ Bieber, 
pp. 44/45. 
1 3 Cf. Beutler/ Bieber, p. 73 on the legal problems of a withdrawal. 
Chapter C. 
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3. The Autonomy of Community Institutions 
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In September 1974, Jean Monnet told President Valerie Giscard 
d'Estalng of France: " I think what's lacking more than anything in 
European affairs (...) is authority. Discussion is organized: deci-
sion is not. By themselves, the existing Community institutions are 
not strong enough."17 
This statement shows the ambitious designs of the great European 
Monnet. because actually the extent to which the member states have 
endowed the Community's institutions with autonomous power is quite 
unusual compared with other international organisations. 
Art. 4 EECT lists the four main institutions which exercise the 
powers of the Community: The European Parliament, the Council, the 
Commission and the Court of Justice. 
Although the position of the European Parliament has been somewhat 
strenghtened by the SEA18, i t does not play the same important role 
as the national parliaments. 
The central decision- and law-making body of the Community is the 
Council. It decides and acts on the basis of proposals submitted by 
the Commission. Apart from the vast amount of specified competences, 
the Council may, under certain conditions, also resort to the 
'blanket power' of Art. 235 EECT. 
The Council is normally also responsible for the external relations 
of the Community. It concludes agreements between the EC and other 
international organisations or states, but the negotiations are 
carried out by the Commission.19 Such agreements are binding also on 
member states. Furthermore, the member states are limited in their 
own treaty-making power by the ERTA-princlple, which says that they 
1 6 J. Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranatlo-
nalism, p. 269. This is also the view of the German Constitutional 
Court which describes the EC as 'a sui generis Community in the 
process of progres-slng integration', Internationale Handelsge-
sellschaft, (1974] 2 CMLR 540 at 549 para. 19. 
1 7 J. Monnet, Memoirs, p. 513. 
1 8 See Turpin, p. 306. 
1 9 Art. 228 (1). 
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may not enter into a treaty with a non-member state which could 
"affect" Community legislation or alter its scope.20 
The independence of the Council's power from the interest of single 
member states can best be seen in those cases when i t decides by 
qualified (or, less often, simple) majority voting. 2 1 
Whereas the Council is composed of representatives of national 
governments, the members of the Commission are required to be above 
national loyalties 2 2. Its function is to act as guardian of the 
Treaty2 3 and to carry through Community interests, which, in fact, i t 
does quite vigorously. 
The fourth principal institution is the Court of Justice which has 
been equipped with comprehensive competences24 and whose judgments 
are binding not only on Community institutions, but also on the 
member states23. 
4. The Principles of Direct Effect and Supremacy of Community Law 
Perhaps the most important feature which distinguishes the Community 
from other international organisations is the extent to which 
primary26 and secondary Community law permeates the national legal 
systems and creates directly enforceable rights and obligations for 
2 0 See Case 22/70 Commission v. Council, [1971J ECR 263; ERTA = 
European Road Transport Agreement (sometimes cited with the French 
abbreviation AETR). 
2 1 See. Art. 148 EECT. The principle of majority voting has been 
extended to new areas by the SEA. On the other hand, the member 
states have protected vital national interests by the so-called 
'Luxembourg Accord' of 28 January 1966. It is a sort of political 
convention to the effect that certain decisions may only be taken 
unanimously. 
2 2 See Art. 10 (2) Merger Treaty. 
2 3 See Art. 156 EECT. 
2 4 See Art. 164 EECT. 
2 3 Art. 171 EECT. 
2 6 Primary Community law are the founding and amending treaties 
themselves. 
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individuals.2 7 
The practical importance of Community law is due to the combined 
operation28 of two key principles: Direct effect and supremacy of 
Community law. 
Whenever a rule of Community Law creates rights for individuals which 
have to be protected by municipal courts i t is said to be 'directly 
effective'. 2 9 A precondition for direct effect is the 'direct appli-
cability' 3 0 of a law. 'Directly applicable' means that a Community 
provision becomes automatically part of a domestic legal system 
without the necessity of further national measures of incorporation. 
As for the instruments of secondary Community legislation, Art. 189 
EECT attributes direct applicability only to regulations, but not to 
directives or decisions. Neither does the Treaty make any statements 
about the direct applicability of Treaty provisions. The further 
development of the principles of direct applicability and direct 
effect was left to the European Court of Justice. 
The notion of direct effect consistently led to another question 
the Treaties had left open: which provisions should prevail in the 
case of a conflict between Community law and national law? 
In response to that question the Court of Justice created the second 
key concept: the doctrine of supremacy of Community law over any form 
of national law. 
Here is the answer to the question why the British concept of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty faces a much stronger challenge from the EC 
than from traditional international organisations. It is therefore 
worthwhile analysing in greater detail the relevant case-law of the 
ECJ and its implications for the legal authority of national parlia-
2 7 See G. Howe, Sovereignty and Interdependence - Britain's Place in 
the World, p. 683; see also L. Collins, European Community Law in 
the United Kingdom, pp. 7-8. 
2 8 See U. Everling, Zum Vorrang des EG-Rechts vor nationalem Recht. 
pp. 1201, 1203. 
2 9 J. Steiner, Textbook on EEC Law, p. 20. 
3 0 For the relation of the two concepts see J.A. Winter, Direct 
Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different Con-
cepts in Community Law. 
However, The ECJ tends to use the two terms interchangeably, 
Steiner, Textbook on EEC Law, p. 20. 
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5. Summary: Some Elements of Federalism 
"(Wjhere you have an association of States which in one form or 
another have agreed to divide power and control between centralised 
and regional authorities, you have at least the essential elements of 
the federal concept." 
This was the conclusion of Lord Mackenzie Stuart, then President of 
the European Court of Justice.31 Of course, the EC is at present 
neither a state nor a federation. But i t does come to one's mind that 
in addition to the division of powers, many of the features distin-
guishing the Community from other international organisations also 
occur in federal systems.32 
Federations are set up by a constitution. The basic document of the 
Community is not a constitution, but a Treaty. On the other hand, the 
Treaty was designed to be what is called a 'Framework Treaty' (traite 
cadre), establishing legislative, executive and judicial institutions 
of the Community, and has been further 'constltutionalised' by the 
ECJ. 
As in federations, there is a central court with exclusive jurisdic-
tion to give authoratative rulings on the interpretation of Community 
law and its decisions are binding on the member states in order to 
ensure a unified system of common law. 
As in federations, legislation by the central authorities of the 
Community can apply directly to citizens and companies in the 
member states and even prevail over national legislation in cases of 
conflict. 
Finally, the Community has its own diplomatic relations and has the 
right to conclude treaties with non-member states which have direct 
force for the member states. 
Lord Mackenzie Stuart, Problems of the European Community: Trans-
atlantic Parallels, p. 185. 
Cf. Hartley, Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems: The Emerging 
Constitution of the European Community: also D. Lasok, in: D. 
Lasok / P.A. Stone, Conflict of laws in the European Community, 
pp. 6, 17 - 18. 
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6) Outlook: Economic/Monetary and Political Union 
The future shape of the Community is being discussed in the ongoing 
Intergovernmental Conferences on Economic and Monetary Union and on 
Political Union. Final results are not expected before the summit of 
the heads of government in Maastricht (Netherlands) by the end of 
1991. Negotiations so far have proved very dif f icul t 3 3 which is 
hardly surprising considering the sensitivity of the areas concerned 
and the possible far-reaching implications of any decision. As new 
proposals are being put forward all the time, any attempt to 
anticipate the particulars of the final outcome would be pure 
speculation. I will therefore confine the following to a sketch of 
the broad issues on the agenda. 
a) Economic and Monetary Union 
The discussion on Economic Union is directed at an open market 
system, combining growth and employment with price stability and 
environmental protection. Such a system should be dedicated to sound 
and sustainable financial and budgetary conditions and to economic 
and social cohesion and is likely to entail a strenthening of 
Community institutions. 
At the moment, public attention is focused on the aim of European 
Monetary Union (EMU) which hopes to accomplish: 
the integration of financial markets and complete freedom of 
capital transactions, 
the irrevocable fixing of currency exchange rates and, ultimate-
ly, 
a single currency for Europe. 
On a meeting on Rome in October 1990, eleven member states agreed in 
3 3 See e.g. Financial Times, 8 April 1991, EMU train stopped dead in 
its tracks. 
principle on a timetable for EMU34 which followed the three-stage 
approach suggested by the Delors Report*. 
Stage One36 aims at a single free market in financial services; the 
inclusion of all member states' currencies in the exchange rate 
mechanism (ERM); the removal of impediments to the private use of the 
ECU; and a more salient role for the Committee of Governors of the 
Central Banks. 
Stage Two requires a new Treaty to establish an independent European 
Central Bank which will eventually aquire fu l l responsibility for the 
formulation and implementation of a Community monetary policy 
(thereby absorbing the existing arrangements of coordinating national 
monetary policies) and the intervention vis-a-vls foreign currencies 
on the exchange markets. 
The final stage will bring an irreversible fixing of exchange 
parities and the adoption of a single currency. 
The UK government had and stil l has reservations to the idea of an 
independent Central Bank and objects against the 'imposition' of a 
single currency37. Instead, i t favours a 'hard ECU' option which 
would mean a common currency besides the national currencies. 
3 4 The UK objected to the setting of a timetable before decisions on 
the substance had been taken in the IGC, see The Times, 29 October 
1990. Britain alone as date is set for monetary union. 
3 0 Report of the Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary 
Union, published 17 April 1989; text In (1989) Europa-Archiv, pp. 
D283 et seq. 
3 6 This stage has already officially begun on July 1st 1990, follo-
wing the European Council meeting in Madrid. 
3 7 It is hard to see how a single currency could be Imposed. All the 
other member states could do is to conclude a separate treaty 
without Britain. One of the options being discussed now is a 
Commission proposal that would allow the UK to sign a treaty now, 
but making actual participation dependent on the decision of a 
future Parliament. 
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Because no blueprint, comparable to the Delors Report on EMU, exists 
for Political Union, there is a confusing welter of proposals on the 
table. 
However, the idea behind Political Union is to remedy three major 
deficiencies in the present framework of the Community. 
The first issue is the Community's representation to the 'outside' 
world. The EC has undoubtedly become an economic giant, but i t has 
failed to develop a matching coherent political identity which would 
allow i t to adopt a higher profile on the international scene. The 
present framework of European Political Co-operation (EPC) is too 
cumbersome and too slow to respond efficiently to urgent events. 
Community foreign policy is often limited to belated joint declara-
tions. The Gulf crisis and the GATT negotiations have shown the 
deficiencies of the existing system. 
There are plans for introducing a (parallel) European citizenship. 
The changing role of NATO has also led to a debate about a joint 
security policy. 
The second aim of Political Union is to put an end to the infamous 
democratic deficit of the Community. Legislative powers once held by 
national parliaments lie now mainly with the unaccountable Council of 
ministers38 and executive functions are assigned to unelected 
Commissioners39. 
There are several ways in which the democratic legitimacy of the 
Community could be strengthened. An obvious measure would be to 
extend the powers of the EP in the legislative process40; there could 
be vetos for certain areas or Strasbourg might be given the right to 
initiate legislation. The appointment of Commissioners could be made 
subject to confirmation by the EP. Another idea is to remove the 
3 8 For a detailed analysis see S. Williams, Sovereignty and Accounta-
bility in the European Community. 
3 9 The Commission as a whole is under a limited control by the EP, 
see Art. 140 III and 144 EECT. 
4 0 The EP has aired its own ideas in a Resolution which is to serve 
as the basis of a Draft Constitution for European Union, see 
Europe Documents, Nr. 1674, 19 December 1990. 
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secrecy which surrounds Council meetings. 
Accountability could also be achieved by involving national parlia-
ments in EC law-making.4 1 
The third concern is the improvement of the decision-making process. 
The general idea is that efficiency can be greatly increased by 
applying majority voting to more areas. The calls for the majority 
rule become more urgent as new applicants like Turkey and Sweden are 
knocking on the doors. 
Another 'magic' concept that has gained enormous popularity is the 
subsidiarity principle.4 2 Basically i t means that tasks which may be 
undertaken more effectively in common should be carried out by the 
Community; all other tasks should be left to the member states. 
c) Comment 
Whatever the exact outcome in the IGCs will be, one thing seems 
certain: the trend will definitely be to broaden the Community's 
powers and to reinforce the existing federalist traits. 4 3 All the 
questions about national and parliamentary sovereignty will recur 
with renewed vigour. 
4 1 Michael Heseltine e.g. has advocated the establishment of a second 
chamber ('senate') consisting of representatives of national par-
liaments, Financial Times, 20 November 1990, Co-operation, not 
federation. See also the views of the Commission, Europe Docu-
ments, Nr. 1659, 31 October 1990. 
4 2 See the Editorial Comment, (1990) 27 Common Market Law Review, pp. 
181 - 184. 
4 3 As a matter of fact, the word 'federal' has now appeared for the 
first time in a new draft Treaty for the EC; see Financial Times, 
18 June 1991, UK rejects 'federal' Europe move. 
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I I . Direct Effect and Supremacy in the Case-Law of The European 
Court of Justice 
1. Introduction 
The European Court of Justice is not modelled after any particular 
court of the member states. Its powers, tasks, procedures and methods 
of interpretation are distinct both from continental and from common-
law courts. It seems therefore justified to make in advance some 
brief introductory remarks in as far as they might be useful for the 
following analysis of the cases. 
Tasks 
The Court's main task is to "ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of this Treaty the law is observed".44 
It decides49 disputes between member states46, disputes between the 
EC and member states47, disputes between Community institutions 4 8 
and, in some cases, disputes between the Community and individuals 4 9. 
One of its most important tasks is to give preliminary rulings to 
references made by national courts under Art. 177. Under this pro-
cedure, the ECJ is only concerned with the application and interpre-
tation of Community law 8 0, not with national law, which remains in 
the exclusive domain of municipal courts. 
Methods of interpretation 3 1 
Like any continental or common-law court, the ECJ will start with a 
4 4 Art. 164 EECT, Art. 31 ECSCT, Art. 136 EuratomT. 
4 3 Some of its duties are now delegated to the new Court of First 
Instance, which was established in 1989 under Art. 168a EECT 
(Council decision 88/591, OJ No. L 319, 25 November 1988, p. 1). 
4 6 Art. 170, 219 EECT. 
4 7 Art. 169 EECT. 
4 8 Art. 173, 219 EECT. 
4 9 See list in Beutler/ Bieber, p. 139. 
5 0 The ECJ's power to rule on the validity of Community Acts is 
exclusive, see Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v. HauptzoIJamt LUbeck-Ost, 
[19881 3 CMLR 57. 
8 1 For a detailed treatise see A. Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation 
and Community Law; cf. also Collins, pp. 130 - 134. 
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literal translation and will normally not depart from the wording of 
a provision i f i t is clear and compelling32, but i t is, of course, 
most of the time faced with the extra difficulty of several authentic 
versions33. 
Historical interpretation is only of limited importance as the 
Sometimes the Court employs a systematic interpretation, giving 
relevance to the place of an Article in a particular chapter of the 
Treaty or its coherence with other provisions.93 
Some of the most important and far-reaching judgments were reached 
when the Court resorted to the purpose or intent of a provision or of 
the treaties in general. This coincides with the systematic approach 
inasmuch as the aims of the treaties have been incorporated in the 
treaties5 6. Its leading motives are the principles of non-discrimina-
tion, freedom (of persons, trade, services and capital), solidarity 
between the member states and economic and legal integration.3 7 
The Court has developed two special forms of teleological interpreta-
tion called e f f e t utile and e f f e t necessaire. The first denotes "such 
a minimum result as is required to make the Treaty effective" and the 
second "such an interpretation as must necessarily flow from the 
existence in fact of the common market and the Community or from the 
principles laid down in the founding treaties."38 
3 2 See e.g. Case 40/64 Sgarlata v. Commission, (1965) 1 ECR 215 at 
227; Case 10/61 Commission v. Italy, (1962) ECR 1. 
The ECJ does not avail itself of the literal method to the extent 
English courts do: see P.D. Dagtoglou, The English Judges and 
European Community Law, p. 76. 
3 3 For the EECT this follows fom Art. 248. 
3 4 H.G. Schermers, Judicial Protection in the European Communities. 
§25; Bredimas, pp. 57 et seq. 
3 3 See e.g. Case 59/75 Pubblico Ministero v. Manghera, (1976] 1 ECR 
91 at 100, paragraphs 6 and 7: "[Art. 37 (1)] must be considered 
in its context in relation to the other paragraphs of the same 
article and its place in the general scheme of the Treaty". 
See also Beutler/ Bieber, p. 223. 
3 6 Art. 2 EECT, Art. 2 ECSCT, Art. 1 EuratomT. 
3 7 Beutler/ Bieber, p. 226. 
3 8 G. Slynn, The European Court of Justice, p. 415. 
travjeaux preparatoires of the Treaties are secret.34 vje^au 
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Case-Law 
In continental legal theory courts are to apply the law in the cases 
at issue and not to make i t . 8 9 Nevertheless, i t is recognised also in 
non-common-law systems that court decisions can be a source of law 
when they f i l l gaps in the existing legal frameworks.60 
As the founding treaties left quite a number of such gaps, there were 
many uncertainties even about fundamental principles of Community 
law. Normally one should expect the legislature to f i l l these gaps, 
but the Council showed itself rather reluctant to act. Thus the ECJ 
(which could not postpone its judgments until the Council had made up 
its mind) frequently found itself in the unexpected role of the 
Community's law-creating institution. 6 1 In some areas of Community 
law the decisions of the ECJ can be the most Important or even only 
source of law. 
Strictly speaking, the judgments of the Court are binding only inter 
partes*2 unless the a provision is declared void, in which case the 
effect is erga omnes*3. The Court itself has pointed out in Da Costa 
en Schaake64 that i t is not legally bound by its previous rulings and 
that national courts are free to make a reference for a preliminary 
ruling even i f the same question has been decided in a prior case. 
On the other hand, the Court in the same judgment also allowed 
national courts ruling in last instance to rely on previous prelimin-
ary rulings in cases where they would normally have been obliged to 
consult the ECJ under Art. 177 (3) EECT.68 In addition, the ECJ 
seldom overrules its previous decisions but generally follows the 
precedents i t has established, sometimes quoting from or simply 
3 9 Schermers, Judicial Protection in the EC, § 166. 
6 0 In Germany, for example, a large part of labour law is judge-made 
(Richterrecht). 
6 1 See Beutler/ Bieber. pp. 213/214; Schermers, g 35. 
6 2 Beutler/ Bieber, pp. 244, 245. 
6 3 Case 66/80 International Chemical Corporation v. Amministrazione 
delle Finanze dello Stato, (1981] 2 ECR 1191 at 1215, 1216. 
paragraphs 11-13, 18. 
6 4 Joined Cases 28-30/62 Da Costa en Schaake, [1963] ECR 31 at 37-39. 
6 8 This is part of the now commonly accepted acte clair principle, 
see e.g. Collins, pp. 156 - 162. 
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referring to earlier judgments66. It thus gives its rulings a force 
that goes beyond the decided case.67 
As Schermers has pointed out, decisions of the Court of Justice 
cannot be formally divided into the ratio decidendi and obiter 
dicta.60 Although the Court naturally avails itself of arguments 
which would be classified as obiter under English law, they have the 
same force of precedent as other forms of reasoning. 
2. Van Gend en Loos69 
Van Gend en Loos is arguably the most creative and salient judgment 
ever delivered by the Court. It has laid the foundations for almost 
every major development in Community constitutional law. 
a) Background of the Case 
In 1957 the Netherlands had ratified the EEC Treaty, which entered 
into force 1 January 1958. Two years later another Dutch law ratified 
a Benelux customs protocol. 
The Dutch forwarding agency Van Gend en Loos had imported glue from 
Germany on which a customs duty of 3 per cent was levied. Under the 
new Benelux customs protocol, the product was classified differently 
with the result that Van Gend had to pay 8 per cent duty. The firm 
brought an action against the new classification in the Amsterdam 
Tariefcommissie ('Customs Court'). The Dutch court realised that the 
case before them concerned trade between two member states of the 
European Economic Community and was uncertain about the effect of the 
6 6 See e.g. Case 54/80 Wilner, [1980] 3 ECR 3673 at 3681, paragraphs 
6 - 8, in which the ECJ repeats the decision of Case 65/79 
Chatain, [1980] 2 ECR 1345. 
6 7 To English lawyers, this is familiar as the stare-decisis 
doctrine. 
6 8 Schermers, § 855. See also N.P. Gravelles, Disapplying an Act of 
Parliament Pending a Preliminary Ruling: Constitutional Enormity 
or Community Law Right?, p. 586. 
6 9 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen, [1963] ECR 1. 
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Treaty (in particular Art. 12 EECT) on this import. Consequently, i t 
made use of its discretion under Art. 177 EECT to ask the European 
Court of Justice to explain Art. 12 of the Treaty. 
The crucial question (abridged) was: 
"Does Art. 12 EECT have direct application7 0 within the territo-
ry of a member state, in other words, can nationals of such a 
state, on the basis of this article, lay claim to individual 
rights which the court must protect?" 
b) The Arguments of the Netherlands and Belgian Governments 
Under the rules of procedure for Art. 177, the firm itself, the 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, the Commission and the 
Dutch, Belgian and German governments submitted written observations 
to the EC J. 
The arguments put forward by the governments of the Netherlands and 
Belgium were particularly powerful and highlight the issues at 
stake.71 
Both member states objected against the admissibility of the ques-
tion, thus denying the jurisdiction of the ECJ, and also against the 
idea of a direct effect of Treaty provisions. 
The Netherlands government disputed that a request of a national 
court for a preliminary ruling under Art. 177 may concern an alleged 
infringement of the Treaty by a member state. It suggested that 
action in such cases could only be taken on initiative of another 
member state or the Commission under Articles 169 and 170. In other 
words, whether or not the Netherlands was fulf i l l ing its EEC Treaty 
obligations was relevant only on the international level, between the 
contracting parties, and could not be of any consequence to an 
individual. 
The Belgian government maintained that the Amsterdam Tariefcommissie 
was confronted with two international treaties which both had become 
7 0 In the now established terminology of the ECJ this should read 
'direct effect. 
7 1 The following account is taken from the summary contained in the 
judgment of the ECJ. 
Chapter C page 75 
part of the Dutch national law. To decide which treaty prevailed in 
case of a conflict was solely a problem of national constitutional 
law and had nothing to do with the interpretation of an article of 
the EEC Treaty. Hence, the case fell within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Netherlands court and the request to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling was inadmissible. 
The Belgian government added that no answer which the ECJ could give 
to the first question would have any bearing on the proceedings 
brought in the Tariefcommissie. Thus, a preliminary ruling was not 
'necessary to enable i t [the Dutch court] to give judgment' and the 
ECJ should consequently reject the request. 
As to the substanive issue, Netherlands government distinguished 
between 'internal effect' 7 2 and 'direct effect1, the first being a 
precondition to the second. It pointed out that the actual wording 
showed that Art. 12 only placed an international obligation on member 
states, who were free to decide how they intended to f u l f i l i t . 7 3 
Since Art. 12 had no internal effect, i t could not, a fortiori, 
produce direct effect. Even i f i t had internal effect, i t could not 
be construed in a sense that would permit individuals to claim 
subjective rights which the national courts must protect. 
Similarly, the Belgian Government argued that Art. 12 merely obliged 
member states to refrain from measures which would amount to new or 
increased customs duties, but i t did not provide that any such 
measure would automatically be void. Art. 12 did therefore not create 
directly applicable rights which nationals could invoke and enforce. 
At this point the orthodoxy in international law of all of these 
propositions must be emphazised. It was not the governments, but the 
ECJ which was treading on new and untested ground in the following 
judgment.74 
7 2 By which i t meant 'direct applicability'. 
7 3 A similar reasoning was given by the German government. 
7 4 Cf. D. Wyatt, New Legal Order or Old?, for an attempt to explain 
the Community with traditional concepts of Internatonal Law. 
c) The Judgment of the Court 
After reiterating the arguments put forward against the admissibili-
ty of the first question, the ECJ set out: "However in this case the 
Court is not asked to adjudicate upon the application of the Treaty 
according to the principles of the national law of the Netherlands, 
which remains the concern of the national courts, but i t is asked, in 
conformity with subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 
177 of the Treaty, only to interpret the scope of Article 12 of the 
said Treaty within the context of Community law and with reference to 
its effects on individuals (italics supplied]. This argument has 
therefore no legal foundation."78 
The style in which the Court dismissed the objections against its 
jurisdiction is typical in its harsh brevity for the ECJ's mode of 
reasoning. It sounds more like an inviolable statement than like an 
argument. To understand why the ECJ is so adamant, one has to look at 
the alternative. Suppose, the Court had denied its own jurisdiction, 
Van Gend might st i l l have won its case before the Tariefcommissie on 
grounds of Dutch constitutional law. But exactly the same case would 
probably have been resolved differently under a different national 
legal order76 with the paradoxical result that Art. 12 EEC Treaty 
offers direct protection to some traders but not to others, although 
i t is supposed to cover all trade within the Community. It is 
understandable that the Court was anxious to avoid this result. 
But how is its answer to the arguments of the two member state 
governments Justified? 
When the Court stated that i t was only asked to explain the scope of 
Art. 12 with reference to its effect on individuals, i t impliedly 
assumed that i t could answer this question exclusively on the basis 
of Community law, without looking at national constitutional concepts 
78 Op. cit.. note 69, p. 11. 
7 6 For example, in Italy the constitution did not recognize the 
internal primacy of international treaties as did the vague Art. 
66 of the Dutch constitution then in force. 
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of how international treaties are incorporated into national law. 7 7 
The Court thus already anticipated the argument which, as we will 
see, i t later used to decide the substantive issue. 
The ECJ also rejected the second objection against the admissibility 
of the first question by stating that i t was for the national court 
alone to determine when a preliminary ruling was needed to enable i t 
to give judgement.78 
It then went on to deal with the question of direct effect of Article 
12 and eventually concluded: "[A]ccording to the spirit, the general 
scheme, and the wording of the Treaty, Art. 12 must be interpreted as 
producing direct effects and creating individual rights which natio-
nal courts must protect."79 
The Court principally used three arguments to support this finding. 
First, instead of analysing Art. 12, the Court started its reasoning 
with an outline of the objectives of the EEC Treaty. In choosing this 
unusual80 approach the Court indicated that the real question raised 
by the Dutch court was of a fundamental and general nature which was 
not confined to a particular article of the Treaty. It said: "The 
objective of the Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market, the 
functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in 
the Community, implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement 
which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting 
states".81 The Court then mentioned the facts that the Preamble of 
the Treaty refers not only to governments but to peoples, that the 
Community institutions had been endowed with sovereign rights and, 
7 7 This is exactly what the Commission had contended in its written 
observation: "Community law must be effectively and uniformly 
applied throughout the whole of the Community. The result is first 
that the effects of Community law on the internal law of Member 
States cannot be determined by this Internal law but only by 
Community law" [italics supplied], cf. [1963] ECR p. 6. 
7 8 This has considerably strenghtened the position of the national 
courts. 
79 Op. cit., note 69, p. 13. 
8 0 See supra, I I . 1) on interpretation techniques. 
81 Op. cit., note 81, p. 12. 
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finally, that the nationals of member states participated in the 
functioning of the Community through the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee. The key-point of the Court's first 
argument was the function of the Community. It said, in effect, that 
although the Treaty was an international treaty, its far-reaching 
aims required that i t be treated differently from ordinary treaties 
in order to make i t work. 
The Court backed this up with its second argument, which was based on 
a systematic analysis of Art. 177 EECT: "In addition, the task 
assigned to the Court of Justice under Article 177, the object of 
which is to secure uniform interpretation of the Treaty by national 
courts and tribunals, confirms that the states have acknowledged that 
Community law has an authority which can be invoked by their 
nationals before those courts and tribunals."8 2 
The idea behind this was the following: Art. 177 empowers national 
courts to refer a question to the ECJ only " i f i t considers that a 
decision on the question is necessary to enable i t to give a ruling". 
Such a decision could only be 'necessary' i f the legal position of 
individuals is affected by Treaty provisions. 
From the two arguments the ECJ concluded that "the Community 
constitutes a new order of international law 8 3 for the benefit of 
which the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member 
States but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of 
Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations 
on individuals but i t is also intended to confer upon them rights 
which become part of their legal heritage."84 
Thus having declared that i t is principally possible for Treaty pro-
visions to confer enforceable rights on individuals the ECJ took the 
third step and examined Art. 12 EECT. It found the provision to be 
a) a clear and unconditional negative obligation and 
b) not dependent on further measures under national law 
82 Op. cit., note 69, p. 12. 
8 3 The substance of this sentence has often been repeated (most 
recently in Case 2/88 J.J. Zwartveld, (1990) 3 CMLR 457), with the 
subtle difference that in later cases the ECJ has wisely refrained 
from describing the Community as an order of 'international law'. 
84 Op. cit., note 69, p. 12. 
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and thus "ideally adapted to produce direct effects between Member 
States and their subjects [...) The fact that under this Article i t 
is the Member States who are made the subject of the negative 
obligation does not imply that their nationals cannot benefit from 
this obligation."83 
Finally, the Court also dismissed the argument based on Articles 169 
and 170 of the Treaty: "A restriction of the guarantees against an 
infringement of Article 12 by Member States to the procedures under 
Articles would remove all direct legal protection of the individual 
rights of their nationals. [...J The vigilance of individuals 
concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision 
in addition to the supervision entrusted by Articles 189 and 170 to 
the diligence of the Commission and the Member States."86 
d) Summary 
To summarise, the ECJ has made three important points in Van Gend: 
First, the EEC Treaty is different from other international treaties 
and extends beyond the usual mutual committment of states on an 
inter-se level. From its whole purpose and institutional framework i t 
follows that i t can directly confer rights upon individuals which are 
enforceable against member states. This is all the more remarkable 
since three of the six founding members revealed a directly opposing 
understanding of the Treaty8 7. 
Second, i t follows from Van Gend that the main burden of protecting 
these Community rights falls on the national courts.88 
Third, the Court has offered some criteria as to what Treaty 
provisions can produce direct effects. 
85 Op. cit., note 69, p. 13. 
86 Ibid. 
8 7 They must have felt as i f confronted with Dr. Frankenstein's 
monster: a life of its own, independent of its creators and 
becoming difficult to keep under control. See also U. Everling, 
Slnd die Mitglledstaaten noch Herren der Vertrage?, p. 178. 
8 8 The implications of this will be discussed in greater detail under 
III . 3. 
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In Van Gend en Loos the ECJ only developed the principle of direct 
effect. This automatically leads to the question which rule the 
national judge has to obey i f a directly applicable Community rule 
and a rule of national law contain contradicting instructions for the 
same situation. This problem was broached in Costa v. ENEL. 
a) Background of the Case 
In 1962, private Italian electricity undertakings were nationalised 
by a statute of 6 December and their assets transferred to the Ente 
Nazionale per l'Energia Elletrica, ENEL90. 
The lawyer Flaminio Costa, a shareholder in one of the private firms 
and an opponent of nationalisation, refused to pay an invoice over 
1.925 l i ra 9 1 charged by ENEL for supply of electricity. When sued, he 
pleaded before the Milanese giudice conciliator^2 that the 
nationalisation legislation was not only a breach of the Italian 
constitution but also incompatible with Art. 102, 93 (3), 53 and 37 
EECT. 
The Milanese judge did not bother to frame a question, but simply 
cited Art. 177 EECT and sent the whole case file to the ECJ. 
The legal issues in this case were threefold. First, the Court again 
had to decide about the admissibility of the reference. Second, i t 
concerned the relation between national and Community law and third, 
i t raised questions about the Treaty Articles on which Costa had 
based his refusal to pay. 
8 9 (1964) ECR 585. 
9 0 National Electricity Board. 
9 1 Roughly &1. 
9 2 The giudice conciliatore is similar to a small claims court in 
Britain. 
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b) The Observations of the Italian Government and the Opinion of 
the Advocate General 
The Italian government's arguments in Costa v. ENEL mostly fal l into 
line with the reasoning of the three other governments in Van Gend. 
Italy challenged the admissibility of the reference on two gounds, 
First, i t objected to the wording of the question which asked the ECJ 
to decide on the validity of an Italian law. 
Second, i t maintained that the giudice conciliatore did not need an 
interpretation of an international Treaty do decide a dispute over a 
ridiculous amount of money. Should the Italian legislation happen to 
be a breach of the Treaty of Rome, this matter would have to be 
resolved under the procedures provided for by Articles 169 and 170. 
The Milan judge, meanwhile, only had to apply domestic law in order 
to give a ruling: "In this case, the court has no provision of the 
Treaty of Rome to apply and cannot therefore have any of the doubts 
on the interpretation of the Treaty that Article 177 of the Treaty 
itself clearly requires; i t merely has to apply the national law 
(that concerned precisely with ENEL) which governs the question 
before i t . " 9 3 
The Advocate General (A.G.) M. Lagrange retorted with two considera-
tions, one concerning the formal entitlement of the Italian judge and 
the other concerning the substantive issue whether the Italian judge 
must also apply Community law. 
The right of the guidice conciliatore to refer his question to the 
Court in Luxembourg follows from Art. 177 (2) EECT. The power to 
decide if a request for a preliminary ruling is 'necessary' is vested 
alone in the national judges. This decision cannot be questioned or 
dismissed by the ECJ.94 
The A.G. then proceeded to explain, again treading along the way the 
ECJ had paved in Van Gend, that in each Member State, two legal 
systems coexisted and that particular situations may be subject to 
both. The real problem, according to the A.-G. was: i f a national 
court finds that there are two opposing rules which cover the same 
situation, "one deriving from the Treaty or the Community insti tu-
tions, the other from national legislature and institutions: which 
9 3 As quoted by Advocate General Lagrange, [1964] ECR 585 at 602. 
9 4 This is exactly what the Court had already decreed in Van Gend. 
Chapter C. 
must predominate |...|?"99 
page 82 
c) The Judgment of the Court 
Since the Milanese judge in effect had asked the ECJ to rule on the 
compatibility of Italian law with the Treaty, the Court extracted 
from the reference those questions which alone pertained to the 
interpretation of the Treaty. It thus neutralised the first objection 
of the Italian government. 
It then echoed the Advocate General's reply to the submission that an 
interpretation of the Treaty was not 'necessary' by pointing to the 
clear separation of functions between national courts and ECJ set up 
by Art. 177. 
Then the Court tackled the potentially most dangerous argument put 
forward by the Italian government: that the giudice conciliatore was 
obliged to decide the case before him by applying only national law. 
Again the ECJ went far afield in its endeavour to invalidate the 
objections, reiterating the essence of its jugdment in Van Gend. I t 
set out: "By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its 
own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and 
capacity of representation on the international plane, and, more 
particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty 
or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member 
States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited 
fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their 
nationals and themselves."96 
So far, there are only a few arguments which have not already been 
used in Van Gend. The Court points out every characteristic97 i t can 
think of that justifies the claim that the Treaty of Rome is 
different in its legal nature and effects from every known tradltio-
98 Op. tit., note 89, p. 602. 
98 Op. tit., note 89, p. 593. 
9 7 See the comparison in C. I . 
The Court not only introduces the arguments of unlimited duration 
and international representation, but, slightly unusual, also 
refers to the real powers of the Community, thus availing itself 
of a purely political argument. 
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nal international treaty. From this i t had inferred in its previous 
judgment the direct effect of suitable provisions of Community law. 
In the following crucial sentences the Court consequentially extends 
the implications of the special nature of Community law to the 
question which rules prevail in cases of conflict: "The integration 
into the laws of each Member State of provisions which derive from 
the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit of the the 
Treaty, make i t impossible for the States, as a corollary, to accord 
precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system 
accepted by them on the basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot 
therefore be inconsistent with that legal system. The executive force 
of Community law cannot vary from one state to another in defence of 
subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the 
objectives of the Treaty set out in Article 5 (2)". 9 8 
It could be objected that the acceptence of the legal system 
established by the Treaty of Rome 'on the basis of reciprocity' is 
nothing unique. Quite the reverse, reciprocity is a feature common to 
most international treaties. Whenever one signatory fails to f u l f i l 
its duties under a treaty this entails the danger that the goals of 
the respective treaty might be jeopardized. International law provi-
des certain mechanisms for such cases. The general idea is that any 
breach of one party suspends the obligation of the other party (or 
parties) to adhere to the infringed rule." 
What the Court says in Costa v. ENEL, by referring to the 'terms and 
the spirit of the Treaty', is that the objectives of the EECT are too 
comprehensive and too valuable to be frustrated unilaterally. The 
system of suspension may work for ordinary treaties, but not for the 
Treaty of Rome. The Court made this very clear in a judgment which i t 
delivered shortly after Costa v. ENEL, when It held that the relevant 
principle of international law "cannot be recognised under Community 
law". 1 0 0 In other words, the functioning of the Community law depends 
98 Op. tit., note 89, pp. 593 - 694. 
9 9 For members of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, this 
follows expressly from Art. 60. Over and above that, the principle 
behind these Art. is regarded as a general rule of international 
law, see I . Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 
19 and 618. 
1 0 0 Joined Cases 90 and 91/63 Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium, 
(1964] ECR 626. 
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so much on its unconditional and uniform application in the member 
states that opposing national measures cannot be tolerated under any 
circumstance. 
The ECJ has condensed these conclusions in one memorable sentence: 
"It follows from all these observations that the law stemming from 
the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its 
special nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however 
framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and 
without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into 
question."101 
The Court went on to examine the different Treaty provisions on which 
Mr. Costa had based his complaint and found that at least Article 53 
and Article 37 (2) were capable of creating individual rights. 
d) Summary 
Costa v. ENEL is important for several reasons. First, the ECJ 
disappointed whoever had felt that i t had overshot the mark in Van 
Gend en Loos and confirmed the course i t had adopted then. It became 
evident that the direct applicability and effect of Art. 12 was not 
an isolated exception but that quite a number of provisions might 
prove to fal l into the same category.102 
Second, the ECJ maintains that a Treaty provision may not only be 
directly effective, but i t must also prevail over any conflicting 
rule of national law, even i f i t was enacted subsequent to the rule 
of Community law. 1 0 3 
101 Op. cit., note 89, p. 594. See also A.J. Mackenzie Stuart, The 
European Communities and the Rule of Law, pp. 16 et seq. 
1 0 2 For a detailed account of directly effective Treaty provisions 
and the respective case-law of the ECJ see Schermers, § 187. 
1 0 3 This principle has been held up unwaveringly by the ECJ, see e.g. 
Case 14/68 Walt Wllhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, [1969] ECR 1. 
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In this case the Court of Justice was requested to further clarify 
the relationship between national law and Community law. 
a) Background of the Case 
Under Italian law 1 0 3 importers of meat into Italy had to allow and to 
pay for, veterinary and public health checks on their merchandise at 
the frontier. 
Simmenthal S.p.A., which imported beef from France, had challenged 
this legislation before an Italian court and sued the Italian 
Minister of Finance for return of the fees paid. The court had made a 
reference108 under Art. 177 (2) EECT to the European Court of Justice, 
asking the Court to explain Articles 12 and 30. From the interpreta-
tion the ECJ gave i t was clear that the health checks amounted to 
measures having equivalent effect to quantative restrictions (and 
hence were contrary to Art. 30 EECT) and the fees were a charge 
having equivalent effects to customs duties (which was a breach of 
Art. 12). 
Consequently, the Italian court had ordered the Ministry of Finance 
to repay the unlawfully charged inspection fees, together with 
interest, to Simmenthal. 
The Minister appealed against this order, arguing that until the 1970 
statute had been set aside by the Italian Constitutional Court (which 
is under Art. 136 of the Italian Constitution the only body which can 
lawfully annul statutes) i t had to be applied by all lower courts. 
The Minister could support his view by citing some recent judgments 
1 0 4 There are four cases known under the name 'Simmenthal1. The first 
is Case 35/76 Simmenthal SpA v. Amministrazione delle Flnanze 
dello Stato, (1976) 3 ECR 1871, the third is Case 70/77 Simmenthal 
SpA v. Amministrazione delle Flnanze dello Stato, [1978] 2 ECR 
1453, and the fourth is Case 92/78 Simmenthal SpA v. Commission, 
(1979] 1 ECR 777. 
We are dealing with the second, Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle 
Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, [1978] 1 ECR 629. 
1 0 3 In particular a 1970 statute. 
toe First Simmenthal case, op. cit., note 104. 
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of the Constitutional Court which had said that the question whether 
an Italian law is unconstitutional under Art. I I 1 0 7 of the Constitu-
tion can only be decided by the Constitutional Court. 
The lower court, aware of the decision of its highest court, but also 
familiar with the case-law of the ECJ in Van Gend and Costa v. ENEL, 
in its dilemma made another reference to the ECJ: 
It wanted to know whether every national court has the power under 
Community law to immediately set aside national legislation incompa-
tible with directly effective Community provisions, even i f under the 
constitutional law of a member state this right is reserved to 
special authorities. 
b) The Judgment of the Court 
The clear answer the Court gives to the question at the end of its 
judgement reflects exactly the attidude which had led to the bold 
decisions in the previous two cases. The Court ruled: "A national 
court which Is called upon, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to 
apply provisions of Community law is under a duty to give fu l l effect 
to those provisions, i f necessary refusing of its own motion to apply 
any conflicting provisions of national legislation, even i f adopted 
subsequently, and i t is not necessary for the court to request or 
await the prior setting aside of such provisions by legislative or 
other constitutional means."108 
It is interesting to see how the Court justifies this result. It 
starts by pointing out that direct applicability means that rules of 
Community law must be fully applied in all member states from the 
very moment of their entry into force and proceeds: "Furthermore, in 
accordance with the principle of the precedence of Community law, the 
relationship between provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable 
measures of the institutions on the one hand and the national law of 
the Member States on the other is such that those provisions and 
measures not only by their entry into force render automatically 
inapplicable any conflicting provision of current national law but -
1 0 7 Art. 11 of the Italian Constitution provided for the possibility 
to set aside statutes which are incompatible with certain types of 
international treaties. 
108 Op. cit., note 104, pp. 645 - 646. 
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in so far as they are an integral part of, and take precedence in, 
the legal order applicable in the territory of each of the Member 
States - also preclude the valid adoption of new legislative measures 
to the extent to which they would be incompatible with Community 
provisions."109 The Court, playing i t safe, added the ultimate threat 
that anything short of this would "imperil the very foundations of 
the Community.""0 
The other argument put forward by the Court follows again from the 
function of Art. 177 EECT. If the national court could not apply 
Community law after receiving of a preliminary ruling of the ECJ to 
this effect, the effectiveness of Art. 177 would suffer. 
The arguments of the Court so far have been powerful, but they have 
not answered one decisive question: Why should a lower national court 
be entitled to disregard a provision of the constitution which 
reserves the right to annul national legislation exclusively either 
to the legislature or to a special Constitutional Court? 
This problem Is solved in the next passage of the Judgment. 
"...|a]ny provision of a national legal system and any legislative, 
administrative, or judicial practice which might impair the effect-
iveness of Community law by withholding from the national court 
having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything 
necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national 
legislative provisions which might prevent Community rules from 
having fu l l force and effect are incompatible with those requirements 
which are the very essence of Community law. 
This would be the case in the event of a conflict between a provision 
of Community law and a subsequent national law i f the solution of the 
conflict were to be reserved for an authority with a discretion of 
its own, other than the court called upon to apply Community law, 
even i f such an impediment to the fu l l effectiveness of Community law 
were only temporary."111 
This is a clever but also rather tricky argument. From the fact that 
the fu l l , uniform and undelayed application of Community rules is 
dependent on the ability of every court concerned to set aside 
conflicting national legislation, the Court infers that any second-
109 Op. cit., note 104, p. 643 paragraph 17. 
110 Op. cit., note 104, p. 643 paragraph 18. 
111 Op. cit., note 104, p. 644 paragraphs 22 - 23. 
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order national norm confining this ability to other authorities is 
consequently itself Inconsistent with Community law. 
At this point the Court has touched on a fundamental problem which 
always occurs when two different legal orders enter into competition. 
The problem becomes clear when one tries to formulate a hypothetical 
objection of the Italian Constitutional Court to the ECJ's conclu-
sions. It might go like this: 'From its point of view, the ECJ may be 
perfectly right in saying that every rule of national law which 
reserves the power to set aside national legislation to a special 
court is incompatible with Community law. But does this automatically 
entitle lower courts to ignore this rule? Under Italian law, Art. 11 
of the Constitution is valid until we, the Constitutional Court, say 
otherwise. This decision cannot be preempted by the ECJ or anyone 
else. As long as Art. 11 exists, every Italian judge is bound i t . 1 1 1 2 
So, the ECJ, applying Community law, arrives at one conclusion, and 
the Italian Constitutional Court, applying Italian law, arrives at 
the opposite conclusion. 
Thus the logically prior question is, who decides what happens to the 
conflicting rules. Even before this one has to ask which legal order 
determines who decides and so on and so on. Because this is a case of 
infinite regression, there is ultimately no 'correct' answer. 
At this point the wheel turns fu l l circle to the Kelsian grundnorm, 
because this is exactly what lies at the heart of the matter: each 
court has to presuppose a norm which does not derive its validity 
from a higher norm. 
The ECJ of course insists that the Community can only function i f 
Community law decides in the last instance113 and expects national 
courts to assume the right to disregard national legislation which is 
in conflict with Community law. The success of the Simmenthal II 
judgment depended very much on the acceptence of this authority by 
the national courts.1 1 4 
1 1 2 In effect, this was the Constitutional Court's argument in a 
judgment of 27 December 1973, Case 183 Frontini v. Ministero delle 
Finanze, [1974] 2 CMLR 372. 
1 1 3 See Everling, Zum Vorrang des EG-Rechts vor nationalem Recht, p. 
1206; Steiner, Textbook on EEC Law, p. 36. 
1 1 4 See G. Bebr, Development of Judicial Control of the European 
Communities, pp. 664 et seq. 
Chapter C. 
c) Summary 
page 89 
Simmenthal confirmed the precedence of Community law over national 
law, whether prior or subsequent to the conflicting Community rule. 
It also told national courts that, when called upon to apply 
Community law, they are entitled to set aside national measures which 
are contrary to the respective rule. Any national provision which 
withholds this power from them is itself incompatible with Community 
law and can be ignored. 
5. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft113 
In the previous cases Community law had conflicted either with ordi-
nary statutes or with constitutional provisions of 'minor' importan-
ce.1 1 6 In this case the conflict arose between Community law and f u n -
damental human rights guarantees in the constitution of a member 
state. 
a) Background of the Case 
A German exporter of cornflour was required by a Community agricultu-
ral Regulation to obtain a license for its trade. On application for 
the licence the firm had (under another Regulation) to pay a 
'performance deposit' which was forfeit in case the exports were not 
managed within the period allowed for by the licence. 
After the firm exceeded the licence period and lost its money, i t 
brought an action against the cereals intervention agency before the 
Verwaltungsgericht1" Frankfurt-am-Main for the return of all the 
deposit. 
The German court had in a number of earlier instances declared the 
1 1 3 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle filr Getreide und Futtermittel, (1970) ECR 1125. 
1 1 6 It has to be pointed out that unlike in the UK, in most 
continental member states constitutional law is formally dis-
tinguishable from ordinary statute law. 
1 1 7 This is a specialised Administrative court. 
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Community Regulations void because they were in breach of the 
elementary rights protected by Articles 1-20 of the German Grundge-
setz (GG)118. In particular, i t had established an infringement of 
Articles 14 1 1 9 and 2 ( l ) 1 2 0 GG in conjunction with the principle of 
proportionality. 
This time, the Frankfurt court under Art. 177 (2) EECT referred the 
matter to the ECJ. It pointed out that according to Art. 1 (3) of the 
Constitution, all three powers in the state, including the legisla-
ture, are bound by the fundamental rights. 1 2 1 German membership of 
the EC is based on Art. 24 (1) GG which allows the transfer of 
sovereign rights to international institutions. But the German Par-
liament could not transfer powers which i t did not possess under the 
Constitution to the EEC, and this included the power to violate 
fundamental rights. 
The crucial question which the ECJ had to answer (although this was 
not the one drafted by the national court) was whether Community law 
could be reviewed against the constitution of a member state. 
b) The Judgment of the Court 
Bearing its earlier statements in mind, the Court's solution to the 
problem was well predictable. Had i t conceded that the supremacy of 
Community law should yield to the basic rights under the German 
constitution, this would have opened the way for judicial review of 
Community acts against the constitution of every single member state. 
Ignoring the specific constitutional problems of Art. 24 (1) GG the 
Court held: "Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law 
in order to judge the validity of measures adopted by the inst i tu-
118 Basic Law = Constitution of West Germany. 
1 1 9 Art. 14 protects 'ownership rights'. Under the German Constitution 
this is a rather wide concept which also comprises the right to 
collect and enjoy the fruits and benefits from an industrial or 
commercial enterprise. 
1 2 0 Art. 2 covers all areas of human activities which are not covered 
by 'specialised' guarantees and protects them against unjustified 
encroachments. 
1 2 1 Quite unlike the UK Parliament, the German Bundestag is not 
sovereign in the sense outlined under B. 
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tions of the Community would have an adverse effect on the uniformity 
and efficacy of Community law. In fact, the law stemming from the 
Treaty, an independent source of law, cannot because of its very 
nature be overridden by rules of national law, however framed 
(italics supplied], without being deprived of its character as Commu-
nity law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being 
called into question. Therefore the validity of a Community measure 
or its effect within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations 
that It runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by 
the constitution of that State or the principle of a national 
constitutional structure."1 2 2 
The message is, quite bluntly, that Community law is superior to 
every aspect of national constitutional law, even its most fundamen-
tal principles.1 2 3 However, the Court did not stop here. It probably 
realised that this answer had to be most unsatisfying not only for 
the Frankfurt court and that i t was likely to conjur up the danger 
that national courts might refuse to follow this view. 1 2 4 
As there is no express Bill of Rights in the Treaties the Court's 
next consideration seems to be a kind of peace-offer meant to ease 
the implications of the previous passage: "However, an examination 
should be made as to whether or not any analogous guarantee inherent 
in Community law has been disregarded. In fact, respect for 
fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles 
of law protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such 
rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, must be ensured within the framework of the 
structure and objectives of the Community."128 
1 2 2 Op. cit., note 115, p. 1134 paragraph 3. 
1 2 3 What this implies for the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
will be discussed infra, I I I . 
1 2 4 In fact, the case before the court in Frankfurt had a sequel 
before the Federal Constitutional Court, see infra IV. 1. c). 
1 2 3 Op. cit., note 115, p. 1134 paragraph 4. On the facts of the case, 
the Court held that the Regulations in question (102/64, 120/67, 
473/67) had not violated fundamental rights protected by Community 
law. 
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In its later case-law126 the ECJ has often referred to the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR of 4 
November 1950) to which all the members of the EC are party. Although 
the ECJ has never gone so far as to declare the Convention part of EC 
law 1 2 7 one may assume that the principles to which the Community is 
bound are identical. 1 2 8 
Meanwhile, the Court's attitude towards the question of fundamental 
rights has been reinforced by the joint statement of the European 
Parliament, Council and Commission of 1977129 and by the fact that 
the preamble of the SEA 1986 confirms adherence to fundamental rights 
as formulated in the ECHR. 
6. Factortame 
On June 19 1990, the European Court of Justice delivered a prelimina-
ry ruling requested by the House of Lords under Art. 177 EECT in the 
case Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame 
Limited and others.130 
For the present we will look at the case from the European angle but 
i t will also be analysed from the point of view of the British 
Courts.131 
1 2 6 See e.g. Case 4/73 Nold v. Commission, [1974J 1 ECR 491 at 507 
paragraph 13; Case 36/75 Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 
[1975] ECR 1219 at 1232 paragraph 32; Case 44/79 Hauer v. Land 
Rheinland-Pfalz, [1979] ECR 3727 at 3746 paragraphs 17 - 19; Case 
136/79 National Panasonic (UK) Ltd v. Commission, [1980] ECR 2033 
at 2057 paragraph 19. 
1 2 7 Cf. Case 98/79 Josette Pecastaing v. Belgian State, [1980] ECR 691 
at 716. 
1 2 8 Collins, p. 9; Schermers, § 182. 
1 2 9 OJ 1977 No. C 103, p. 1. 
1 3 0 Case C-213/89 [1990] 3 CMLR 1. 
1 3 1 See infra, chapter D., IV. 2. a). 
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In 1983, the EC Council adopted a Regulation133 concerning the 
management and fair distribution of fishery resources. It alloted 
fixed quotas of total allowable catches to each individual member 
state. 
In the UK, non-British nationals were excluded from owning British 
fishing vessels (only the catches of vessels sailing under the 
British flag count against the British quota) under the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894. However, the Act did not preclude corporate 
ownership by British companies. A number of Spanish fishermen took 
advantage of this, incorporated companies under UK law (one of which 
is Factortame Ltd), purchased 42 existing British fishing vessels and 
re-registered another 53 vessels in the UK which had formerly flown 
the Spanish flag. Most of the catches made by these boats were landed 
directly in Spain. 
The UK government was concerned that the British quota was being 
exploited by vessels without a genuine economic link to the United 
Kingdom (a practice for which the term 'quota-hopping' was forged). 
Consequently i t enacted the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 and the 
Merchant Shipping (Registration of Fishing Vessels) Regulation 1988, 
changing the existing rules for registration with the explicit 
intention to protect the interests of the UK fishing industry. 
The most important change was that only those vessels qualify for 
registration which are owned at no less than 75 per cent by British 
citizens resident and domiciled in the UK ('qualified persons'), or 
are owned by companies incorporated in the UK which in turn must be 
controlled at no less than 75 per cent by 'qualified persons1.134 
Under the new system, the 'Spanish' vessels could not satisfy the 
conditions for British ownership. 
Factortame and the other companies in question, by means of an 
application for judicial review, challenged the compatibility of Part 
II of the 1988 Act with their rights under directly effective 
Community law before the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench 
1 3 2 For a very detailed account of events see Gravelles, Disapplying 
an Act of Parliament Pending a Preliminary Ruling: Constitutional 
Enormity or Community Law Right?, pp. 568 et seq. 
1 3 3 Council Regulation 170/83, OJ 1983 No. L 24, p. 1. 
1 3 4 Part I I , section 14 of the Merchants Shipping Act 1988. 
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Division and also applied for the grant of interim relief. 
On 10 March 1989, the Divisional Court made a reference under Art. 
177 EECT for an explanation of the relevant provisions of Community 
law (Articles 7, 52, 58, 221) 1 3 0 and at the same time ordered that 
pending final judgment the national statute be disapplied as regards 
the applicants. 
The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal of the Secretary 
of State for Transport and, on March 22 1989, set aside the order for 
interim relief, arguing that under national law the courts had no 
power to suspend the application of Acts of Parliament. 
The matter was then brought before the House of Lords1 3 6 which 
supported the view of the Court of Appeal concerning national law. It 
held that British courts were prevented from granting interim relief 
by two jurisdictional obstacles: 1) according to an established 
common law rule this remedy is not available against the Crown and 2) 
the presumption that an Act of Parliament is compatible with Communi-
ty law unless and until declared to be incompatible. 
However, the House of Lords referred to the ECJ the question whether, 
notwithstanding the rule of national law, English courts had the 
power or even the duty to grant an interim injunction against the 
Crown under Community law. 
b) The Judgment of the Court 
In his written opinion the Advocate General Guiseppe Tesauro had 
remarked that "[t)he reply which the Court is called upon to give 
[..] in the Factortame case certainly will rank amongst those which 
help to define the context of relations between national courts and 
1 3 8 Case 221/89, lodged at the European Court Registry on July 17, 
1989, is sti l l pending. 
On August 4 1989, the Commission on the same grounds brought an 
action under Art. 169 EECT against the UK before the ECJ (Case 
246/89, pending before the Court). Simultaneously, i t applied for 
an interim order requiring the UK to suspend the provisions in 
question (Case 246/89R). This order was granted by the President 
of the Court on 10 October 1989. 
1 3 6 [1989) 2 All ER 692. 
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Community law". 1 3 7 
The actual reasoning (paragraphs 18 - 24) of the ruling which the ECJ 
returned to the House of Lords turned out to be soberingly short and 
half of i t is a repetition of the judgment in the Simmenthal case138. 
Nevertheless, the Court took its Simmenthal judgment one discernible 
step further. 
The Court started by pointing out the importance of fu l l , uniform and 
undelayed application of directly applicable Community rules. Every 
conflicting provision of national law would be rendered automatically 
inapplicable. Then i t stressed that i t is for the national courts to 
ensure the legal protection of individual rights under Community law. 
Having prepared the ground for the decisive argument, the Court went 
on: "The Court has also held that any provision of a national legal 
system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which 
might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from 
the national court [ . . 1 the power to do everything necessary at the 
moment of its application to set aside national legislative provi-
sions which might prevent, even temporarily, Community rules from 
having fu l l force and effect are incompatible with those require-
ments, which are the very essence of community law I 1 3 9 ] . It must be 
added that the fu l l effectiveness of Community law would be just as 
much impaired i f a rule of national law could prevent a court seised 
of a dispute governed by Community law from granting interim relief 
in order to ensure the fu l l effectiveness of the judgment to be given 
on the existence of the rights claimed under Community law. It 
follows that a court which in those circumstances would grant interim 
relief, i f i t were not for a rule of national law, is obliged to set 
aside that rule." 
At a first glance, this seems like a perfectly natural extension of 
the Simmenthal judgment. The inherent novelty can be perceived more 
clearly i f one looks at an argument which the UK goverment had put 
forward in its written observations before the judgment. It had 
confirmed that the implications of the Simmenthal judgment were 
1 3 7 Opinion of the Advocate General, paragraph 1, not yet published. 
1 3 8 Case 106/77, see supra, I I . 4. 
1 3 9 So far the Court claims to be following paragraphs 22 and 23 of 
Simmenthal, which is not entirely true, since i t added 'even 
temporarily'. 
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fully recognised in United Kingdom law. Nevertheless, "(iln Simmen-
thal the rights In question were not theoretical, because they had 
already been established by the Court in a previous judgment [Case 
35/76 Simmenthal I]; furthermore, the action brought by Simmenthal 
before an Italian court was a well-established remedy in the national 
legal order. The contrast with the present case is therefore strik-
ing." 1 4 0 
Both are indeed true. But by ignoring these differences the ECJ 
impliedly makes two important points: 
First, the concept of primacy of Community law over national law is 
not only effective once an individual Community right is definitely 
established. It also affects the stage of uncertainty while the claim 
to a Community right is being examined. It follows from the principle 
of effectiveness or e f f e t utile that even the protection of an 
alleged or putative Community right must be given priority over 
national legislation. 
Should the alleged right under Community law later be found to exist, 
the setting aside of national law is ex post facto vindicated because 
the national provision had in fact always been contrary to Community 
law. 
The interesting and new development in Factortame becomes apparent i f 
the claimed Community rights are found to be illusory. In this case, 
a national law which is perfectly in line with Community law will 
have yielded, i f only temporarily, not to a conflicting Community 
rule but to the temporary possibility that such a rule might exist. 
To the ECJ, this is more tolerable than depriving an individual of a 
possible Community right. 
The second point concerns the availability of interim measures. In 
Rewe v. Hauptzollamt Kiel141 the Court had held that the Treaty "was 
not intended to create new remedies in the national courts to ensure 
the observance of Community law other than those already laid down by 
national law". 
Factortame qualifies this judgment to some extent. If a remedy is 
generally known to a national legal system and the question is only 
1 4 0 Paragraph 32; also cf. A. Barav, Enforcement of Community Rights 
in the National Courts: The Case for Jurisdiction to Grant an 
Interim Relief, p. 374. 
1 4 1 Case 158/80 [19811 2 ECR 1805 at 1838 paragraph 44. 
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whether the remedy is available in a particular case, the principle 
of e f f e t utile requires national courts to ignore rules which would 
deny the imterlm protection to an applicant who can reasonably claim 
a right under Community law. This is not equivalent to the creation 
of a new remedy. 
7) Further Cases Concerning the Principle of Direct Effect 
The preceding cases are the most fundamental and have therefore been 
discussed in some detail. However, a number of additional elements 
have evolved in other cases before the ECJ which should be mentioned 
briefly. 
a) The Status of Secondary Community Law 
First i t must be pointed out that once the Court has established that 
a particular measure of secondary Community law is directly effective 
there is no difference 1 4 2 in legal force to a Treaty provision. This 
can clearly be seen in the Internationale-Handelsgesellschaft case 
where a number of simple Council Regulations took precedence over the 
core of German constitutional law. 
aa) Regulations 
According to Art. 189 EECT Regulations are directly applicable but 
this does not necessarily mean that they are also directly effecti-
ve. 1 4 3 The ECJ has underlined this by its frequent use of the formula 
that "by virtue of Article 189 regulations are directly applicable 
and, consequently, may [italics supplied] by their very nature have 
direct effect". 1 4 4 Whether or not they confer directly enforceable 
rights on private nationals remains to be seen in every individual 
1 4 2 With one exception concerning Directives which will be explained 
later. 
1 4 3 Collins, p. 73; Schermers, § 253; Steiner, Textbook on EEC Law, p. 
24. 
1 4 4 Case 4/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office, (1974] ECR 1337 at 1348 
paragraph 12. 
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bb) Decisions 
A Decision "is binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is 
addressed" (Art. 189 (4) EECT). Decisions may be issued by the 
Council or by the Commission and may be addressed to individuals or 
to member states. 
Decisions addressed to individuals will by their very nature produce 
direct effects. 1 4 8 But even if the addressee is a member state, a 
decision may be invoked by individuals i f i t meets the same condi-
tions which have been set up for the test of primary law for direct 
effects: above all there must be a clear and unconditional obliga-
tion. 1 4 6 
cc) Directives 
One of the most controversial aspects147 of the principle of direct 
effect is the fact that It has been extended to Directives. 
A Directive is "binding, as to the results to be achieved, upon each 
member state to which i t is addressed, but shall leave to the 
national authorities the choice of form and methods" (Art. 189 (3) 
EECT). 
On the face of i t , Directives are not even directly applicable (since 
they require implementing measures by the member states), let alone 
directly effective. Notwithstanding this apparent obstacle the Court 
of Justice found in Grad v. Flnanzamt Traustein1<lB that Directives, 
too, could under certain circumstances be directly effective. An 
indispensable requirement for the direct effect of Directives is that 
1 4 8 Schermers, § 254. 
1 4 6 This was held by the ECJ in three related judgments of October 
1970: Case 9/70 Grad v. Finanzamt Traustein, [1970] 2 ECR 825; 
Case 20/70 Lesage v. Hauptzollamt Freiburg, [1970] 2 ECR 861 and 
Case 23/70 Haselhorst v. Finanzamt Dilsseldorf, [1970] 2 ECR 881. 
1 4 7 See Collins, pp. 94 et seq. 
1 4 8 Case 9/70 [1970] ECR 825. 
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the time-limit for their implementation has expired.1 4 9 The member 
states enjoy discretion as to the course of action they want to adopt 
while the implementation period lasts. But after that, their obliga-
tion becomes an absolute one and they will not be allowed to benefit 
from their own failure to implement the Directive. 1 9 0 
A Directive may also be invoked by individuals i f its implementation 
by the national authorities appears to fal l short of the require-
ments.131 A Directive may also be (immediately) directly effective 
when i t does not specifically call for implementation measures, 
provided the other criteria for direct effect are satisfied. 1 8 2 
The direct effect of non-implemented Directives must not be confused 
with the obligation of all the authorities in the member states to 
interpret all their domestic law in a way that will secure the 
achievement of the result of Directives referred to in Art. 189 (3) 
1 4 9 It was unsuccessfully attempted to invoke a Directive before the 
expiry of the time-limit in Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v. 
Ratti, [19791 2 ECR 1629. 
1 3 0 Beutler/Bieber, p. 230. See also Case 148/78 Ratti, op cit., at 
1642. 
1 3 1 See Case 51/76 Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemlngen v Inspecteur 
der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, [1977] ECR 113 , or Case 8/81 
Becker v. Finanzamt Miinster-Innenstadt, (19821 ECR 53 at 70. Much 
of the litigation concerning the direct effect of EC equal pay and 
treatment Directives was caused by the UK governments view that 
only minor alterations to the Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 was required; see Pickstone v Freemans 
pic, [1988] 2 All ER 803 HL. 
Cf. also J. Steiner, Coming to Terms with EEC Directives, p. 144. 
1 8 2 See Case 4/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office, [1974] ECR 1337. In this 
well-known case Miss Ivonne Van Duyn, a Dutch national who wanted 
to work for the Church of Scientology, was able to challenge the 
Home Office's refusal to allow her enter the country by citing 
Art. 3 of the Directive 64/221 (relating to the free movement of 
workers). 
See HL Select Committee on the European Communities (1974-5), 10th 
Report, on the consequences of the Van Duyn case for the UK 
government. 
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b) Direct Effect Between Individuals104 
As to primary Community Law, the direct effect of suitable Treaty 
provisions is not limited to cases between individuals and public 
authorities but can also play a role in the litigation between 
private parties (this is also sometimes called 'horizontal ef-
fect ') . 1 9 8 
Regulations, too, may have horizontal effect. 
Directives, on the other hand, only oblige member states to take 
implementing measures. Thus the ECJ held: "It follows that a directi-
ve may not of itself impose obligations on such an individual and 
that a provision of a directive may not be relied upon as such 
against such a person."196 
1 9 3 See Case 14/83 Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, (19841 2 
ECR 1891 at 1909; Case 79/83 Harz v. Deutsche Tradax GmbH, (1984] 
2 ECR 1921; also Case 222/84 Johnston v. Chief Constable of Royal 
Ulster Constabulary, (1986] ECR 1651 at 1690. 
1 9 4 See Bieber/ Beutler, pp. 231-2. 
1 9 9 See e.g. Case 43/75 Defrenne v. SABENA (No. 2), [1976] ECR 455, 
which concerned Art. 119 EECT and the principle of 'equal pay for 
equal work' contained therein. 
1 9 6 Case 152/84 Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire 
Authority (Teaching), [1986] ECR 723 at 749 paragraph 48. 
III. The Implications of the Principles of Direct Effect and 
Supremacy of Community Law for the National Legal Systems 
Against the background of the case-law of the European Court of 
Justice concerning the principles of direct effect and supremacy of 
Community law i t is now possible to give a summarised description the 
relationship of Community law and national law as i t presents itself 
today. 
The conclusions which can be distilled from the cases are of course 
valid in relation to all the member states, but particular emphasis 
will be laid on such aspects which bear relevance to the doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty. For the sake of clarity, the consequences 
of the two principles will be considered in three sections: the 
implications for 1) the mode of incorporation of Community law, 
2) for national legislators and 3) for national courts. 
The different aspects are of course closely interrelated and comple-
ment each other. 
It must be borne in mind that this part represents solely the 
'European' point of view. As we shall see shortly, the member states 
do not necessarily concur. Depending on their respective starting 
points, fu l l compliance with the views put forward by the ECJ 
required (or st i l l requires) fundamental departures from deeply 
rooted legal traditions which can not be expected to be brought about 
over night. 
1. The Implications for the Incorporation of Community Law into 
National Legal Systems 
The problem of the relationship between the national legal order of a 
state and the international legal order is nothing new. Somehow the 
modus of their co-existence has to be regulated. There are (without 
going into the subleties of the subject) basically two solutions to 
this problem: Monism and Dualism. 
a) The Monist Approach 
The monist theory is based on the assumption that national and 
international law are part of the same legal system. This means that 
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rules of international law can be directly applied within the 
national legal order without the need of incorporating measures. 
This compensates the relative weakness of international law which is 
due to the fact that i t lacks an effective institutional framework 
for its enforcement. 
The concept of monism does not necessarily pre-empt the question of 
the status of international law in cases of conflict 1 5 7, although 
ideally the rules of the larger Community should prevail over 
domestic law. 
Among the member states of the European Community, the BENELUX-
countries, France and Greece have a monist system. 
b) The Dualist Approach 
According to the dualist theory, international and national law are 
two distinct and separate legal systems. The former has no effect in 
municipal law unless i t is expressly incorporated. 
None of the member states of the Community adheres to the dualist 
therory in this extreme form as customary international law is 
generally treated as law of the land. 1 3 8 
Compared to the monist approach, dualism has a number of drawbacks as 
far as international treaties are concerned: first, i t leads to a 
rather cumbersome process since every transformation takes time. 
Second, the transformed national rule may differ from the original 
wording of the treaty provision (or, in the context of Community law, 
of binding decisions adopted by Community institutions), thus spoi-
ling the objective of uniformity. Third, the courts might be 
induced by the fact that they are concerned with a rule of national 
and not of international law to employ their usual domestic methods 
of interpretation. Lastly, any implementation by a national legisla-
tor would be subject to the lex posterior rule and could easily be 
repealed. 
1 3 7 See Schermers, § 210; Steiner, Textbook on EEC Law, p. 34. This is 
disputed, however, as some writers maintain that monism automati-
cally entails the priority of international law, see e.g. Collins, 
p. 14. 
1 3 8 For the United Kingdom see Brownlie, pp. 43 et seq., with further 
references. 
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On the other hand, the main advantage of the dualist system is that 
i t fully sustains the freedom of action of national parliaments. Not 
only can they decide if , but also when, how and to what extent they 
are going to incorporate the international rule. 
The dualist system can be found in Ireland, Denmark, Portugal and, 
not surprisingly, in the United Kingdom139. 
Germany and Italy, too, favour the dualist approach, with the 
variation that the laws by which the respective parliaments authorize 
their governments to ratify the treaty simultaneously incorporate i t 
into the national legal system.160 
A similar approach can be found in the Spanish Constitution, Art. 96 
(1): "Validly concluded international treaties, once officially 
published in Spain, shall form part of the internal legal order." 
c) The Attitude of the European Court of Justice 
As we have seen, the ECJ clearly advocates a strictly monist view. 
Although the Treaty itself is silent on this point (except for 
regulations in Art. 189 EECT), the Court insists that the Community 
can only function i f member states adopt a monist approach where 
Community law in concerned: Community law does not require any 
transformation into national law (in other words, from the Communi-
ty's point of view the European Communities Act 1972 is superfluous; 
the Westminster Parliament might as well repeal i t without making the 
slightest change to the operation of Community law in the UK!). 
It must be absolutely identical in all member states and It is 
effective from the moment of its entry into force without further 
need for approval by national authorities. 
Furthermore, Community law must prevail over municipal legislation 
(including provisions of the constitution), irrespective of which is 
first in time. 
1 3 9 For the UK, this principle was only recently confirmed by Lord 
Oliver in J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v. Department of Trade 
and Industry. "(A] treaty is not part of English law unless and 
until It has been incorporated into the law by legislation."; 
(1989) 3 WLR 969 at 1002, [1989] 3 All ER 523 at 544-545, HL. 
1 6 0 Art. 59 (2) German constitution; Art. 80 Italian constitution. 
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On a political level, the consequences of Community membership for 
national parliaments are quite obvious: certain policy areas are 
separated from their immediate sphere of responsibility. For some 
areas, like customs duties, this separation is total, in other areas, 
like competition law, competences are shared. Speaking in the catego-
ries that were used above161 to explain the fictional character of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty, EC-membership has very substantially added 
to the actual restraints 0/ legal sovereignty, thus eve^ widening the c 
gap between constitutional theory and political reality. 
The legal control of national parliaments over the decision-making 
process on the European level is limited: i t cannot extend much 
further than to instruct government ministers how to vote in Council 
meetings.162 National parliaments have to accept that they are no 
longer the only legitimate source of legislation. Community inst i tu-
tions have the power to make rules which directly affect the same 
people and the same territory. 
In areas where the Community has taken action, the national legisla-
tors must abstain from from passing conflicting legislation. In the 
Community context, this is not only an obligation on the internatio-
nal level which leaves intact the theoretical power to enact contra-
vening laws. In the view of the ECJ, "to the extent that the Member 
States have transferred legislative powers [..] they no longer have 
the powers to adopt legislative provisions."163 
3. The Implications For National Courts 
The most profound repercussions of the principles of direct effect 
and supremacy of Community law fal l on the national judiciaries. 
161 Supra, chapter B. I . 6. b). 
1 6 2 This is a prerogative exercised by the Danish parliament, see 
D.A.C. Freestone/ J.S. Davidson, The Institutional Framework of 
the European Communities, pp. 105 - 106. For the UK cf. infra, 
chapter D. III . 1. b). 
1 6 3 Case 40/69 Hauptzollamt Hamburg v. Bollmann, [1970] ECR 69 at 79 
paragraph 4. 
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In Van Gend i t was made clear that the national courts play a vital 
role in the European Community, since they (and not the ECJ) in 
practice have to protect individuals against any kind of encroachment 
of their rights under Community law. 1 6 4 The essence of 'direct effect' 
is that every national may invoke a suitable rule of primary or 
secondary Community law in his favour directly before a municipal 
court. 
The judges are thus called upon to apply a new range of legal rules 
in addition to the rules of their own national legal system. As we 
have seen, they are supposed to apply these rules as such (!); 
because they exist as rules of Community law and not because i t Is 
the (unspoken) will of their national legislator. In other words, 
they, too, are asked to accept that there are new organs with an 
Independent legislative authority. 
If we at this point recall the orthodox definition of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty165 the conflict is obvious. The Westminster Parliament is 
considered to be the only legitimate legislative authority; every 
other form of legislation in the state can only be a delegated one 
which is rooted in, and accountable to, Parliament. The courts are 
not supposed to accept a rival legislative power. 
The problem becomes even clearer i f we include the element of 
supremacy of Community law in our considerations. 
The national courts are not only expected to apply these new rules, 
but also to grant them priority in cases of conflict with a national 
law. In the present context we may safely bypass the old dispute 
whether this means that the national law must be 'declared void', 
'set aside' or 'disregarded'. It doesn't matter as in any case the 
clash with the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty is unavoidable: in 
the UK, no person is recognised as having a right to override or set 
aside the legislation of Parliament.166 
The Community not only presents the courts with a new source of 
legislation but also sets up a hierarchy in which the national 
parliaments are only second. Even national constitutional law must 
yield to the Community's legal order. 
This hierarchy also excludes the lex posterior rule: national legis-
lation cannot repeal prior Community law. 
1 6 4 See Schermers, §8 674/5. 
1 6 0 See supra, chapter B. 
1 6 6 See supra, p. 8. 
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In the early days of the Community i t has been suggested that the 
problem could be solved i f the national Courts adopted new, Communi-
ty-sociable techniques of interpreting national law. 1 6 7 Such pragmatic 
approaches are desirable and appropriate. But they can only serve to 
minimize the number of times in which the two laws are truly 
irreconcilable and the question of which will prevail must be 
decided. 
The conclusions which have to be drawn from the case-law of the ECJ 
go further than that. Ultimately, the ECJ envisages a change of role 
of the national courts. As far as Community law goes, they are no 
longer seen as a purely national institution but as an instrument of 
'the law' in general (including Community law), doing justice inde-
pendently of any national authority. 1 6 8 Bebr has remarked that "since 
Community law is [ . . 1 applied by national courts, its supremacy 
depends on the readiness of these courts to follow the case-law of 
the Court."169 Asking the national courts to uphold Community rules 
even against the contravening will of the national legislator, 
however framed, calls for a transfer of judicial loyalty to Community 
institutions. 1 7 0 Thus, from the point of view of the ECJ, the transfer 
of political sovereignty is complemented by a transfer of legal 
sovereignty which is essential for the effective functioning of the 
Community. 
In effect, national courts are asked to act upon a new grundnorm or 
rule of recognition in favour of the Community. 
Such an idea must be a serious inroad on the national legal systems 
of all member states, especially those who traditionally follow the 
dualist view. 
But for the UK, this shakes the very foundations of the doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty, which, as we found, is based on the total 
allegiance of the courts to the UK Parliament. 
1 6 7 See the discussion in Petersmann, pp. 78 - 81. 
1 6 8 See Schermers, g 201; J.D.B. Mitchell, "What do you want to be 
inscrutable for, Marcla?" or The White Paper on the Legal and 
Constitutional Implications of UK Membership of the European 
Communities, pp. 121 et seq.; Beutler/Bieber, p. 215. 
1 6 9 Bebr, p. 664. 
1 7 0 See Petersmann, p. 104. 
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Summary 
The ECJ uses 'sovereignty' in an interdisciplinary, embracing sense. 
The transfer of sovereign rights is at the same time a political and 
a legal process, both inseparably linked. 1 7 1 
The ECJ's theory of a 'new legal order' is a direct challenge to the 
traditional constitutional understandings as far as they are based on 
the idea of an autonomous nation state. 1 7 2 Taken at its face value, It 
is in particular irreconcilable with the orthodox doctrine of Parlia-
mentary Sovereignty. 
IV. The Reaction in the Member States 
Traditionally, the questions of direct applicability and direct 
effect of an international treaty are answered not from the point of 
view of this treaty but according to the constitutional rules of the 
contracting states (simply because they are the lex fori). For the 
UK, i t has been argued that this rule applies also to the EC, without 
any qualification. 1 7 3 
The ECJ, on the other hand, has a strong case by pointing out that 
the EC is not just another international organisation but stands for 
a unique and ongoing process of political integration which involves 
the member states in their entirety. This process could easily be 
jeopardized by an inflexible insistence on concepts which are obli-
vious to the special problems arising from Community membership. 
Then again, the fact that we are dealing with a political process 
works both ways. The Community must be anxious not to overtax the 
ability or the readiness of its members to commit themselves to 
irreversible integrational steps at a given time. 1 7 4 
From the ECJ's point of view, the question of the relationship has 
been clearly and logically answered on the basis of the efficacy of 
1 7 1 See Petersmann, p. 102. 
1 7 2 See Rix-Mackenthun, p. 122; Petersmann, p. 105. 
1 7 3 Collins, pp. 40-41. 
1 7 4 This could lead to the same sort of political crisis which the 
Community experienced in 1965, when France abstained from Council 
meetings for several months because of grave disagreements over 
the future course of the Community; see Beutler/ Bieber p. 34. 
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the Community. 
This cannot simply be ignored. The special nature of Community's 
legal order demands that all member states, and especially those 
which usually follow the dualist theory, take the ECJ's views into 
account. 
Before we examine the situation in the United Kingdom, we shall 
briefly look at how the other member states and in particular their 
courts handle the principles of direct effect and of supremacy of 
Community law. Generally, the municipal courts seem now prepared to 
follow the ECJ's view that the Community is an autonomous source of 
law which takes precedent over national law In cases of conflict. 1 7 3 
However, the development of attitudes in the individual member states 
was heterogenous due to the differing constitutional foundations. 
1. The Founding Member States 
a) The BENELUX States 
The countries with the least problems in connection with Community 
law are the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The revised Dutch constitu-
tion of 1958 lays down in its Art. 66 the supremacy of international 
law even over subsequent national law. This provision is also applied 
to Community law. Luxembourg, too, has traditionally held a monist 
view which poses no problems for the courts which loyally apply 
Community law. 1 7 6 
The situation was slightly more complicated in Belgium, where the 
constitution did not comprehensively regulate the conclusion and the 
effect of international treaties. In addition, the Belgian system of 
separation of powers prevented courts from reviewing the validity of 
national legislation. 
But in a historic and fundamental decision of May 27 1971, the 
Belgian Cour de Cassation acknowledged both the principles of direct 
effect and of supremacy of Community law and the lower courts' power 
1 7 9 See Everling, Zum Vorrang des EG-Rechts vor natlonalem Recht, p. 
1201. 
1 7 6 See G. Olmi, Les rapports entre droit communautaire et droit 
national dans les arrets des jurisdictions superieures des Etats 
membres, pp. 246 et seq. 
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of judicial review.1 7 7 The judgment was particularly remarkable becau-
se the Cour did not attempt to prove the validity of these principles 
by re-interpreting the national provisions on the relationship bet-
ween domestic and international law, but instead adopted the ECJ's 
theory of a 'new legal order'. 
b) France1 7 8 
In France, the constitutional starting conditions for Community 
membership seemed rather favourable. Traditionally, France has tended 
towards a monist view of the relationship between national and 
international law. 1 7 9 Both the constitution of 1946 (in Art. 26) and 
the constitution of 1958 (in Art. 55) give international treaties 
priority over national law. 
Still, the enforcement of Community law in France was difficult right 
from the beginning. First of all, French courts, and above all the 
Conseil d'Etat, were extremely hesitant to make references to the ECJ 
under Art. 177 EECT.180 They had developed their own acte clair 
doctrine1 8 1 which the applied generously to Community matters. 
Secondly, the priority of international treaties was conditional on 
reciprocity 1 8 2. It was only in 1975 that the Cour de Cassation set 
this restriction aside for the application of Community law: "But in 
the Community legal order the failure of a Member State of the EEC to 
comply with its obligations under the Treaty [..} is subject to the 
procedure laid down by Article 170 of that Treaty and so the plea of 
lack of reciprocity cannot be made before the national courts."183 In 
177 Minister for Economic Affairs v. S.A. Fromagerie Franco-Suisse he 
Ski, [19721 CMLR 330. 
1 7 8 See in greater detail D. Baumgartner, Per Vorrang des Gemein-
schaftsrechts vor franzosischem Recht. 
1 7 9 See Schermers, § 210. 
180 For examples see Beutler/Bieber, p. 93. The Conseil d'Etat asked 
the ECJ for an interpretation of a Community provision for the 
first time in 1970! 
1 8 1 See Schermers, §§ 727 et seq. 
1 8 2 Meaning their application by the other party. See supra, p.. 
183 French Cafes Jaques Vabre Case, Cour de Cassation, 24 May 
1975, (1976) 13 CMLRev, pp. 128 - 132 with note by G. Bebr. 
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the same judgment the Cour removed another obstacle: since the French 
Revolution the French courts were not permitted to hold parliamentary 
enactments void, with the consequence that they were bound to a 
strict lex posterior rule. The Cour de Cassation now ruled that even 
subsequent French statutes had to yield to Community law. 
Only months later the Cour confirmed the primacy of Community law 1 8 4, 
but this time the result was not inferred from Art. 55 of the 
constitution but from the special nature of the Community's legal 
order! 
Whereas the jurisdiction of the Cour de Cassation (and of most other 
French courts) is fully in line with the requirements of Community 
law, the opposite was true for the Conseil d'Etat. It had shown a 
steadfast reluctance to set aside national statutes which conflict 
with prior Community law. 1 8 5 According to the Conseil d'Etat, only the 
Conseil Constitutionnel could decide on the constitutionality of 
national law. 1 8 6 Since the Conseil Constitutionnel itself does not 
regard the compatibility of national law with Community law as a 
problem of constitutionality, there was a serious jurisdictional gap. 
In 1980, the Conseil d'Etat in a much critisised judgment187 also 
blithely refused to accept the direct effect of a particular Directi-
ve, which had been positively established by the ECJ in its Van Duyn 
judgment188. It repeated this obstinate refusal in 1986, when i t 
disregarded a decision of the ECJ which had held the Sixth VAT 
Directive to be directly effective, but recently, the Conseil d'Etat 
seems to have accepted at least the direct effect of the Sixth VAT 
Directive1 8 9. This apparent change of attitude in the last year has 
1 8 4 See Beutler/Bieber, p. 94 note 74. 
1 8 9 See in particular the judgment of 1 March 1968, (1968) Recueils 
des Decisions du Conseils d'Etat; more recently judgment of 23 
November 1984, (1985) Actualites juridiques de droit administratif 
(AJDA), p. 216. 
1 8 6 Judgment of 15 January 1975, (1975) Journal droit international, 
p. 416; also cf. Everling, Zum Vorrang des Gemelnschaftsrechts vor 
natlonalem Recht, pp. 1203 et seq. 
187 Minister of the Interior v. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, (1980] 1 CMLR 543. 
1 8 8 See supra, p. 99. 
189 Compagnie Alitalia, [1990] 1 CMLR 248. 
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been confirmed in an important judgment of 24 September 1990 in which 
the court fully accepted the supremacy of Community law over subse-
quent French statutes.1 9 0 
c) Federal Republic of Germany 
Germany is one of the member states with a dualist approach to 
international law. In spite of this, the problem for the German 
Courts was not so much the idea of Community law as an autonomous 
legal order1 9 1 which has to be applied directly and prevails over 
national law in cases of conflict. 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht has acknowledged that Community law 
prevails over subsequent incompatible legislation and has also con-
firmed that lower German courts can, in accordance with the Slmmen-
thal principle, set aside such provisions without having to wait for 
an authorative ruling by the Constitutional Court1 9 2 (which otherwise 
has the exclusive power to review statutes 1 9 3). 
The problem in Germany was (and in theory sti l l is) the question of 
constitutional review of Community legislation. Under the Grundgesetz 
the legislator is bound by the catalogue of fundamental rights and by 
a number of basic structural principles. Consequently, any power 
which the German parliament transfers to an international organisa-
tion under Art. 24 GG is subject to the same limitations. 
This was exactly the objection of the Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt in 
the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft Case.194 The Frankfurt Court, 
discontented with the preliminary ruling i t received from the ECJ, 
asked the Bundesverfassungsgericht to decide on the constitutionality 
of the EC Regulations. The Bundesverfassungsgericht answered the 
question of its own jurisdiction in the affirmative, arguing that 
only thus would a comprehensive protection of fundamental rights be 
190 Maurice Boisdet, [1991] 1 CMLR 3. 
1 9 1 In fact, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsge-
richt) has given up the dualist view as far as Community law is 
concerned and has expressly adopted the ECJ's concept. 
1 9 2 BVerfGE 22, 292 et seq.; see also BVerfGE 73, 339 et seq. 
1 9 3 Articles 93 and 100 of the Grundgesetz. 
1 9 4 See supra, pp. 89/90. 
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guaranteed.198 This jurisdiction would exist so long as there is no 
Community Bill of Rights similar to the one set out in the German 
constitution. 1 9 6 But in the following years, the court progressively 
narrowed the scope of its own jurisdiction, most profoundly by 
exempting primary Community law. 1 9 7 
Eventually, in 1986, the court took a major step forward and declared 
that i t would refrain from exercising its jurisdiction to check the 
constitutionality of secondary Community law against the Grundge-
setz.198 The consistent case-law of the ECJ in connection with human 
rights in the Community and the de-facto application of the European 
Convention on Human Rights had convinced the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
that the Community offers a sufficient standard of protection.1 9 9 
It must be pointed out, though, that in theory the court sti l l 
reserves the right to check whether Community law encroaches on 
inalienable principles of the German constitution. 2 0 0 
Like the Conseil d'Etat in France, there is one Federal Court in 
Germany which has displayed an alarming obstinacy in its attidudes 
towards Community law. The Bundesfinanzhof (Germany's highest fiscal 
court) refused to acknowledge the direct effect of the Sixth VAT 
Directive 2 0 1 and repeated this refusal 2 0 2 even after a lower Court had 
1 9 0 BVerfGE 37, 271 (29 May 1975). 
1 9 6 This judgment has become famous under the name 'Solange' 
Csolange' = 'so long as'). It has both been applauded and 
strongly criticised, see the numerous citations in Beutler/Bieber, 
p. 99, notes 101 and 102. In retrospective, the judgment has 
turned out to be less disintegrating than was initially feared. 
1 9 7 BverGE 52, 187 CVielleichf, 25 July 1979); BVerfGE 58, 1 ('Euro-
Control I ' , 23 June 1981) and BVerfGE 59, 63 ('Euro-Control I I ' , 
10 November 1981). 
198 Re Application of Wiinsche, [1987] 3 CMLR 225. In Germany, this 
judgment is known as 'Solange I I ' ; see M. Hilf, Solange I I : Wie 
lange noch solange?. 
199 Re Application of Wiinsche, [19871 3 CMLR 225 at 259 paragraph 36. 
zoo This test would only be an indirect one as the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht would not rule on Community law but on the constitu-
tionality of of the German law of accession. 
2 0 1 Judgment of 16 July 1981, [1982) 1 CMLR 527. 
2 0 2 Judgment of 25 April 1985, (1985) 20 Europarecht, p. 191. 
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made a reference under Art. 177 (2) EECT and the ECJ had re-affirmed 
that individuals could invoke the provisions of this Directive in 
national courts2 0 3. 
Meanwhile the Bundesverfassungsgericht has ended this conflict and 
told the Bundesfinanzhof that the ECJ has not exceeded its powers by 
according direct effect to Directives.2 0 4 
d) Italy 
The situation in Italy resembles the one in Germany as Italy, too, 
adheres to the dualist view and has a constitutional court. 2 0 8 
Initially the Corte constituzionale had held in the case Costa v. 
ENEL that the ratification treaty concerning EEC membership only had 
the status of an ordinary law and and consequently was subject to the 
lex posterior rule in cases of conflict. 2 0 8 In 1973 the Corte adopted 
the theory of the Community as an autonomous legal order and declared 
this to be compatible with the Italian constitution. 2 0 7 Two years 
later the court accepted that national legislation which conflicted 
with Community law was unconstitutional, even if i t was later in time 
than the conflicting Community provision. 2 0 8 But the Corte s t i l l 
considered itself as the only authority which could rule on the 
constitutionality of national law. Full compliance with the Simmen-
thal principle was accomplished in 1984, when the Corte recognized 
that lower courts were entitled to set aside national legislation on 
2 0 3 Case 70/83 Kloppenburg v. Finanzamt Leer, [1984] ECR 1075. 
204 Re Application of Kloppenburg, (1988) 3 CMLR 1. 
2 0 3 See Everling, Zum Vorrang des Gemeinschaftsrechts vor nationalem 
Recht, p. 1202. 
2 0 6 Judgment of 24 February 1964, Foro ital. 1964 I , Col. 466. 
2 0 7 Judgment of 27 December 1973 Nr. 183, (1974) Europarecht p. 249. 
2 0 8 Judgment of 30 October 1973 Nr. 232. Foro ital . 1975 I , 2661; 
(1976) Europarecht, p. 245. 
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their own. 2 0 9 
However, just like the Bundesverfassungsgericht the Corte constitu-
zionale has hinted that the Italian law of accession is st i l l subject 
to its jurisdiction as far as fundamental principles of the state 
order or basic human rights are concerned. 
2) The New Member States 
The legal situation of all the 'new' member states2 1 0 was slightly 
different because the principles of direct effect and supremacy of 
Community law had already been established. They form part of the 
acquis communautaire, the acceptance of which by the new members was 
a condition of all treaties of accession.211 
The Republic of Ireland and Denmark became members of the Community 
in 1972. In both countries international treaties are not directly 
applicable as a general rule. 2 1 2 Consequently the Irish and the Danish 
constitution were amended in order to accommodate them to the 
2 0 9 The Constitutional Court expressly declared that because of its 
autonomous character Community law renders inapplicable even sub-
sequent national measures and that ordinary courts may establish 
this without referring the question to the Constitutional Court: 
Dec. No. 170, SpA Granital v. Amministrazione delle Flnanzo dello 
Stato, (1984) Common Market Law Review, pp. 756 et. seq. with a 
commentary by G. Gaja. See also Droese, Das Simmenthal II-Urtell 
des EuGH in der itallenlschen Rechtsprechung und Literatur, p. 272. 
2 1 0 The information on Spain and Portugal is sti l l rather meagre; for 
Spain see I . Aurrecoechea, Some Problems Concerning the Constitu-
tional Basis for Spains Accession to the European Communities, 
and, The Role of the Autonomous Communities in the Implementation 
of European Community Law in Spain. 
For Portugal see M. E. Goncalves, Quelques problemes Juridiques 
que pourra poser l'appllcation du droit communautaire dans l'ordre 
juridique portugais face a la Constitution de 1976. 
2 1 1 See Beutler/ Bieber, pp. 41 and 101; also P. Dagtoglou, The 
Southern Enlargement of the European Communities. 
2 1 2 For Ireland this is expressly said in Art. 29 (6) of the 
constitution. 
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requirements of Community law. 
Denmark adopted a provision (similar to the ones in Italy and 
Germany) allowing for the delegation of powers to international 
authorities. The number of references of Danish courts to ECJ under 
Art. 177 EECT is strikingly low. This may be due to the fact that 
under the Danish rules of procedure references are only made in 
agreement with the parties involved. 2 1 3 In the cases before Danish 
courts there sti l l seems to be some reluctance to fully recognise the 
principle of supremacy of Community law. 2 1 4 
The amended Art. 29 of the Irish constitution lends strong support to 
Community law: "No provision of the Constitution invalidates laws 
enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the state necessitated by 
the obligations of membership of the Communities or prevents laws 
enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the Communities, or 
Institutions thereof, from having the force of law in the state."2 1 3 
In 1982, the Irish Supreme Court acknowledged the principle of 
supremacy of Community law. 2 1 6 
On the other hand the Supreme Court was not prepared to extend the 
effect of Art. 29 of the Constitution to fundamental changes of the 
EEC Treaty in connection of the Single European Act. 2 1 7 
In Greece218 (which acceeded in 1981), the relationship of national to 
Community law are governed by Art. 28 (1) of the Greek constitution: 
"The generally acknowledged rules of international law, as well as 
international conventions as of the time they are sanctioned by law 
and become operative according to the conditions therein, shall be an 
integral part of domestic Greek law and shall prevail over any 
contrary provision of the law." 
2 1 3 Beutler/ Bleber, p. 102. 
2 1 4 See H. Rasmussen, Ober die Durchsetzung des Gemeinschaftsrechts in 
Danemark. 
2 1 3 Third Amendment to the Irish Constitution (1972). 
216 Campus-Oil Ltd. v. The Ministry for Industry, (1984] CMLR 479. 
217 Crotty v. An Taoiseach, [1987] 2 CMLR 666. 
See J. P. McCutcheon, The Irish Supreme Court. European Coopera-
tion and the Single European Act, pp. 93 - 100. 
2 1 8 See D. Evrigenis, Legal and Constitutional Implications of Greek 
Accession to the European Communities. 
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It was obvious from this brief survey that for a variety of reasons 
there are still some reservations to accepting the dogmatic implica-
tions of the principles of direct effect and supremacy of Community 
Law. 
However, the majority of national courts seem now prepared to accept 
their new functions (and powers) with respect to the enforcement of 
Community law even though in some cases this amounts to a departure 
of traditional constitutional doctrine. But what is also clear is 
that this has been a gradual process; a cautious step-by-step 
approach rather than a spontaneous and unconditional endorsement of 
the ECJ's case-law. 
D. European Community Law in the United Kingdom 
I . Introduction 
Although all the member states are struggling to accept the legal 
implications of Community membership, the United Kingdom's position 
is special. The constitutional problems of British membership are 
aggravated by a number of unique circumstances. Only the Westminster 
Parliament is sovereign in the sense that i t enjoys unlimited power 
of law-making. The doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty was found to 
be based on the relation between Parliament and the courts, which 
"owe dutiful obedience" to the will of the legislator. 
But as was also shown above, the combined principles of direct effect 
and supremacy of Community law challenge exactly this subordination 
and thus apparently threaten to tear away the 'very keystone1 from 
the edifice of the British constitution. 
Unlike other member states, Britain with her unwritten constitution 
cannot avail herself of the possibility of a formal amendment of i t . 
Why should i t be so difficult to accomplish the supremacy of 
Community law if, as various Acts of Independence have proven, 
Parliament can transfer parts of its sovereign power to other 
legislative institutions, even under the orthodox doctrine?1 
Unfortunately, this mechanism is unworkable in the Community context. 
In all the cases cited the transfer of sovereignty was a territorial 
one. Parliament released only the courts in a particular territory 
from their obligations, but then the divorce was absolute and 
irrevocable. In the EC, the transfer is not defined territorially, 
but functionally. 2 It concerns not the courts in some distant former 
colony but in the United Kingdom. They are to enforce Community law 
in its own right and to obey national legislation in fields not 
occupied by Community law. 
The problem with this functional division of powers is that, as long 
as the courts sti l l recognise any Act of Parliament as the highest 
1 This question was raised by Mitchell, "What do you want to 
be inscrutable for, Marcia?", pp. 119/120. 
2 N.M. Hunnings, Constitutional Implications of Joining the Common 
Market, pp. 57/8, uses the terms 'vertical' and 'horizontal' loss 
of sovereignty. See also de Smith/ Brazier, pp. 78/79; and Rix-
Mackenthun, p. 136. 
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form of law (as they are bound to do under the doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty), i t is difficult to envisage a statutory 
construction which is in complete conformity with the case-law of the 
ECJ. Any legislative attempt to guarantee Community law supremacy 
would somehow have to sidestep the rule that no Parliament can bind 
its successors. Otherwise the instrument which grants 'supremacy' 
would always be subject to a future repeal, be i t expressly or 
impliedly. 
Under these circumstances the only realistic chance of fu l l compli-
ance with the requirements set up by the ECJ therefore seems to be 
that the British courts take the initiative and start to alter the 
grundnorm or rule of recognition which underlies the doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty.3 
Whether there is a readiness on the side of the judges to part with 
the old rule depends on several conditions: First, the changes In 
political reality must appear so fundamental that they call for a 
change in legal doctrine. This reflects on the question how far (or 
deep) political integration in the Community has progressed. Second, 
the courts will also observe carefully how the bearer of legal 
sovereignty itself, Parliament, deals with the implications of 
Community membership on sovereignty. If there is a general climate of 
acceptance that a modification of the rule would serve British 
interests well, this could certainly increase the likelihood of 
creative judgments. On the other hand, i t can hardly be expected that 
the judiciary attempts to swim against the general stream of pol i t i -
cal ideas. 
The following analysis will therefore have three parts. First, i t 
will be necessary to look at the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) 
and in particular its sections 2(1) and 2(4) which are concerned with 
direct effect and supremacy of Community law. Second, the attitude of 
Parliament itself towards the question of sovereignty will be 
examined. Lastly, on the basis of the two preceding parts, a scrutiny 
of the leading cases before British courts will show whether there 
are any signs for changes to the orthodox doctrine of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty. 
3 See Collins, p. 29 with supporting references in note 17. 
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I I . The Incorporation of Community Law in the United Kingdom 
1. Pre-Accession Ideas 
The constitutional difficulties of EC membership had been clearly 
perceived by academics and also by politicians, although the 1967 
White Paper Legal and Constitutional Implications of United Kingdom 
Membership of the European Communities devoted only two paragraphs to 
the issue.4 
Before the ECA was enacted, a number of ideas emerged as to how the 
direct effect and supremacy of EC law should be handled.3 Wade urged 
that the courts be relieved from the possible dilemma of loyalty by 
employing a 'European Communities (Annual) Act1 which would assert 
the supremacy of Community law. Alternatively he suggested that every 
fresh piece of legislation should contain the formula "This Act 
conforms to the|_European Communities".6 
Martin proposed the creation of a constitutional convention to the 
effect that Parliament is restrained from legislating contrary to 
Community law.7 Apart from the fact that conventions are not 
'created' ad hoc but evolve, the fact that they are not binding on 
the courts makes them an ineffective instrument of protecting Commu-
nity law supremacy.8 
A rather cumbersome method for avoiding the problem was proposed by 
Trindade. He suggested that every Bill before Parliament should be 
scrutinised for incompatibilities with Community law by a permanent 
Parliamentary Committee especially established for that purpose. 
Judges faced with a possible conflict between national and Community 
law should stay proceedings and refer the national rules to the 
Committee for consideration and, i f necessary, amending legislation 
by Parliament.9 
4 Cmnd. 3301, paras 22 and 23. 
3 Most of these proposals are summarized by Rix-Mackenthun, pp. 135 
et seq.; see also F.A. Trindade, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the 
Primacy of European Community Law, pp. 379 et seq. 
6 H.R.W. Wade, Sovereignty and the European Communities, pp. 3 - 5 . 
7 A. Martin, The Accession of the United Kingdom to the European 
Communities: Jurisdictional Problems, pp. 7 et seq. 
8 See Collins, p. 29; Rix-Mackenthun, p. 136. 
9 Trindade, pp. 394 et seq. 
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In addition to the delays in judgment such a procedure would cause 
and its conflict with the idea of Art. 177 EECT, its failing is the 
assumption that legislative correction of the national provision is 
needed before Community law can prevail. 
Some authors took the occasion of Community membership to repeat the 
calls for a written constitution.1 0 
Eventually, none of the above ideas were translated into action, but 
they provide a background against which the technique actually opted 
for in the ECA can be assessed. 
2. The European Communities Act 1972 
The ECA was enacted mainly for two reasons. First, accession to the 
Community necessitated a number of immediate amendments to and 
corrections of national law which were made in sections 4 - 12. 
Second, the United Kingdom courts act upon a dualist theory of 
international (treaty) law. On two different occassions preceding 
membership i t was made clear that no exemption to the dualist 
approach would be made for the EC. 
When the United Kingdom Government entered into negotiations of 
membership, Mr. Raymond Blackburn brought proceedings against the 
Attorney General seeking a declaration to the effect that the signing 
of the Treaty of Rome by Her Majesty's government would be unlawful. 
He argued that membership would involve the surrender of part of the 
sovereignty of the Queen in Parliament and that any subsequent Act of 
Parliament giving effect to the United Kingdom's accession would be 
an attempt to bind its sucessors. 
The Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, conceded that Mr. Blackburn 
might be correct, but went on to explain why the court declined to 
consider his objections: "Negotiations are st i l l in progress for us 
to join the Common Market. No agreement has been reached. No Treaty 
has been signed. Even if a Treaty is signed, it is elementary that 
these courts take no notice of treaties as such. We take no notice of 
treaties until they are embodied by Acts of Parliament and then only 
to the extent that Parliament tells us. [...] Mr. Blackburn 
1 0 See e.g. O. Hood Phillips, Reform of the Constitution, pp. 145 et 
seq. 
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acknowledged the general principle, but he urged that this proposed 
treaty is in a category by itself, in that it diminishes the 
sovereignty of Parliament over the people of this country. I cannot 
accept this distinction. The general principle applies to this treaty 
as to any other."11 
On exactly the same grounds the court refused to deal with a 
complaint put forward by Mr. Ross McWhirter that membership of the 
Community would constitute a violation of the Bill of Rights 1689.12 
Thus the prevailing legal philosophy called for an Act of Parliament 
to incorporate the whole body of Community law. 
a) Section 3 
Before dealing with section 2 i t is convenient to mention section 3 
which provides a sort of background for the other provisions of the 
Act. Normally, foreign law is treated by the courts not as a question 
of law but as a question of fact. In contrast thereto, issues of 
Community law are to be treated as questions of law. 
Subsections 2 - 5 explain of which sources of evidence judicial 
notice shall be taken. But, the most important and slightly contro-
versial provision is contained in subsection 1: any question as to 
the meaning or effect of the Treaties or secondary Community legisla-
tion must be determined 'in accordance with the principles laid down 
by and any relevant decision of the European Court*. 
As shown above, the principles of direct effect and supremacy are 
creatures of the case-law of the Court of Justice. If s. 3(1) imposes 
on the United Kingdom courts the obligation to follow this case-law, 
does this not mean fu l l acceptance of these principles without any 
need to resort to sections 2(1) and 2(4)?13 
I should think not. Sections 2(1) and 2(4) precede section 3. As they 
deal with the problems of direct effect and priority specifically, 
they are leges speciales in relation to s. 3(1). Therefore i t seems 
that one cannot derive from s. 3(1) any conclusions that go beyond 
11 Blackburn v. Attorney General, [1971] 2 All ER 1380 at 1382 (CA). 
12 McWhirter v. Attorney General, [1972] CMLR 882 at 886. 
1 3 Hallsbury's Laws of England. Vol. 51 Para. 3.06, states that "it 
would appear to produce the same practical results as section 2(1) 
and section 2(4)". 
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what is provided for by s. 2(1) and 2(4). 
What section 3(1) can do is serve as an aid in the interpretation of 
section 2(4). 1 4 
b) Subordinate Legislation under Section 2(2) 
Section 2 of the ECA distinguishes between directly applicable 
Community provisions and such which require implementing measures. 
For the larger part of the latter, s. 2(2) ECA empowers the executive 
to accomplish this implementation18 by passing statutory instru-
ments16, either in the form of regulations made by a designated 
Minister or department or as an Order in Council.17 As subordinate 
legislation such provisions are subject to the doctrine of ultra 
vires and could thus be held invalid under certain circumstances. 
Hence the potential conflict between Community law supremacy and the 
Sovereignty of Parliament cannot arise i f an inconsistency is disco-
vered between Community law and subordinate legislation (which is 
subject to judicial review). 
However, there are a number of exceptional cases in which implementa-
tion can only be effected by an Act of Parliament.18 
1 4 See T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, p. 
242; E.C.S. Wade/ A.W. Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative 
Law, p. 137. 
1 3 As Collins, p. 113, points out, subordinate legislation under s. 2 
(2) ECA may also serve to f i l l out or make specific provisions for 
those rights and obligations which are directly effective. 
1 6 Unless a draft of the instrument has been approved of by both 
Houses of Parliament, i t is subject to annulment by a resolution 
of either House, see Schedule 2 section 2 paragraph 2 (2) ECA 
1972. 
1 7 The importance of delegated legislation under s. 2(2) cannot be 
overestimated as by virtue of s. 2(4) i t may prevail over or even 
repeal and amend existing Acts of Parliament; see D.N. Clarke/ 
B.E. Sufrin, Constitutional Conundrums: The Impact of the United 
Kingdom's Membership of the European Communities on Constitutional 
Theory, pp. 48/9. 
1 8 See Schedule 2 section 2 paragraph 1 (1) of the ECA 1972. 
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c) Directly Applicable and Effective Community Law - Section 2(1) 
The key provision for directly applicable Community law is s. 2(1) 
ECA which reads: 
"All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restric-
tions from time to time created or arising by or under the 
Treaties19, and all such remedies and procedures from time to 
time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance 
with the Treaties are without further enactment to be given 
legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognized 
and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed 
accordingly; [...]" 
Several comments may be made. 
The link to the principles of direct applicability and direct effect 
is established by the passage "without further enactment to be given 
legal effect". 2 0 Nevertheless, i t must not be forgotten that s. 2(1) 
ECA is itself an enactment. Community rules have force not because 
they are created by Community institutions and the United Kingdom is 
a member of the Community, but only because s. 2(1) ECA 1972 
exists.2 1 
On the other hand, the ECA does not purport to determine itself the 
criteria for direct applicability: this is left entirely to the 
Community's legal system ("in accordance with the Treaties"), thus 
creating an interersting interaction between national and Community 
constitutional law. 
The Government White Paper 1967 had stressed the 'constitutional 
innovation' needed for "the acceptance in advance as part of the law 
of the United Kingdom of provisions to be made in the future by 
instruments issued by Community institutions - a situation for which 
there is no precedent in this country."22 The wording of s. 2(1) 
embraces existing as well as future provisions ("from time to time 
created") and i t also covers both primary and secondary Community law 
1 9 Section 1(2) ECA defines what the Treaties are. 
2 0 See Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 51 para 3.05. 
2 1 See Hartley, The Foundations, pp. 236/7; G. Howe, The European 
Communities Act 1972, p. 1; Clarke/ Sufrin, p. 46. 
2 2 Cmnd. 3301 para. 22. 
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("by or under the Treaties").23 
d) The Supremacy of Community Law - Section 2(4) 
Although s. 2(4) does not contain terms like 'supremacy' or 'prima-
cy' 2 4, i t was drafted to ensure the prevalence of Community law in 
the United Kingdom. The key passage is to be found "oddly sandwiched 
in the middle"28 of s. 2(4): 
"any enactment passed or to be passed [...] shall be construed 
and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this 
section."26 
As one of the foregoing provisions is s. 2(1), i t appears that fu l l 
Justice is done to the view of the ECJ because all acts are to be 
subordinate to directly applicable Community law, irrespective of 
which was f i rs t . 2 7 Alas, i t is not this simple. 
In the United Kingdom, under a doctrine of continuing sovereignty, 
the chronological order of the conflicting provisions is relevant. 
One can distinguish three different constellations. 
Any national rule prior to the ECA 1972 must be regarded as repealed 
by s. 2(4) to the extent that i t is incompatible with Community 
law. 2 8 This is a direct consequence of the lex posterior principle2 9 
which forms part of the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
A more problematic situation arises from post-accession legislation. 
There are two possibilities: either the directly applicable Community 
2 3 According to Hartley, The Foundations, p. 240, section 2(1) covers 
not only written Community law but also its general principles. 
2 4 According to Turpin, p. 334, i t wasn't thought right at the time 
to make an express declaration in the Act. 
2 3 Turpin, ibid. 
2 6 I t is generally accepted that theses words are not linked to the 
preceding part of s. 2(4) in a sense which would confine them to 
delegated legislation; see Clarke/Sufrin, p. 49. 
2 7 See Hartley, The Foundations, p. 242. 
2 8 See J. Jaconelll, Constitutional Review and Sec. 2(4) of the 
European Communities Act 1972, pp. 69/70. 
2 9 See Turpin, p. 335. 
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provision precedes in time the Act of Parliament or vice versa. 
Some authors30 do not join in this distinction. They argue that the 
principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty limits the effect of s. 2(4) 
ECA on all Acts of Parliament passed after 1 January 1973. As 
Parliament cannot bind its successor and as therefore the lex 
posterior rule applies, the courts must in a case of an irreconcila-
ble conflict accord precedence to the Act of Parliament as the latest 
expression of Parliament's will. 
However, there are good arguments which confirm the suspicion that 
this undiscriminating view needlessly increases the scope of the 
problem. 
The distinction explained above might be vindicated as follows: 
First, i t Is useful to remember the combined effects of sections 2(1) 
and 2(4) ECA. Section 2(1) commands that all directly applicable 
Community rules which are "from time to time to be created" shall be 
recognized and enforced in the United Kingdom and s. 2(4) supplies 
that national legislation shall "have effect subject to" such provi-
sions. So, clearly, the ECA allows Acts of Parliament to be superse-
ded by later Community law which, i f understood as a special form of 
delegated legislation, must itself be regarded as the most recent 
expression of Parliament's will . Therefore the problem of priority 
could only arise i f the post-accession Act of Parliament had 
"protected" itself against this mechanism by impliedly limiting the 
scope of the ECA. 
It is only natural that sometimes matters need regulating before 
decisions on the Community level are taken. If a post-accession Act 
of Parliament contains provisions for an area of policy which are not 
yet pre-occupied by Community law, there is hardly a way for 
Parliament to foresee inconsistencies with future Community provi-
sions. What reason should there be to believe that its decisions are 
not open to subsequent alterations by Community provisions? Unless 
Parliament says otherwise, the political fact of Community membership 
is justification enough for the assumption that Parliament did not 
intend to entrench its Act against the effects of subsequent directly 
applicable Community law. 
From the foregoing i t follows that the problem of priority arises 
only i f a post-accession Act of Parliament conflicts with a prior 
3 0 E.g. Hartley, The Foundations, p. 242; Turpin, p. 334. 
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rule of Community law. Only at this point does the continuing 
Sovereignty of Parliament intrude. 3 1 
What is the outcome i f Parliament legislates contrary to earlier 
Community law? Is there anything in s. 2(4) which would enable the 
courts simply to ignore such a provision and apply the contradicting 
Community rule instead, as the Simmenthal principle would demand? 
This question calls for a deeper investigation of the nature of 
s. 2(4) ECA. Three different understandings of the provision are 
conceivable and all three have been advocated. 
aa) A Substantive Entrenchment? 
The most extreme interpretation of s. 2(4) is that i t entrenches s. 2 
and 3 against any form of repeal or amendment in a later statute: 
"[..] where a statute of such fundamental constitutional importance 
provides for certain of its provisions to be alterable, i t must 
thereby be entrenching the remainder. Section 2(4), in its last part, 
expressly provides that the Second Schedule may be altered by 
subsequent Act of Parliament, a provision which is otherwise quite 
unnecessary. Is this a further attempt to entrench the fundamental 
sections of the Act?"32 
If this were indeed entrenchment, i t would mean that English law 
which is inconsistent with Community obligations is, without more, 
invalid and there would be no way to avoid this mechanism! 
Such a view would be in line with the case-law of the ECJ but 
unfortunately i t does not find sufficient justification in the facts. 
First of all, the feasibility of such a substantive entrenchment 
would be rejected both under the orthodox doctrine and under the new 
view. 3 3 But, more important, there is hardly enough indication in the 
wording of sec. 2(4) of an endeavour to break with traditional 
constitutional theory. The mention that the Second Schedule can be 
changed by Act of Parliament could also mean that alterations by 
subordinate legislation are excluded. Nothing in the parliamentary 
3 1 See Jaconelli, p. 70; de Smith/ Brazier, p. 80. 
3 2 B. Hoggett The Impact of Community Law upon the Law of the United 
Kingdom (II). p. 75. 
3 3 See supra, pp. 17 et seq. 
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discussions preceding the enactment of the ECA warrants the assump-
tion that an entrenchment was intended. On the contrary, the historic 
examples of the Acts of Union with Scotland or Ireland3 4 show that 
Parliament has always employed a much stronger, more direct and 
unambiguous language when i t attempted to exempt provisions from 
future repeal. 
bb) A Mere Rule of Interpretation? 
On the other end of the scale one could understand s. 2(4) as a mere 
rule of construction. I^s significance would be to advise the courts 
to choose among several possible interpretations of the words used in 
Acts of Parliaments that which meets the demands of Community law. 
To pick a Community-sociable interpretation is of course only possi-
ble "unless the contrary intention appears"33. 
There are two considerations which speak against such a view. The 
idea that s. 2(4) is, at bottom, a guideline for interpretation is 
based on the phrase "shall be construed". But this ignores the second 
part which reads "and [shall! have effect subject to". Unless this is 
completely empty and meaningless, i t can only be understood as a 
second step after an unsuccessful attempt of construction: i f the 
wording of a national law is not reconcilable with a contradicting 
Community rule by way of interpretation, i t must give way.38 
Even i f s. 2(4) did not expressly provide for a way to set aside 
national legislation, there would stil l be a case to argue that i t is 
more than a rule of interpretation in cases of ambiguity. Otherwise 
s. 2(4) ECA would be nothing but a (superfluous) reiteration of the 
well-established but rebuttable presumption that Parliament will not 
3 4 See supra, chapter B. I . 4. d) dd). 
3 3 This is the standard formula used in the Interpretation Act 1889, 
which is the classic example of an interpretation device. 
3 8 See Jaconelli, p. 66. J.D.B. Mitchell/ S.A. Kuipers/ B. Gall, 
Constitutional Aspects of the Treaty and Legislation relating to 
British Membership, pp. 143-4 have suggested that although s. 2(4) 
does not deprive Parliament of the power to enact legislation 
which is in conflict with Community law, the Act of Parliament 
would be rendered 'inoperative' as far as there is an inconsisten-
cy. 
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intentionally violate the United Kingdom's obligations arising from 
international treaties.3 7 
cc) Protection Against Implied Repeal? 
This leaves a third possible understanding of section 2(4) which lies 
between the two extremes. If s. 2(4) does not constitute a 
substantive entrenchment, itself and the remainder of the ECA 1972 
can be repealed in whole or in a particular case. If an Act of 
Parliament expressly states that its provisions shall be applied 
nothwithstanding conflicting Community provisions, then the judges 
must accept this as the latest expression of will of a continually 
sovereign Parliament. On the other hand, i f s. 2(4) has established a 
stronger principle than the normal common-law presumption concerning 
the interpretation of international law, nothing short of an express 
statement will have that effect. In every other case, i f the wording 
of a statute is capable of a construction which avoids clashes with 
Community law, this must be chosen, and in the remainder of cases the 
irreconcilable national provision must be ignored. 
This third view, to put i t more shortly, would protect s. 2(4) 
against implied repeal.38 
However logical this view of s. 2(4) might seem, especially i f one 
reads s. 2(4) in conjunction with s. 3(1) and considers the alterna-
tives, i t lacks a basis under the orthodox doctrine as i t is in 
conflict with the principles of the Ellen Street Estate Cases.39 
Cf. supra, chapter B, I . 4. b). See also Collins, p. 36. 
See e.g. Hartley, The Foundations, p. 243; Clarke/ Sufrin, p. 53; 
Collins, pp. 39/40. 
See supra, chapter B, I . 4. d) dd). Maugham LJ had declared i t 
"impossible for Parliament to enact that in a subsequent statute 
dealing with the same subject matter there can be no implied 
repeal.", (1934] 1 KB 590 at 597. 
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Although there is not much point in expounding further on the nature 
of s. 2(4) without looking at the actual cases and the attitude of 
the judiciary, some general observations may be made. As Collins has 
rightly pointed out, the technique of the Act is not revolutionary.4 0 
There is no sufficient evidence to suggest that Parliament intended 
to deprive itself of the power to pass legislation which overrides 
Community law. It may amend or repeal the Act, which is therefore 
subject to the continuing sovereignty of Parliament. 
Within these boundaries, the ECA ensures the highest possible degree 
of compliance with the principles of direct effect and and supremacy 
of Community law. 4 1 At the very least, s. 2(4) sets up an extraordi-
narily strong rule of interpretation and construction. It might even 
be found to have effected protection against implied repeal. But i t 
does not protect against an express repudiation of the United 
Kingdom's Treaty obligations. If Parliament intentionally legislated 
contrary to prior Community law, English courts would find no 
justification in the ECA to set aside such legislation. They would 
have to wait until Parliament itself repealed the Act. Community law 
could not be given fu l l effect and there would be a breach of the 
Simmenthal principle. 
Therefore, as had to be expected, the European Communities Act 1972 
alone cannot fully resolve the potential conflict between the prin-
ciple of Parliamentary sovereignty and the claim for supremacy which 
Community law makes. 
III. Governments, Parliamentary Parties and Membership of the 
European Communities 
It has been stated that modifications to the rule of recognition or 
grundnorm can only be expected i f the general political climate is 
favourable to such changes in judicial thinking. Judges do not form 
4 0 Collins, p. 26. 
4 1 The attempt to satisfy the Community law requirements without 
sacrificing the sovereignty of Parliament has been called 'a 
fascinating exercise in equivocation, a wilful manifestation of 
legislative schizophrenia' by de Smith/ Brazier, p. 82. 
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convictions of such fundamental nature in the seclusion of an ivory 
tower. They a part of a society in which they perform a certain role 
and which in turn contributes to the definition of that role. 
It is therefore useful to take a look at the development of attitudes 
towards the question of Parliamentary Sovereignty of various govern-
ments, political parties, parliamentary groups42 and of the British 
people, as far as i t has had the opportunity to articulate its 
feelings in public. 
1. British EC-Politics and the Question of Sovereignty 
a) The Discussions before Accession 
In the 1967 White Paper on the Legal and Constitutional Implications 
of Community Membership*3, Parliamentary Sovereignty was but one of a 
number of issues and was not seen as problematic. The EC was put on 
the same level with organisations as GATT and the Paper was built on 
the assumption that "it would be necessary to pass legislation giving 
the force of law to those provisions of the Treaties and of Community 
instruments which are Intended to take direct Internal effect within 
the member states."44 With the same ease was the problem of supremacy 
of Community law disposed of: since Community law would have force 
only through the implementing Act of Parliament, simply applying the 
lex posterior rule would suffice to ensure that the later 'Community' 
law prevails.4 9 The 1967 White Paper proceeded from a steadfast 
conviction that the continuing nature of Parliamentary Sovereignty is 
Immutable. The Lord Chancellor said in the House of Lords: "There is 
in theory no constitutional means available for us to make certain 
that no future Parliament would enact legislation in conflict with 
4 2 It would of course be easier i f parliament as an institution had 
promulgated a view, but, as the examination will show, opinion is 
much too diversified among the political parties (and even among 
politicians of the same parties) to present a homogeneous picture. 
4 3 Cmnd. 3301. 
4 4 Cmnd. 3301, § 22. 
4 8 This was before Simmenthal II, which postulated the primacy of 
Community law also over subsequent national legislation. 
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Community law."46 
The alleged inability of Parliament to divest itself of parts of its 
sovereignty was repeatedly invoked in order to assuage the concerns 
of MPs about the possible implications of Community membership.47 The 
1971 White Paper48 of the Conservative government (Heath), too, 
assured Parliament that "there is no question of any erosion of 
essential national sovereignty."49 Considering these circumstances, 
the clear majorities in both Houses of Parliament who voted in favour 
of membership in October 197130 cannot be taken as an indication of a 
willingness to let go of Parliament's omnipotence. 
When Parliament debated the European Communities Bill, i t was even 
proposed that a clause be inserted into the Bill stating: "It is 
hereby declared that nothing in the Treaties or in the Act shall 
detract from the ultimate sovereignty or supremacy of Parliament 
[...] and any determination of the European Court or of any of the 
Communities or their institutions which is inconsistent herewith 
shall be null and void." 8 1 
4 6 As quoted by Mitchell, "What do you want to be inscrutable for, 
Marcia?". p. 118. 
4 7 See e.g. The Times, 6 July 1972, Reassurance for MPs on British 
Sovereignty, p. 1. 
4 8 Cmnd. 4715, The United Kingdom and the European Communities. 
4 9 Cmnd. 4715, § 29. 
3 0 In the Commons, MPs voted as follows: Conservatives: 282 in 
favour, 39 against and 2 abstained; Labour: 68 in favour, 198 
against, 20 abstentions; Liberals: 5 in favour, 1 against; Others: 
6 against (overall: 356 - 244 in favour). The Lords voted 451 - 58 
in favour. 
Whereas the outcome in the Lords had been expected (see The Times, 
23 October 1971, Large majority for joining EEC is expected in the 
Lords, p. 1) the winning margin in the Commons came somewhat as a 
surprise, see: Parliament gives a resounding Yes to Europe with 
MP's majority of 112 and Jubilation at Community headquarters over 
clear go-ahaed. both in The Times, 29 Oktober 1971, p. 1. 
3 1 This was suggested by the Labour MP Sir Elwyn Jones and supported 
by his Conservative colleague Enoch Powell. See The Times, 6 July 
1972, Labour want power in EEC Bill to withdraw from Treaty of 
Rome, p. 7. 
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b) Community Membership and the Balance of Power Between Parliament 
and the Executive 
There is yet another facet of the problem which made MPs feel uneasy 
about membership. Their concern was not only directed at the fact 
that powers would have to be shared with institutions outside the EC, 
but also at the disturbance of the internal balance of power between 
Parliament and the Executive.52 The only direct influence of the UK 
on EC legislation would not be exerted through the House of Commons 
but through government representatives in the Council of Ministers. 
To make things worse, effective parliamentary scrutiny of ministers' 
behaviour in the Council is hindered by the secrecy which surrounds 
the voting procedures83: Council sessions are neither public nor is 
there any official public record. Many MPs feared that the Treaty of 
Rome would promote and permanently establish in law the shift of 
power from Parliament to the Executive which had until then only been 
based on fact or convention.34 
Indeed, the government profited from the loss of powers of Parliament 
and gained (quasi-)legislative functions in areas of policy comprised 
by Community competences. 
In order to obtain some degree of influence and control, the House of 
Commons reacted in two ways: 
First, a special committee (the so-called Foster Committee) was 
appointed which delivered its final report in October 1973. It 
stated: "It seems that there is no possibility of exercising in this 
field anything like the same degree of control as is available to the 
House of Commons under the present process of enacting a statute. 
However, so long as the weighed majority rule in the EEC Treaty is in 
abeyance, and so long as the practice of unanimity is required, i t 
should be possible to exert at least as much control over this 
legislation as is currently available in respect of delegated legis-
lation in the United Kingdom."BB Hence i t recommended the establish-
ment of a House of Commons Select Committee on European Secondary 
3 2 See Rix-Mackenthun, pp. 145 et seq.; also Freestone/ Davidson, pp. 
104 et seq.; Wade/ Bradley, p. 139. 
3 3 See Freestone/ Davidson, ibid. 
3 4 Cf. also supra, chapter B, I I . 5. a). 
3 9 Foster Committee, Second Report, HC 463-1, p. xv. 
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Legislation56 with the express purpose 'to restore to Parliament 
responsibilities for, and opportunities to exercise its constitutio-
nal rights' in the process of EC law making. Its main function is to 
scrutinize draft Commission proposals for legislation and to assess 
their legal and political implications.97 
The House of Lords also has a Select Committee which produces quite 
substantial reports on proposed Community legislation containing 
detailed evidence and concluding recommendations. One particular sub-
committee (composed mainly of distinguished lawyers) has the task to 
consider whether proposed Regulations or Directives would, i f adop-
ted, impliedly repeal or amend UK legislation or necessitate any 
fresh legislation by Parliament. 
Both Committees may liaise freely. 
The second reaction was the insistence that the principle of ministe-
rial accountability also applies to Community matters. British go-
vernments have accepted this and have accordingly undertaken to 
a) supply Parliament with important Community documents (especially 
draft proposals for legislation submitted by the Commission), 
b) report to the House after Council meetings and 
c) provide a six-monthly report on developments within the 
Community. 
In addition, the Commons demanded in a Resolution that, as a rule, 
Ministers should not agree in the Council to measures which have been 
recommended for consideration in the House by the Select Committee, 
before such consideration has been given. 9 8 
In spite of these efforts, i t must be said that the effectiveness of 
Parliamentary control over the Executive is limited. The Select 
Committees get to see the draft proposals only at one stage: they are 
not supplied later amendments which were necessary to accomodate the 
views of the Council or the EP. Neither are Ministers willing to 
9 6 The word 'secondary' was dropped in 1978. 
8 7 For a detailed description of their functions and work see F.E.C. 
Gregory, Dilemmas of Government, Britain and the European Communi-
ty_, pp. 84 et seq., or Freestone/ Davidson, pp. 107 et seq. 
9 8 Resolution of 30 Oct. 1980, 991 HC Deb. Col. 838. 
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disclose their precise negotiating strategy before meetings, because 
this would weaken their position in the Council. 
At the most, Parliament can urge the Government to exercise its 
'veto' in Council decisions that require unanimity. 
c) The National Referendum 1975 
When Labour won the General Election in February and October 1974, 
the issue of Community membership was again put on the agenda.59 
Early opinion polls had shown EC membership to be rather unpopular in 
the country, mostly because the Community had been given the blame 
for numerous economic problems towards the end of the Heath govern-
ment. The Labour government under Wilson promised to renegotiate the 
terms of British membership and to put them before the British people 
for approval.60 
Although sovereignty had lit t le to do with the key items of renego-
tiation 6 1 (and was, of cause, not negotiable), anti-marketeers (who 
were disturbed by the results of new opinion polls which showed pro-
continuation tendencies) endeavoured to reintroduce this emotional 
issue into the public debate. There was a deep division in the Labour 
Party, extending right through Cabinet.62 The left-wing Labour MP and 
then Cabinet Minister Tony Benn, e.g., in a resolution to his Bristol 
0 9 For background information see S. George, An Awkward Partner -
Britain in the European Community, pp. 71 et seq.; F.E.C. Gregory, 
Dilemmas of Government - Britain in the European Community, pp. 73 
et seq. 
6 0 Such a referendum was a constitutional innovation, but i t did not 
in itself constitute a threat to the sovereignty of Parliament, 
because Parliament was technically not bound by the result, see 
Rix-Mackenthun, pp. 161 et seq. 
George, p. 88, points out that in reality the issue was not the 
terms of membership, but the principal decision of whether or not 
the UK should stay in the Community. The referendum campaign began 
before the renegotiated terms were finalized! 
6 1 The most important problem was the size of Britain's contribution 
to the annual budget. 
6 2 See H. Wilson, Final Term: The Labour Government 1974 - 6, pp. 103 
et seq. 
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constituency, spoke against continuation of membership because i t 
removed sovereignty from the British Parliament.63 
Consequently, the questions of national and Parliamentary Sovereignty 
were in the centre of focus of the Official Report on Renegotiation, 
which the Prime Minister presented to Parliament in March 1975.64 
This report was a masterpiece of ambiguity. A number of statements 
seemed to indicate that the special requirements of legal structure 
within the EC were now seen more clearly and appreciated better than 
in the years before: "Membership of the Community involves some 
changes In the position of Parliament and in its relationship with 
the executive65 [...] No country nowadays has unqualified freedom of 
action. There are restraints even on the super-powers. For other 
countries their freedom of action is even more limited by political, 
military and economic realities outside their control."6 6 After 
stressing the interdependence of modern countries and the role of 
international organisations, the Report continued: "The Community has 
certain distinctive features which make i t unique among international 
groupings.67 [ . . .1 As the Community goes beyond other international 
groupings in the extent of its aims and common action, its inst i tu-
tions are correspondingly more developed and entail a greater pooling 
of sovereignty than other organizations. If the verdict of the 
referendum is, as the Government recommends, in favour of membership, 
then acceptance of the special institutional features of the Communi-
ty is a necessary means to the achievement of effective and worth-
while co-operation and common action."6 8 
Then the White Paper went on to explain the fundamental importance of 
the principles of direct applicability and priority of Community Law. 
All this revealed much more insight into the true nature of the 
Community than did previous statements and should have satisfied even 
the purest Eurocrat. Then came a surprise: "Thus membership of the 
Community raises for us the problem of reconciling this system of 
directly applicable law made by the Community with our constitutional 
6 3 See T. Benn, Against the Tide - Diaries 1973 - 76, pp. 236 et seq. 
6 4 Cmnd. 6003, Membership of the European Community - Report on 
Renegotiation. 
68 Ibid, § 114. 
66 Ibid, § 115. 
67 Ibid, § 118. 
68 Ibid, § 120. 
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principle that Parliament is the sovereign legislator and can make or 
unmake any law whatsoever. That principle remains unaltered by our 
membership of the Community [emphasis supplied): Parliament retains 
its ultimate right to legislate on any matter. The situation was 
fully analysed in the White Paper published by the Labour Government 
in May 1967."69 
Somehow this does not seem the compelling conclusion of the preceding 
passages. However, the report does provide clear proof of the 
government's uncompromising endorsement of the principle of Parlia-
mentary Sovereignty. The positions of the political parties were 
expressed in a vote in Parliament on 9 April 1975. The vote went in 
favour of acceptance by 396 votes to 172, but the majority of Labour 
MPs did not support their government.70 
The referendum itself brought a clear majority for the UK's remaining 
in the Community.71 
d) The 1978 Direct Elections to the European Parliament 
To some lesser extent the familiar concerns about sovereignty were 
repeated in the context of the Commons debates on the first Direct 
Elections Bill in autumn 1977. Until then, Euro-MPs had been nomina-
ted in Westminster to serve in Strasbourg. The discussions centered 
on the issues of the allocation of seats, the choice of an appropria-
te electoral system72 and a suggested 'political clause' setting 
limits to the extension of the powers of the EP (which at the time 
was, not without reason, called 'Assembly' instead of Parliament). 
Clearly i t was felt that a directly elected EP was a challenge to 
national parliaments because of the 'federalist' implications. 
Awarding democratic legitimacy to an institution outside Britain was 
regarded as an issue of profound constitutional importance.73 The 
then Foreign Secretary, David Owen, expressed the government's firm 
69 Ibid, § 134. 
7 0 Labour: 137 in favour, 145 against; Conservatives: 275 in favour; 
8 against. 
7 1 In favour: 67,2 per cent; against: 32,8 per cent. 
7 2 The House of Lords Report on Direct Elections (HL 119) had 
favoured a system of proportional representation. 
7 3 See 934 H.C. Deb., 6.7.77, col. 1250 et seq. 
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belief that the powers of national governments and parliaments must 
not be diminished.74 
Of the parliamentary political parties, only the Liberal Democrats 
were truly in favour of the changes. 
e) The Single European Act 1986 
The next major cause for concern came in 1985, when some member 
states headed by France, Germany and Italy, sought to strengthen the 
Community's institutional framework. It was felt that due to the 
increasing number of member states the Community was in urgent need 
of more efficient decision making procedures in order to achieve its 
goals. Independently, the EP had come up with a Draft Treaty 
establishing the European Union™, which would have entailed radical 
reforms of the existing structures. 
A committe was set up (the Dooge Committee) which produced a number 
of proposals, two of which were particularly controversial and met 
with stiff resistance by Denmark, the UK and Greece: 
The majority of the Committee recommended a return to the original 
Treaty provisions on majority voting in the Council. Against this, 
the British, Danes and Greek argued that the Luxemburg Compromise of 
1966 was understood as part of their terms of membership. 
The other proposal advocated an enhancement of the EP's role in the 
decision making process. For the opposed countries, this seemed an 
unacceptable erosion of national sovereignty. 
Part of the British defence was once more the principle of Parliamen-
tary Sovereignty.76 Considering the fact that Westminster is not 
directly involved in EC legislation, i t is justified to say that the 
British Government had primarily the preservation of its own freedom 
of action in mind. In D. Judge's words, "the British government's 
'principled' defence of British Parliamentary Sovereignty curtails 
the democratization of the EC decision-making process and so ensures 
that British ministers effectively escape both national and suprana-
7 4 See 940 H.C. Deb, 1.12.77, col. 752 et seq. (esp. col. 794). 
7 3 See F. Capotorti/ M. Hilf/ F.G. Jacobs/ J.-P. Jaque, The European 
Union Treaty. 
7 6 See D. Judge, The British Government, European Union and EC Const-
itutional Reform, pp. 323 et seq. 
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tional democratic control."7 7 
In the end, all proposals were put before an Intergovernmental 
Conference, which was summoned in spite of fierce criticism by Mrs. 
Thatcher. 
Britain and her allies negotiated their position well. In exchange 
for an express committment to European Union as the ultimate destina-
tion of the Community and a mention of the European Monetary System, 
the Luxemburg Compromise was kept largely intact and the increases of 
power of the EP were only marginal.78 Thus Mrs. Thacher was able to 
report to the House of Commons that the "United Kingdom's position 
and the position of Parliament are [...] properly protected."79 
f) Mrs. Thatcher and the Bruges Group 
It is no secret that the former Prime Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher 
often had differences with other Heads of State about where the 
Community should be going. Above all, she did not get on well with 
the President of the Commission, Mr. Jaques Delors. She strongly 
resented ideas about a new 'social dimension' to the Community and 
about EMU. 
When Delors addressed the European Parliament in July 1988 he said 
that most member states had not yet fully understood the extent to 
which the completion of the internal market in 1992 would entail a 
transfer of sovereignty to the Community.80 In September he presented 
the Commission's views to the annual TUC conference in Bournemouth, 
which brought him a standing ovation from the delegates as well as 
the wrath of Mrs. Thatcher. The Prime Minister took the opportunity a 
few days later to condemn Mr. Delors and the Commission in a now 
famous speech to the students of the College of Europe in Bruges.81 
7 7 Judge, p. 326. 
78 The Guardian hailed Mrs. Thatcher as the "victor" of Luxembourg 
for her "insistence that European integration should remain subor-
dinate to national interest", 5 December 1985, p. 1. 
7 9 5 December 1985, 88 HC Deb., col. 429. 
8 0 OJ 1988-9, Annex, Debates of the European Parliament, no. 2-
367/140. 
8 1 The speech was entitled 'Britain and Europe' (published by the 
Conservative Political Centre in October 1988). 
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She outlined her vision of a Community of independent sovereign 
states in which national traditions and parliamentary powers would be 
preserved. 
A number of British MPs were so delighted that they spontaneously 
formed the so-called Bruges Group, which describes its own function 
as an independent "forum for informed discussion about European 
affairs." 8 2 The Group is well organised and eminently productive, 
having delivered over a dozen 'Occasional Papers' and some additional 
Study Papers. Its main concern is the protection of national sove-
reignty as may be illustrated by some quotes. Occassional Paper No. 6 
(Feb. 90) asks: 'Is national sovereignty a big bad wolf?' and P. 
Felter writes in the introduction: "It is [..] a contradiction in 
terms to talk about a transfer of sovereignty, for instance, to an 
international organ. The sovereign state may delegate, temporarily, 
its inherent power of consent as agreed by i t . In 1923 for instance, 
the Permanent Court of International Justice rejected the notion that 
a state abandoned any sovereignty through the conclusion of any 
Treaty by which the state undertook to perform or refrain from 
performing a particular act." The former Labour MP Eric Deakins 
concludes the Paper by saying "The rallying cry of those who wish to 
preserve the powers of the British Parliament and People must surely 
be: 'Twelve free nations in one free market' - thus far and not 
further!" 
The Bruges Group has even enlisted the ageing Lord Denning who 
laments that "the European Court of Justice has taken away our 
sovereignty" and points out the appropriate remedy: "Just as 
Parliament in 1972 took us into the European Community, so also i t 
can take us out again. It can repeal or amend the 1972 Act so as to 
make the decisions of the European Court of Justice not binding 
unless approved by our own House of Lords; and to make directives not 
binding unless approved by the Secretary of State. That modest 
amendment would enable us to retain our sovereignty as we were 
promised."83 
See Bruges Group Occasional Paper 1, p. 9. 
Introduction to Occasional Paper 6. 
Without disrespect to the distinguished Lord Denning, i t would 
seem that this 'modest amendment' would fatally undermine the 
Community's foundations. 
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Most of the above seems to assemble to a rather gloomy picture as far 
as the prospects of changes to the rule of recognition are concerned. 
It is probably fair to say that at the present time most MPs would 
maintain that the legal sovereignty of Westminster is (in theory) 
stil l fully intact and that no concessions should be made to the EC. 
Yet, there are also a few signs for a more open approach to the 
matter. 
The Liberal Democrats, who have been rather successful in recent 
elections, are fully committed to European integration. They back 
the 'sovereignty-sensitive' idea of a single currency, as does Labour 
and as does the House of Lords.84 
There are also prominent pro-European voices among Conservatives. 
Sir Geoffrey Howe has written a deep and remarkable article entitled 
'Sovereignty and interdependence: Britain's place in the world'. 8 3 
He analyses the different meanings of sovereignty and points out that 
Dicey's concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty "is an idealized notion 
[..) which is only partly useful in explaining what occurs in the 
real world of British politics." 8 6 Instead one should understand 
sovereignty in today's internationalized and interdependent world as 
"a nation's practical capacity to maximize its influence in the 
world."8 7 Emphazising the pragmatic tradition of constitutional 
change in Britain he says that "theory is adjusted to meet the facts. 
There is a constant dialogue between theory and fact, with most 
attemts to elevate any one theory into an eternal verity likely to be 
disproved by events. Because of this, the sort of absolutist defini-
tion of sovereignty advocated, for example, by Enoch Powell or Peter 
Shore when we debated membership of the European Community and after, 
has a strangely un-British ring about i t . It Is not really our way to 
posit an immovable set of constitutional arrangements or principles 
84 The Daily Telegraph, 18 October 1990, Liberals urge single Euro 
currency: Financial Times, 29 November 1990, Labour backing for 
EMU; Financial Times, 10 November 1990, All-party peers support 
EMU and single European currency. 
8 0 (1990) 66 International Affairs, pp. 675 - 695. 
86 Ibid, p. 677. 
87 Ibid, p. 678. 
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(whether sovereignty of parliament, royal prerogative or integrity of 
empire) and defend them uncompromisingly. It is much more character-
istic to let them evolve spontaneously in response to changing needs 
and conditions (italics supplied)."88 
Sir Geoffrey's attitude towards Europe brought him into conflict with 
Mrs. Thatcher and caused his resignation from the Cabinet the late 
summer of 1990, just as Nigel Lawson had to quit as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer after rows over British membership of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism. 
But eventually the Prime Minister's Inflexibility and 'non-diplomacy' 
in Community matters gave rise to fears of growing British isolation 
in Europe89 and was one of the reasons for her own demise a short 
time later. The new Prime Minister John Major has adopted a much more 
conciliatory style which earned him a warm welcome by the other Heads 
of State in the current Intergovernmental Conferences.90 Whether 
these changes in style are followed by great changes in substance 
remains to be seen but they are certainly more likely under his 
leadership than under Mrs. Thatcher's.91 
The very fact that Mrs. Thatcher's position in her own party weakened 
so quickly and surprisingly could be an indication that MPs are not 
willing to defend principles at the cost of being excluded from the 
process of European integration.9 2 
At any rate, the signals being sent by the government in the current 
88 Ibid, pp. 679 - 680. 
8 9 See e.g. The Times, 31 October 1990, Thatcher bars further 
surrender to Europe. 
9 0 See Financial Times, 15/16 December 1990, UK changes tone over EC 
political union talks. 
9 1 Although Mr. Major insists that he will not tolerate the 'imposi-
tion' of a single currency, his underlying tone is much more pro-
European than that of Mrs. Thatcher. He defended his Euro policy 
(see The Independent, 15 June 1991, Major attacks EC 'faint-
hearts') after a leaked memo by the Bruges Group had accused him 
of being afraid to use his 'veto' against a single currency (see 
Financial Times, 12 June 1991, p. 1). 
9 2 Labour had already claimed to be the true party of Europe, 
criticizing Mrs. Thatcher for her obstructive behaviour at the 
Rome summit, The Times, 4 October 1990, Delegates look to fu l l 
unity. 
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IGCs will be carefully observed by jurists and the courts in this 
country. 
2. The Practical Approach 
In the light some of the statements quoted above one might wonder i f 
the ECJ spends half of his time with cases against the United 
Kingdom. But in practical terms, Britain is as committed a member of 
the Community as any other country. Her record on implementation of 
Community law (once agreed upon), is very good, perhaps with the 
exception of sex equality matters. 
There is also no questioning of decisions of the ECJ. When for 
example the President of the ECJ ordered the UK to suspend 
provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 198893 pending final judgment 
in the Factortame case, this was promptly done by an Order of Her 
Majesty in Council94 on 1 November 1989, with the express approval of 
Parliament. There are even British proposals for a strengthening of 
the ECJ's means of enforcing its judgments. 
So far, the UK Parliament has refrained from exercising its sovereign 
right intentionally to 'overrule' Community legislation and has thus 
avoided a damaging conflict. This does not mean that the potential 
conflict between British Parliamentary Sovereignty and EC supremacy 
could not materialize on some future occasion. Under a doctrine of 
continuing sovereignty, there is no legal safeguard to prevent this 
from happening. There is only the self-discipline of the legislature 
inherent in the British political system to avoid a clash. 
9 3 Case 246/89R, Order of the President of 10 October 1989. 
9 4 Merchant Shipping Act 1988 (Amendment) Order 1989. 
IV. Community Law Supremacy in the British Courts 
Finally, we can turn to the actual cases in which the problem of 
priority between Community law and Acts of Parliament arose or was 
addressed obiter. As was said before, i t is in the judgment of the 
courts that possible constitutional changes must manifest themselves, 
because the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty is primarily a 
description of the relationship between the legislature and the 
judicature.9 3 
The question before us is this: Do the judges in the United Kingdom 
today stil l act upon a rule of recognition which says 'Every Act of 
Parliament must be obeyed. There is absolutely no authority to set 
aside or override an Act of Parliament as it is the highest 
conceivable form of law' ? 
Or does the present rule read: 'We will obey every Act of Parliament 
unless it cannot be reconciled with the Treaty of Rome or secondary 
legislation lawfully enacted under the Treaty.' ? 
Or does the truth lie in between those two? 
The question could be formulated in a diffent way which takes us back 
to Kelsen's grundnorm: What is the reason for the validity of the 
norms the court is about to apply? And, closely tied to this is the 
question as to the function of a court in a member state of the 
Community: are national courts always and exclusively organs of the 
national legal system or do they become (in cases involving 
Community matters) an organ of a comprehensive new legal order which 
was established by the Treaty of Rome?98 
Making such decisions is a process through which jurists go all the 
time, be i t consciously or (mostly) unconsciously.97 At this stage, 
judges do not really act in their capacity as judges but rather as 
jurists. They do not (yet) apply the law, but they ask what enables 
them to apply a given rule as a valid norm (i.e. what is the basis of 
98 Supra, p. 8; See also Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 8, No. 811, 
p. 534 note 5: "[...] the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
represents nothing more or less than a series of predictions of 
how the courts would decide certain issues i f properly brought 
before them". 
9 6 This corresponds to the rule of recognition introduced above. 
9 7 See Kelsen, General Theory, p. 116. 
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Unfortunately, judges will seldom make their assumptions explicit as 
long as there is no compelling reason to do so. 
The ultimate proof of a new grundnorm would be, of course, i f the 
British courts ignored a deliberate attempt by the Westminster 
Parliament to legislate contrary to the Treaty.9 8 So far, Parliament 
has never tried to test its power in this way and i t is most unlikely 
that i t will do so in the future. In the absence of such a real 
judgment, the next best thing are predictions (made obiter) of the 
anticipated behaviour of judges in cases of an intentional conflict. 
Any other signs could only be indirect ones, which need to be weighed 
and Interpreted within their context. Which sorts of clues would 
indicate a renunciation of the established view which underlies the 
orthodox doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty? 
Proceeding from the analysis of the case-law of the ECJ and the 
developments in other member states in chapter C and of the ECA 1972 
in this chapter, the following details in British judgments must be 
scrutinized: 
In cases of conflict, on what authority is supremacy accorded to 
Community law? Is municipal legislation actually set aside or do the 
courts seek to avoid this by giving adventurous interpretations to 
otherwise inconsistent Acts? 
Is the ECA 1972 given as the exclusive reason for the effectiveness 
and the priority of Community law? Which of the three possible 
interpretations of s. 2(4) ECA" is favoured by the courts? 
If no degree of entrenchment is accorded to this section, then 
enforcement of Community law in the national courts is ultimately 
dependent on its continued recognition by Parliament. This could be 
withdrawn at any time in which case British courts would have to 
ignore 'unwanted' Community law. 
If, on the other hand, the courts went beyond the ECA by basing their 
judgments on an endorsement of the relevant case-law of the ECJ, this 
would be a different matter altogether. References to the 'special 
nature' of Community law might indicate that the courts are prepared 
to dissociate themselves from the traditional dualist view of inter-
national law as far as the Community is concerned. There is also a 
9 8 See Thelen, pp. 243/4. 
9 9 See supra, I I . 2. d). 
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subtle difference between a reference to the European Communities Act 
and a reference to the fact of British membership of the EC, the 
latter possibly pointing in a monist direction. 
The first part of the following analysis will show what impact 
membership of the Community has had so far on the doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty and what must be regarded as well establi-
shed and unquestionable. 
But after this I would like to focus attention on some more recent 
and very interesting cases which seem to indicate that there is an 
increasing readiness in British courts to take another major step 
forward. 
1. The Constitutional Position at Present 
a) Conflicts Between Community Law and Prior National Law 
Conflicts of directly applicable Community law with earlier 1 0 0 English 
law are easily resolved under s. 2 of the ECA 1972. Any pre-accession 
legislation which is inconsistent with Community law is seen as 
repealed by the ECA itself. In Polydor Ldt. v. Harlequin Record Shops 
Ltd. 1 0 1 the Court of Appeal had to decide a case in which the importers 
of records from Portugal contested an interlocutory injunction which 
was granted to the UK copyright holders by a lower court. Ormrod LJ, 
with reference to s. 2(1) ECA, found that s. 16(2) Copyright Act 1956 
is applicable "unless the domestic laws give way to a contrary 
provision of Community law." 1 0 2 The National Insurance Commissioner103 
has held in a number of decisions that European law is to prevail 
1 0 0 In this context i t must be remembered that from a British 
viewpoint, no Community law dates back further than 1 January 1973 
as i t is effective only by virtue of s. 2 of the ECA 1972. 
1 0 1 [1980] 2 CMLR 413. 
102 Ibid, at p. 415. In the event, the section was found to be 
inconsistent with a directly applicable provision of a Trade 
Agreement between the EC and Portugal (provisions of international 
treaties to which the EC is a party can also have direct effect, 
see Collins, pp. 68/69). 
103 NOW Social Security Commissioner. 
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over provisions of the National Insurance Act 1965.104 
In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Henri and Darby10* and in R. v. 
Goldstein106 the accused were convicted because they had illegally 
imported goods. Their defence had relied on the argument that the 
(pre-accession) English law which prohibited the import was in breach 
of Art. 30 EECT and thus invalid. The court found that the national 
rule was justified under Art. 36 EECT (which makes a number of 
exemptions from Art. 30), but conceded that otherwise i t would indeed 
have squashed the convictions as a result of Art. 30 EECT and the 
ECA./ 
As this particular aspect of the supremacy of Community law does not 
require a break with orthodox constitutional doctrine, i t is uncon-
troversial. In fact, the mechanism seems so self-evident that now-
adays courts often no longer care to give an explanation why 
Community law prevails over national law. This is illustrated by some 
recent High Court judgments like Council of Kirklees v. Wickes 
Building Supplies Ltd. 1 0 7 or Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent v. 
B & Q pic 1 0 8 , where the courts had to consider the effect of Art. 30 
EECT on s. 47 Shops Act 1950, which largely prohibits Sunday trading. 
There are also no problems i f a post-accession national law conflicts 
with a Community Directive or Regulation which is enacted subsequent-
l y . 1 0 9 In Marshall v. Southampton Health Authority 1 1 0 an Industrial 
Tribunal had to decide the case of a female employee who was (unlike 
her male colleagues) forced to retire at the age of 62. 
Miss Marshall's claim for damages exceeded the statutory limit under 
s. 65 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, but the Tribunal went on to 
consider the effect of Art. 6 of the (later) Council Directive 
76/207. Having looked at the ECJ's interpretation of the Directive in 
1 0 4 See e.g. Brack v. Insurance Officer, [1977] 1 CMLR 277. 
1 0 3 11980] 2 CMLR 229 (HL). 
1 0 6 [1982] 2 CMLR 181 (CA, Criminal Division) and [1983] 1 All ER 434 
(HL). 
1 0 7 [1990] 2 CMLR 501. 
1 0 8 [1990] 2 CMLR 377; also Mendip District Council v. B & Q pic, 
[1991] 1 CMLR 113. 
1 0 9 See Collins, p. 39. 
1 1 0 [1988] 3 CMLR 389. 
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von Colson and Ka.ms.nn v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 1 1 1 the Tribunal 
said: "what we have here, in our view, is a direct conflict" 1 1 2 and 
held that the remedy under the Sex Discrimination Act was inadequate. 
Consequently, i t ignored s. 65 of the Act and awarded Miss Marshall 
damages far beyond the fixed l imit . 1 1 3 
The conclusion from these cases is that priority over national 
legislation will be given to subsequent Community law i f a conflict 
cannot be reconciled otherwise. As long as the chronological order is 
(1) national rule - (2) Community rule, a displacement of the former 
can easily be accomodated within the orthodox doctrine. It does not 
amount to a challenge of Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
b) Conflicts Between Community Law and Subsequent National Law 
The real problem under a doctrine of continuing sovereignty is the 
claim of Community law that i t must prevail also over later Acts of 
Parliament. The possible interpretations of the relevant section 2 of 
the ECA 1972 have already been looked at and i t is now time to 
analyse the views and solutions adopted by the courts over the years. 
Some of the following cases are not primarily concerned with a 
conflict between national and European law but they contain instruc-
tive statements as to the status of Community law under the 1972 Act. 
aa) The Early Cases 
One of the first cases in this country involving Community law was 
Esso Petroleum v. Kingswood Motors114. The court was faced with the 
question i f a pre-Community solus tie agreement between two private 
1 1 1 Case 14/83 [1986] 2 CMLR 430. 
1 1 2 [1988] 3 CMLR 389 at 400. 
1 1 3 The Court of Appeal later overruled the Industrial Tribunal's 
decision (see Marshall v. Southampton Health Authority, [1990] 3 
CMLR 425, esp. Butler-Sloss LJ at 439). 
Relying on the Duke case (see infra, 1. c)), i t argued that Art. 6 
of the Directive was not sufficiently clear and precise to be 
directly effective and that s. 65(2) was not Intended to implement 
the Directive. 
1 1 4 [1974] 1 QB 142. 
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parties could be void because i t was in breach of Art. 85 EECT. 
Considering the effect of the new body of law, Bridge J observed118: 
"By the European Communities Act 1972, the provisions of the EEC 
Treaty [...] became part of our domestic law in this country on 
January 1, 1973, and where there is a conflict with our domestic law 
the effect of the Act of 1972 is to require that the Community law 
shall prevail." 
He did not go into further detail or mention s. 2(4), but the above 
statement has proved typical for future judgments in one respect 
which is important for the question of supremacy: the view of 
Community law is almost without exception dualist. It has effect and 
takes priority only as a result of the ECA.116 
It also coined the formula that Community law was made 'part of our 
domestic law1 by the ECA117 which has since been reiterated on many 
occasslons by the Court of Appeal1 1 8 and the House of Lords119. 
In some of the early judgments the endeavours to f i t Community law 
into the familiar categories of English law occasionally overshot the 
mark. In Application des Gaz S.A. v. Falks Veritas Ltd. Lord Denning 
113 Ibid, at p. 151. 
1 1 6 See inter alia Application de Gaz S.A. v. Falks Veritas Ltd., 
[1974] 1 Ch 381 at 391; Shields v. Coomes Ltd., [1978] ICR 1159 at 
1164; Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, [1979] ICR 785 at 789 and 796; 
Garland v. British Rail Engeneering Ltd., [1982] 2 WLR 918 at 935; 
Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk Marketing Board, [1984] 1 AC 130 
at 141; Duke v. GEC Reliance, [1988] 1 All ER 626 at 629. 
1 1 7 This stands in striking contrast to Turpin's view, p. 333: "It 
will be noticed that the law made applicable by section 2(1) keeps 
its separate identity as Community law: i t is not made part of 
English (or Scottish) law but is to be enforced together with that 
law in the courts of the United Kingdom." 
1 1 8 See Application des Gaz S.A. v. Falks Veritas Ltd., [1974] 1 Ch. 
381 at 393; Bulmer Ltd. v. Bolinger S.A., [1974] 1 Ch. 401 at 418; 
Shields v. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd., [1978] ICR 1159 at 1164; 
Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, [1981] QB 199 at 200; Marshall v. 
Southampton Health Authority, [1990] 3 CMLR 425 at 435. 
us see e.g. Pickstone v. Freemans pic, [1988] 2 All ER 803 at 817 
(per Lord Oliver). 
assi 
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described the Treaty as being "equal in force to any statute"1 2 0 and 
Stamp LJ remarked that Articles 85 and 86 EECT were to be treated 
"precisely as i f the terms of the Treaty were contained in an 
enactment of the Parliament of the United Kingdom".121 
A rather practical approach towards the resolution of conflicts 
between Community law and subsequent national law was demonstrated by 
the National Insurance Commissioner in a number of cases involving 
the Social Security Act 1975 and EEC Council Regulation 1408/71. In 
Re Medical Expenses Incurred in France122 i t was decided that a 
British national was to be qualified as 'worker' under Regulation 
1408/71 and was therefore entitled to a benefit under the U.K. Act. 
As a result of s. 2(1) ECA a disqualifying provision of the Social 
Security Act could not be applied.1 2 3 
There was no explanation as to how a provision of a 1972 Act managed 
to restrict the applicability of a subsequent Act of Parliament. In 
Re An Absence in Ireland124 and also in Re Residence Conditions120 and 
Kenny v. Insurance Officer 1 2 6 the Commissioner simply held that 
Articles of Regulation 1408/71 prevailed over provisions of the 
Social Security Act 1975 without any reference the ECA at all. 
The first time that the potential problem under national constitutio-
nal law was openly addressed was in Felixstowe Dock and Railway 
Company v. British Transport Docks Board127. A private Bill, which was 
contemplated at the time, planned for a takeover of the port of 
Felixstowe by the Docks Board. The applicants argued that such a 
takeover would constitute the abuse of a dominant position contrary 
to Art. 86 EECT. 
1 2 0 [1974] 1 Ch. 381 at 393; repeated in Bulmer v. Bollinger, [1974] 1 
Ch. 401 at 418. 
121 Ibid, p. 399. 
1 2 2 [1977] 2 CMLR 317. 
123 Ibid, p. 327. 
1 2 4 [1977] 1 CMLR 5; held that Art. 38 and 39 of Regulation 1408/71 
override s. 82(5)(a) Social Security Act 1975. 
1 2 0 [19781 2 CMLR 287. 
1 2 6 [1979] 1 CMLR 433; held that s. 49 (l)(b) Social Security Act 
1975 yields to either Art. 19 or 22 of Regulation 1408/71. 
1 2 7 [1976] 2 CMLR 655. 
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Speaking of the proposed Bi l l 1 2 8 , Lord Denning MR remarked obiter: " I 
would add only this. It seems to me that once the Bill is passed by 
Parliament and becomes a statute, that will dispose of all the 
discussion about the Treaty. The courts will then have to abide by 
the statute without regard to the Treaty at a l l . " 1 2 9 It is quite 
obvious that at the time Lord Denning did not consider the ECA to 
have fettered the sovereignty of Parliament. 
Almost two years later, Lord Denning again had to deal with the 
question of Community law supremacy and this time he seemed much more 
favourable to the notion. In Shields v. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd. 1 3 0 a 
female employee of a Betting Shop brought an action because she 
received a lower salary than her male counterparts. The shop owner 
reasoned that his male employees served an extra function as deter-
rents against robberies. The Court of Appeal was faced with the task 
of determining the effect of Art. 119 EECT. 
Having established that Art. 119 EECT is directly applicable because 
of s. 2(1) ECA 1972 and that British courts are bound by the 
judgments of the ECJ in Costa v. ENEL and Simmenthal by virtue of s. 
3(1) ECA,131 Lord Denning went on to say: "Suppose that the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom were to pass a statute inconsistent with Art. 
119, as, for instance, i f the English Equal Pay Act 1970 gave the 
right to equal pay only to unmarried women. I should have thought 
that a married woman could bring an action in the High Court to 
enforce the right to equal pay given to her by Art. 119. I may add 
that I should have thought that she could bring a claim before the 
Industrial Tribunal also. It seems to me when the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom sets up a tribunal to carry out its Treaty 
obligations, the tribunal has jurisdiction to apply Community law, 
and should apply i t , in the confident expection that this is what 
128 which was not passed in the event. 
129 Ibid, p. 664/6. It has to be admitted, though, that when Felixsto-
we was decided, the ECJ had not yet delivered its Simmenthal 
judgment which clarified that i t did not matter whether the 
national law was prior or subsequent to the Community provision. 
1 3 0 [1978] ICR 1159. 
131 Ibid, pp. 1164 et seq. 
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Parliament intended 1 3 2 . If such a tribunal should find any ambiguity 
ot any inconsistency with Community law, then i t should resolve i t by 
giving primacy to Community law." 
There had so far been no authorative statement on the matter by the 
House of Lords, except for a dictum by Lord Hailsham in The 
Siskinai33, a case which was only marginally concerned with European 
law. His Lordship had remarked: "It is the duty of the courts here 
and in other member states to give effect to [directly applicable] 
Community law as they interpret i t in preference to the municipal law 
of their own country over which ex hypothesi Community law pre-
vails." 1 3 4 The formulation seems to suggest that the reason for 
Community law supremacy must be the same in all countries including 
the United Kingdom133 but this interpretation might already be over-
burdening this short and isolated passage. 
Summing up, the first years after accession showed an evolving 
unanimity within the judiciary that the combined effects of s. 2(1), 
2(4) and 3(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 must extend also 
to later Acts of Parliament which are inconsistent with Community 
law. Insofar, the British courts very pragmatically acted in a way 
which supported the legal structure of the Community and which at the 
same time they knew to be the intention of their Parliament and 
government to f u l f i l the UK's obligations under the Treaty. 
There was, however, no clear idea of how the mechanism worked that 
allowed the ECA to stand against later expressions of Parliament's 
sovereign will. What was missing was a sound theoretical foundation 
for the already established practice. 
1 3 2 Emphasis added. It seems that the Master of the Rolls was already 
subtly preparing the ground for subsequent statements in 
Macarthys. 
1 3 3 [1978] 1 CMLR 190. 
134 Ibid, p. 224. Turpin, p. 336, wonders what is to be made of the 
words 'as they Interpret i t ' . 
1 3 3 A hypothesis applying to every member state can hardly be derived 
from the British European Communities Act. 
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Such a theoretical basis was finally offered by Lord Denning MR in 
Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith 1 3 6 . The salient facts of this sex-discrimina-
tion case can quickly be summed up. Mrs. Smith was employed as 
manageress of a warehouse by Marcarthys Ltd. Her male predecessor in 
the job had received higher remuneration although his duties had not 
differed substantially from hers. Under the Equal Pay Act 1970 (as 
amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) Mrs. Smith clearly would 
have been entitled to equal pay i f she had been employed contemporan-
eously with a higher paid colleague. 
However, Lawton and Cumming-Bruce LJJ did not think that the Act 
extended also to cases where a woman succeeded a man in a job, 
whereas Lord Denning thought it did. In its narrow interpretation 
there was a possible conflict between the Act and Art. 119 EECT137. 
Hence the Court of Appeal referred a question as to the interpreta-
tion of the relevant Community provisions to the ECJ but at the same 
time Lord Denning contemplated on the position that would arise i f 
the Equal Pay Act was actually found to be inconsistent with 
Community law 1 3 8: "Under section 2(1) and (4) of the European Communi-
ties Act 1972 the principles laid down in the Treaty are 'without 
further enactment' to be given legal effect in the United Kingdom: 
and have priority over 'any enactment passed or to be passed' by our 
Parliament. So we are entitled - and I think bound - to look at Art. 
119 of the Treaty because i t is directly applicable here [...] We 
should, I think, look to see what those provisions require about 
equal pay for men and women. Then we should look at our own 
legislation on the point - giving i t , of course, fu l l faith and 
credit - assuming that it does fully comply with the obligations 
under the Treaty. In construing our statute, we are entitled to look 
at the Treaty as an aid to its construction: and even more, not only 
as an aid but as an overriding force. If on close investigation i t 
should appear that our legislation is deficient - or i t is inconsis-
tent with Community law - by some oversight of our draftsmen - then 
i t is our bounden duty to give priority to Community law. Such is the 
1 3 6 [1979] ICR 785. 
137 This is denied by Collins, p. 32, but for our present purposes i t 
doesn't actually matter whether the conflict was real. 
138 Ibid, p. 789. 
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result of section 2(1) and (4) of the European Communities Act 1972. 
I pause here, however, to make one observation on a constitutional 
point. Thus far I have assumed that our Parliament, whenever i t 
passes legislation, intends to f u l f i l its obligations under the 
Treaty. If the time should come when Parliament deliberately passes 
an Act - with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any 
provision in i t - or intentionally of acting inconsistently with i t -
and says so in express terms [emphasis added] - then I should have 
thought that i t would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute 
of our Parliament. [.,.] Unless there is such an intentional and 
express repudiation of the Treaty, i t is our duty to give priority 
under the Treaty." 
These last few sentences are quite extraordinary i f one considers the 
orthodox doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. At a first glance, 
they seems to confirm Parliament's power to legislate contrary to 
Community law whenever i t wishes to do so. The snag, however, is that 
Parliament has to use a certain form of legislation in order to 
exercise this power. It has to state expressly in the letters of the 
law that i t wishes to repudiate the Treaty. What this means has been 
accurately pointed out by T.R.S. Allen 1 3 9: Parliament in 1972 has 
actually succeeded in binding its successors by imposing a form 
requirement in order for certain fresh pieces of legislation to be 
effective. Or, to make use of the possible interpretations of s. 2 
ECA introduced at the beginning of this chapter, the relevant 
provisions of the ECA are effectively protected against any form of 
implied repeal.140 
If Lord Denning's view of the law is correct, then the strictly 
orthodox perception of Parliamentary Sovereignty is no longer valid 
with respect to the UK's membership of the Community. There is a 
definite break with the Ellen Street Estate cases, according to which 
entrenchment against implied repeal was impossible. 
Such a form requirement stil l falls short of what the ECJ proclaims j 
in Simmenthal, but i t provides a quite reliable guarantee that ' 
Community law will be respected in the UK. As long as Britain stays 
in the Community, Parliament is unlikely to resort to open rebellion 
against EC rules. 
1 3 9 T.R.S. Allen, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Lord Denning's Dexterous 
Revolution, p. 25. 
1 4 0 See Clarke/ Sufrin, pp. 62/3; Turpin, p. 346. 
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In Worrlngham v. Lloyds Bank Ltd. 1 4 1 Lord Denning built on his own 
judgment im Macarthys and his lead was also gratefully taken up by 
lower courts.1 4 2 
The House of Lords was more cautious in its initial reactions. In 
Garland v. British Rail Engeneering Ltd. Lord Diplock refused to 
commit himself as to whether an express statement by Parliament was 
needed to override Community law 1 4 3. 
Over the years, however, i t i t seems that Lord Denning's novel 
approach has been ingrained in the minds of the judges and recently 
i t has also received 'official' approval by the House of Lords in 
Factortame v. Secretary of State for Transport14*, Analysing the 
effect of s. 2(1) and (4) ECA on the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 Lord 
Bridge set out: "This has precisely the same effect as i f a section 
were incorporated in Pt II of the 1988 Act which in terms enacted 
that the provisions with respect to registration of British fishing 
vessels were to be without prejudice to the directly enforceable 
Community rights of nationals of any member state of the EEC."143 
Although the formulation is different from Lord Denning's, i t boils 
down to the same thing: unless Parliament states expressly that its 
own legislation shall prevail, i t must give way to directly effective 
Community law. 1 4 6 
c) Preference for Interpretation 
The frequency of conflicts between national law and European law is 
closely related to the way national law is interpreted. The traditio-
1 4 1 [1982] ICR 299 at 303. The Court of Appeal held that Art. 119 EECT 
took priority over s. 6 (1A) (b) Equal Pay Act 1970 which 
tolerated the exclusion of female clerks under the age of 25 from 
the defendent bank's pension scheme. 
1 4 2 See e.g. Jenkings v. Kingsgate Ltd., [1981] ICR 715 at 721 
(Employment Appeal Tribunal). 
1 4 3 [1982] 2 WLR 918 at 935. 
1 4 4 [1989] 2 All ER 692 at 701. For the background see chapter C, I I . 
6. a). 
1 4 0 This reminds very much of Wade's pre-accession proposal! 
1 4 6 See the comment by C. Greenwood, All ER Annual Review 1989, p. 125 
at 129. 
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rial English methods of interpretation of statute law are rather rigid 
compared to most continental legal systems. Without going into any 
detail, there are three main approaches at the disposal of English 
courts. 
The oldest and probably most dominating rule is called the literal 
rule. It says that " i f the language of a statute is clear all that is 
necessary is to expound on the words in their natural and ordinary 
sense."147 The golden rule entitles the court to choose a meaning 
consonant with common sense i f the words are equivocal and the 
mischief rule is a rudimentary equivalent to the teleological aproach 
of the EC J. According to the mischief rule, the court may take into 
account the underlying legislative intent but i t is limited in 
respect of the material i t may use in the course of its investiga-
t ion. 1 4 8 English courts do also not assume the power to f i l l gaps in 
the law by way of analogies. 
As far as Community law itself was concerned, British courts quickly 
adopted the 'European' style of interpretation. Lord Denning said in 
Bulmer v. Bollinger. "All the way through the Treaty there are gaps 
and lacunae. These have to be filled in by the judges, or by 
regulation or directives. It is the European way. [...] Seeing these 
differences, what are the English courts to do when faced with a 
problem of interpretation? They must follow the European pattern. No 
longer must they examine the words in meticulous detail. No longer 
must they argue about the precise grammatical sense. They must look 
to the purpose or intent." 1 4 9 
When a counsel in Polydor v. Harlequin based his entire argument on 
the alleged difference between the words 'prohibited' and 'abolished' 
in a Community Treaty, Templeman LJ rejected this "old-fashioned 
English method of interpreting Community law" by saying: "it seems to 
me that i t will be perverse to put on nineteenth century blinkers and 
1 4 7 See Vestry of St. John, Hampstead v. Cotton, [1887) 12 AC 1. 
1 4 8 See Bredimas, p. 158. 
1 4 9 [1974] 2 CMLR 91 at 119; see also Lord Denning in The Siskina, 
[1978] 1 CMLR 190 at 202 (CA): "It is our duty to apply the Treaty 
according to the spirit and not the letter". For a practical 
example see MacMahon v. Dept. of Education and Science, [1982] 3 
CMLR 91 at 98. 
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to say there is a real distinction". 1 3 0 
The House of Lords warned judges in DPP v. Henri and Darby1*1 that when 
faced with Community law, interpretation may be needed even i f the 
English text may seem perfectly clear. 
But, what about the interpretation of national law? 
Evidently, i f English courts were obliged to stick to the letter of 
the law very strictly, they would find themselves more often in a 
situation where the literal meaning of a statute cannot be reconciled 
with Community law. A more liberal approach to interpretation, on the 
other hand, might avoid the question of supremacy in the majority of 
cases. The following cases illustrate how far the courts are prepared 
to go in order to uphold parliamentary enactments. 
Again the immensely instructive case Macarthys v. Smith may serve as 
starting point. Lord Denning thought that the Court was entitled "to 
look at the Treaty as an aid to its [the Act's] construction".132 
Cumming-Bruce LJ disagreed: " I do not think that i t is permissible, 
as an aid to construction, to look at the terms of the Treaty. If the 
terms of the Treaty are adjudged in Luxembourg to be inconsistent 
with the provisions of the Equal Pay Act 1970, European law will 
prevail over that municipal legislation. But such a judgment in 
Luxembourg cannot affect the meaning of an English statute".1 3 3 
Confronted with academic scolding134, however, he admitted1 3 3: "Perhaps 
I expressed myself a li t t le too widely there" and explained that his 
previous statement had been based on the view that the Act was 
unambiguous. If there was an ambiguity, i t would be appropriate to 
look at the Treaty in order to resolve i t . 1 8 6 
At the time, this was exactly the position as with every ordinary 
1 3 0 [1980] 2 CMLR 413 at 423/4. 
1 3 1 [1980] 2 CMLR 229 at 234 per Lord Diplock. 
1 3 2 [1979] ICR 785 at 789. 
133 Ibid, at 798. 
1 3 4 See O. Hood Phillips, High Tide in the Strand? Post - 1972 Acts 
and Community Law, p. 34. 
1 3 3 See Macarthys Ltd v. Smith, [1981] QB 199 at 201/2. 
1 3 6 See also Jenkins v. Kingsgate Ltd., [1981] ICR 715 at 721. 
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international treaty. 1 9 7 
In Garland v. British Rail Engeneering Ltd. 1 3 8 the House of Lords went 
one step further. Instead of insisting on an 'ambiguity test', Lord 
Diplock said a statute giving effect to international treaties should 
always be construed consistent with the obligation, i f the words of 
the statute are "reasonably capable of bearing such a meaning" and 
that this was a fortiori the case where EC obligations are concerned. 
More recently, there have been two decisions by the House of Lords1 3 9 
which make i t increasingly difficult to uphold the once clear 
conceptual distinction between interpretation and judicial law-
making. 
As a result of a judgment by the European Court1 6 0 that the UK had 
failed adequately to implement the Council Directive 75/117 ('Equal 
Pay Directive'), the Equal Pay Act 1970 was amended by statutory 
instrument161. In Pickstone v. Freemans pic the female applicants 
sought to invoke the new provisions in order to claim equal pay with 
a male colleague. The Court of Appeal held 1 6 2 that the new section 
could not be given the interpretation for which the applicants 
contended, but, as there was stil l a conflict between the Equal Pay 
Act and Community law, directly applied Community law to grant the 
application. The House of Lords upheld this decision, though on 
completely different grounds. Their Lordships argued that since the 
1983 Regulations had been specifically adopted in order to give 
effect to the decision of the ECJ, they must be interpreted in the 
light of Art. 119 EECT, the Equal Pay Directive and the ECJ's 
decision in Case 61/81: "[...] a construction which permits the 
section to operate as a proper fulfilment of the United Kingdom's 
obligation under the Treaty involves not so much doing violence to 
the language of the section as filling a gap by an implication 
137 The Eschersheim, [1976] 1 All ER 920 at 924 per Lord Diplock; or 
Maclaine Watson v. Department of Trade and Industry, [1989] 3 All 
ER 523 at 545 per Lord Oliver. 
1 3 8 [1982] 2 All ER 402 at 415. 
1 3 9 Both cases were concerned with statutory instruments, but the 
principles are equally valid for primary legislation. 
1 6 0 Case 61/81 Commission v. UK, [1982] ECR 2601. 
1 6 1 Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983, SI 1983/1794, made under 
s. 2(2) ECA 1972. 
1 6 2 [1987] 3 All ER 756. 
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{emphasis added! which arises, not from the words used, but from the 
manifest purpose of the Act and the mischief i t was intended to 
remedy".163 
This approach was confirmed in Litster v. Forth Dry Dock and 
Engeneering Co Ltd. 1 6 4 : "[...] the greater flexibility available to 
the court in applying a purposive construction to legislation 
designed to give effect to the United Kingdom's Treaty obligations to 
the Community enables the court, where necessary, to supply by 
implication words appropriate to comply with those obligations 
[emphasis added]." 
In both cases the court 'rescued' national legislation from being 
set aside by reading into i t words or passages which should have been 
included by the legislator in the first place. 
Is this sti l l interpretation or are the judges creating new law? This 
question must be left open here163, but in any case Pickstone and 
Litster show how far English courts today are prepared to go in order 
to avoid the 'hard option' of disapplying national law. 
Having said that, there are two important restrictions on this novel 
approach to interpretation. 
First, i t cannot be applied to ordinary international treaties. Lord 
Oliver expressly stated in Pickstone that i t has "to be recognized 
that a statute which is passed in order to give effect to the United 
Kingdom's obligations under the EEC-Treaty falls into a special 
category and i t does so because, unlike other treaty obligations, 
those obligations have, in effect, been incorporated into English law 
by the European Communities Act 1972." 1 6 6 
The second limitation was established by the House of Lords in Duke 
v. GEC Reliance 1 6 7 . In the cases considered above, the UK legislation 
had been passed in order to carry out Community obligations. 
The question in Duke was whether s. 6(4) of the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975, which allowed discrimination against the applicant with 
1 6 3 [1988] 2 All ER 803 at 817 per Lord Oliver. 
1 6 4 [1989] 1 All ER 1134 at 1153 per Lord Oliver. 
1 6 0 For some instructive reflections see Allen, The Limits of Parlia-
mentary Sovereignty, pp. 617/8. 
1 6 6 [1988] 2 All ER 803 at 817. 
1 6 7 [1988] 1 All ER 626. 
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respect to her retirement age, had to be interpreted in the light of 
the later Council Directive 76/207 ('Equal Treatment Directive'). 
Lord Templeman, speaking for a unanimous House of Lords, rejected 
this argument. 
He insisted that the language of an Act of Parliament had to be 
"considered in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the date 
of the enactment."168 The plain meaning of a statute which was not 
enacted for the purpose of implementing Community obligations could 
not be distorted as to comply with Community law which is not 
directly applicable (thus not falling within the scope of s. 2(4) of 
the ECA 1972).169 
Despite academic criticism 1 7 0, the principle was affirmed in the House 
of Lords in Finnegan v. Clowney Youth Training Programme Ltd. 1 7 1 
d) Summary 
Summing up, i t is submitted that the following represents the 
consolidated position of British courts today: 
Community law is directly applicable/effective because of the 
European Communities Act 1972. This contrasts with the monist 
view of the relationship between Community law and national law 
held by the European Court of Justice. 
The courts will generally act on a presumption that national 
legislation is consistent with the United Kingdom's obligations 
under international treaties. Any ambiguities will be resolved 
in favour of the obligations undertaken. 
168 Ibid, at p. 635. 
1 6 9 The court relied on a principle established by the ECJ in Case 
14/83 von Colson, [1984] ECR 1891 at 1909 paragraph 28: "It is for 
the national court to interpret and apply the legislation adopted 
for the implementation of the directive [emphasis added] in 
conformity with the requirements of Community law". 
1 7 0 See e.g. A. Arnull, The Duke Case: An Unreliable Precedent, p. 
313; N. Foster, The Effect of the European Communities Act, s. 
2(4), p. 775. 
1 7 1 [1990] 2 CMLR 859. For another example see Organon Laboratories 
Ltd. v. Dept. of Health, [1990] 2 CMLR 49 at 69/70, (CA). 
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If national legislation is intended to carry out directly 
applicable Community law, courts are entitled to depart from the 
strict and literal application of the words in order to avoid 
conflicts. They may even close gaps in the legislation by 
implying words or whole provisions. 
This technique must not be applied to legislation which was not 
passed to give effect to Community obligations. 
Directly applicable Community law prevails over Inconsistent 
prior Acts of Parliament by virtue of s. 2 ECA 1972. 
Directly applicable Community law also prevails over subsequent 
Acts of Parliament i f the inconsistency cannot be removed by way 
of interpretation. This is unless Parliament expressly declares 
in the Act that i t intends to breach the UK's obligations under 
the Treaty. Parliament in 1972 has succeeded to entrench s. 2 
ECA and thus the entire body of directly applicable Community 
law against any form of implied repeal. 
Although the protection against implied repeal seems a reliable 
safeguard, British courts have not gone quite as far as the courts in 
other member states. The ultimate authority for the effectiveness of 
Community law in this country is not the fact of membership, but an 
Act of the Westminster Parliament. As Lawton LJ pointed out in 
Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith172: "Parliament's recognition of EC law and 
of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice by one enactment 
can be withdrawn by another". 
There can be not fu l l endorsement of the principles in Simmenthal as 
long as the understanding of the relationship between the two legal 
systems is dualist. 
However, there has been some development in the rule of recognition. 
Under the orthodox Diceyan doctrine i t would have been impossible for 
the Parliament in 1972 to impose a form requirement on future 
Parliaments which in effect entrenches s. 2 ECA 1972 against implied 
repeal. 
1 7 2 [1979] ICR 785 at 796. 
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In January 1979, the Armagh Magistrate's Court delivered the first 
judgment of a Northern Irish court in a case involving Community 
y^aw. 1 7 3 The issue was the compulsory national marketing system for 
pigmeat, which had previously been found by the ECJ to be incompa-
tible with EC law. 1 7 4 Being familiar with this decision, the judge 
asked himself: "What is the origin and nature of the authority which 
compels this court to disregard that legislation?" His subsequent 
approach to this problem was unorthodox, to say the least. He 
recognized the "conflict between the rule of parliamentary supremacy 
and the United Kingdom's Community obligations"173, but instead of 
applying s. 2(1) and (4) of the ECA 1972, he directly referred to the 
ECJ's statements in Simmenthal and added that "however intellectually 
stimulating and politically and academically interesting speculation 
about the loss of sovereignty or otherwise may be, the reality is 
that the European Communities Act affirms the existence of an 
ultimate rule of recognition for the EEC (emphasis added) and at the 
end of the day the real test of this is the attitude of the courts, 
officials and private persons in the United Kingdom."176 
Although the line of reasoning is dubious (the ECA is hardly evidence 
of a changed rule of recognition), at least one judge in the UK 
thought that the duty of obeying Acts of Parliament ended where i t 
conflicted with the loyalty towards the new legal system, basing this 
conviction on a fu l l endorsement of the relevant case law of the ECJ. 
However, the Pigs Marketing Board case did not find any followers and 
went by largely unnoticed. 
Only within the last two years have there again been judgments which 
indicate that the changes to the rule of recognition have not come to 
an end with the reaffirmation and consolidation of the position first 
articulated by Lord Denning in Macarthys. 
173 Pigs Marketing Board (Northern Ireland) v. Raymond Redmond, [1979] 
3 CMLR 118. 
1 7 4 See Cases 31/77 and 53/77, [1977] 2 CMLR 359. 
1 7 3 [1979] 3 CMLR 118 at 121. 
176 Ibid. 
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Among all the recent cases involving Community law, Factortame has 
caused the most exitement and received a great deal of academic 
attention. 1 7 7 
The ECJ had decreed in its preliminary ruling that there must not be 
any obstacles in principle which prevent courts from granting interim 
protection against national legislation. What i t had not done was to 
lay down substantive conditions for the grant of interim relief or to 
specify the measures at the courts' disposal. 
Hence, the final decision lay again with the House of Lords. In their 
judgment of 11 October 1990178 their Lordships found that the Spanish 
applicants met the conditions for interim relief because the irrepa-
rable damage the applicants could suffer pending the ECJ's ruling on 
the substantive issue outweighed the detriment to the public interest 
resulting from the possibility that the British fishing quota was 
illegally exploited. This was the more so as even i f the applicants 
were to establish their Community right before the ECJ, they would 
have had no remedy in damages for losses.179 
In effect, this restored the position that had existed after the 
Divisional Court's original judgment. The difference is that the 
House of Lords granted interim relief as a matter of Community law, 
whereas Neill LJ and Hodgson J in the Divisional Court had thought 
that interim relief against the Crown was available under English law 
(relying on the authority of Herbage100 and Smith Kline & French101). 
1 7 7 See e.g. P. Allott, Parliamentary Sovereignty - From Austin to 
Hart; Barav, Enforcement of Community Rights in the National 
Courts; Gravelles, Disapplylng an Act of Parliament Pending a 
Preliminary Ruling: Constitutional Enormity or Community Law 
Right?; E. Szysczak, Sovereignty: Crisis, Compliance. Confusion, 
Complacency?; H.R.W. Wade, What has happened to the Sovereignty of 
Parliament?. 
1 7 8 [1990] 3 CMLR 375. 
1 7 9 See Bourgoin SA v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 
[1986] QB 716; [1986] 3 All ER 585. 
180 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Herbage, [1987] 1 QB 872. 
181 R. v. Licensing Authority established Under Medicines Act 1968, ex 
parte Smith Kline & French Laboratories (No. 2) [1989] WLR 378. 
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In the initial proceedings before the Divisional Court, the Solicitor 
General had also drawn attention to a decision by the House of Lords 
in Hoffman-La Roche v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry1*2. 
There i t had been said that a statutory instrument is effective and 
has the fu l l force of law unless and until i t is declared to be 
invalid. This presumption, the Solicitor General argued, must apply 
a fortiori to Acts of Parliament. 
Although Neill LJ found this "a very formidable submission"183, he 
demonstrated from Simmenthal and an analysis of s. 2 EC A that the 
presumption of validity did not take sufficient account of the new 
situation created by EC membership and thus could not stand in the 
way of interim relief. 
The Divisional Court was overruled both in the Court of Appeal and in 
the House of Lords. 
Concerning the availability of interim protection against the Crown 
in principle, Lord Bridge analysed the relevant statutory provi-
sions184 and the common law position and concluded that the views 
expressed in Herbage and Smith Kline & French were erroneous. Their 
Lordships also affirmed the Court of Appeal's understanding that the 
presumption of validity must be applied, because neither court could 
detect anything in the Treaty, or in the jurisprudence of the ECJ or 
in the EC A 1972 which would empower a municipal court to override 
national law in favour of an alleged or putative right under 
Community law. 
Thus there were two jurisdictional obstacles to granting interim 
relief as a matter of English law. The effect of the preliminary 
ruling of the ECJ was to remove these obstacles, thereby securing the 
principle of effective protection of Community rights by national 
courts. From the ECJ's point of view, this was only a logical 
continuation of its previous judgments and could hardly surprise 
anyone familiar with Simmenthal. 
1 8 2 [19751 AC 295. 
1 8 3 [1989] 2 CMLR 353 at 373. 
1 8 4 Crown Proceedings Act 1947, ss. 21, 23(2)(b), 38(2); Supreme Court 
Act 1981, s. 31; R.S.C., Ord. 53, r. 3(10)(b). 
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Yet, the decision provoked a considerable amount of excitement. The 
constitutional implications of this judgment seemed so outrageous to 
some Members of Parliament that they demanded an immediate emergency 
debate on the matter.1 8 3 The Conservative MP for Aldridge-Brownhlll, 
Richard Shepard, expressed his concern that "this ruling of the 
European Court has set aside the British constitution as we have 
understood i t for several hundred years". Teddy Taylor MP claimed 
that "until yesterday, no court has ever told this Parliament to 
suspend or nullify the law. The seriousness of this situation is 
abundantly clear. It means that any law which we enacted last week 
[..) can be repealed in a flash by judges in Luxembourg". 
On the other hand, several people with a deeper understanding of the 
legal issues involved dismissed the public outrage as unjustified. In 
a letter to the editor of The Times, Prof. D. Lasok QC said: "Indeed 
our legislators would spend their time more profitably by directing 
their minds to the law in question instead of blowing emotional 
bubbles."186 
At the very least i t is certain that MPs got exited for the wrong 
reasons. The ECJ has no power to repeal national laws and i t has made 
no such claims in its preliminary ruling. It merely told UK that 
there must be no obstacles to granting interim relief against 
national legislation i f the effective protection of Community rights 
so requires. 
Nor was there anything new to the idea that the Merchant's Shipping 
Act 1988 would have to give way to a contrary Community right of the 
Spanish fishermen, i f such a right were found to exist. This was 
always clear from the way British courts have interpreted and applied 
s. 2 of the ECA 1972.187 
The genuine constitutional novelty has occurred on a different level 
which is linked to a peculiarity in the nature of interim protection. 
As long as the ECJ has not clarified the meaning of the relevant 
Community provisions, the national judges cannot know which law they 
1 8 3 See Financial Times, 21 June 1990, Emergency debate call refused; 
The Times, 21 June 1990, Speaker refuses emergency debate on 
supremacy of Parliament, 
lee <phe Times, June 25 1990, Letters to the Editor, p. 13. 
1 8 7 This was also expressly conceded by the Court of Appeal, [1989] 2 
CMLR 353 at 403 per Bingham LJ. 
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ought to apply. Since i t is not evident whether the national rule 
must yield to Community law, they are faced with a choice of two 
putative rights, each of which can claim the benefit of the 
presumption of validity. However, since the ECJ does not create the 
law but only pronounces on its true meaning, the outcome is 
predetermined. 
If a UK court disapplies an Act of Parliament in the way of interim 
protection and the ECJ finds that the statute was indeed conflicting 
with directly effective Community law, the measure was obviously 
fully justified ex post facto by s. 2(1) and (4) ECA. This is how 
Parliament intended to protect directly effective Community rights. 
But where is the justification i f the Community rights did not exist? 
Lord Bridge pointed out in the first judgment that any order 
restraining the Secretary of State from enforcing the contended 
provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 "would irreversibly 
determine in the applicants' favour for a period of some two years 
rights which are necessarily uncertain until the preliminary ruling 
of the [ECJ] has been given. If the applicants fai l to establish the 
rights they claim before the [ECJ], the effect of the interim relief 
granted would be to have conferred upon them rights directly contrary 
to Parliament's sovereign w i l l . " 1 8 8 
Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords had agreed that the 
authority under the ECA to set aside legislation did not extend to 
this constellation. Instead, their Lordships enquired about the 
existence of "an overriding principle of Community law" 1 8 9. What they 
received from the ECJ was not much more than a reminder of the duty 
of national courts to do whatever is necessary to guarantee an 
effective protection of Community rights. 
Thus i t is not surprising that Lord Bridge, on return of the ruling 
1 8 8 [1989] 2 WLR 997 at 1014. 
H.R.W. Wade has remarked that "this simplistice stance is no 
longer adequate, for in the context of Community law Parliament's 
will is no longer sovereign", What has happened to the Sovereignty 
of Parliament?, p. 2. 
I disagree and submit that the following is correct: As long as 
there is no collision with Community law, Parliament remains fully 
sovereign. It can enact any law i t likes. 
1 8« (1989] 2 WLR 997 at 1014 per Lord Bridge. 
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of the ECJ, used rather evasive language when i t came to pinpoint the 
exact source of the Court's authority to grant interim relief 1 9 0: 
"(W)hatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when i t 
enacted the European Communities Act was entirely voluntary. (...) 
There is nothing in any way novel in according supremacy to rules of 
Community law in those areas in which they apply and to insist that, 
in the protection of rights under Community law, national courts must 
not be inhibited by rules of national law from granting interim 
relief in appropriate cases is no more than a logical recognition of 
that supremacy." 
Logical i t may be, but i t lacks a proper foundation under the ECA. 
The ECJ treats the whole problem of interim protection not as a 
question of a directly effective individual right, but (in the 
tradition of SimmenthaJ) as a result of the national courts' general 
obligation to uphold Community law. This construction renders s. 2(1) 
and (4) useless as a juridical basis for intervention by British 
courts. 
Even i f i t was argued that there is a directly enforceable individual 
"right" to interim protection in appropriate cases, this is not what 
Parliament had in mind when i t created s. 2(1) and (4) ECA 1972. 
A "right" to interim protection (if one insisted on this expression) 
would be fundamentally different in nature from directly effective 
rights in the established terminology of the ECJ. It has no existence 
of its own and no fixed point of reference in the Treaty. It can only 
be a procedural reflexion, an annex to a sufficiently probable 
directly effective ('primary') right. 
If we take Factortame, e.g., a "right" of the Spanish fishermen to 
interim protection is only the consequence of their plausible claim 
to primary rights under Art. 7, 52, 58 and 221 EECT. 
S. 2(1) and (4) was aimed only at such primary Treaty rights which 
satisfy the ECJ's criteria for direct effect. It was not meant to 
extend to a (new) secondary "right" to interim protection. This was 
made clear both by the arguments of the British Government before the 
ECJ and by the statements in the House of Lords and the Court of 
Appeal. 
The only remaining conventional attempt of an explanation is that the 
ECJ has established a precedent which the British courts are bound to 
observe by virtue of s. 3(1) ECA. However, when read in context, s. 3 
1 9 0 (1990) 3 CMLR 375 at 380. 
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does not convey the impression that it was intended as a gateway to 
judicial powers over Parliament's sovereign will which go beyond the 
concessions in s. 2(1) and (4). 
The more convincing conclusion from Factortame Is that the UK courts 
are prepared to assume on their own motion the powers which are 
necessary to f u l f i l their function within the Community191, thereby 
leaving the tested grounds of constitutional orthodoxy. 
Strangely, this view can be best supported by an analysis of the 
judgments in the Court of Appeal1 9 2 which reveals some instructive 
details! Bingham LJ addressed the constitutional issue of the supre-
macy of Community law in some length. 1 9 3 
After recalling the historical roots of Parliamentary Sovereignty he 
said that Dicey's definition that there can be no authority with the 
right to nullify or treat as void an Act of Parliament had been 
invalidated as a result of s. 2 ECA 1972.194 
This remained the only time s. 2 ECA was mentioned. The emphasis of 
the following argument rests entirely on extensive citations of the 
ECJ in Van Gend and Simmenthal. What is so unusual about this is 
that Bingham LJ not only supported the conclusions, but also fully 
endorsed the ECJ's reasoning why Community law should prevail over 
national law. 
For the first time, a Judge in a higher English court took up the 
notion of the Community as 'a new legal order of international 
law'! 1 9 0 
Why then did the Court of Appeal overrule the Divisional Court's 
decision to grant the applicants interlocutory relief against the 
crown? The only reason was that the judges could not see a basis for 
such a remedy in Community law. Lord Donaldson MR said: "The ultimate 
1 9 1 See also Allott, p. 377. 
1 9 2 [19891 2 CMLR 392. 
193 Ibid, at 400 et seq. 
1 9 4 This corresponds to statements like Hodgson J's in the Divisional 
Court who, referring to a decision of the House of Lords, said: 
"It was decided at a time when i t was unthinkable that there 
should be in an English court a higher authority than an Act of 
Parliament: but there is now in English law such a higher 
authority.", [19891 2 CMLR 353 at 380. 
193 Ibid, at 401. 
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question is thus whether the courts of this country have any power to 
interfere with the operation of the 1988 Act itself, either by 
modifying its operation or striking i t down, and of doing so not on a 
permanent basis founded upon Community law or the British European 
Communities Act 1972 but on a temporary basis pending a ruling by the 
European Court of Justice. The answer to this question, I have no 
doubt, is in the negative, whether we base ourselves on national or 
on Community law or on both. [...] Accordingly, albeit with some 
reluctance, I have come to the conclusion that in the circumstances 
of this case there is no juridical basis upon which interim relief 
can be granted by the British courts."196 Bingham LJ added: "If, of 
course, the European Court of Justice were to rule, as a matter of 
Community law, that the law obliged or entitled national courts to 
override national laws, whether statutory or otherwise, where to do 
so was necessary or desirable for the protection of claimed but 
unestablished Community rights, the situation would be quite d i f fe-
rent." 1 9 7 
b) Two Sunday Trading Cases 
Another case which illustrates the shift of emphasis away from the 
provisions of the ECA and towards the case law of the European Court 
is W.H. Smith Do-It-All Ltd. v. Peterborough City Council190. This 
was one of a number of cases in which the High Court had to deal with 
the effect of Art. 30 (and 36) EECT on s. 47 of the Shops Act 1950 
which regulates Sunday trading. 
Mustill LJ explained what entitled him to check on the validity of 
this Act 1 9 9: "The United Kingdom has no constitutional courts in the 
same sense as in other countries. True, the exercise of the Royal 
prerogative and of delegated legislation is now theoretically capable 
of being called Into question. But i t is axiomatic that the courts 
have no supervisory or revising powers in relation to primary 
legislation. If Parliament speaks, the courts must obey. This is 
still the fundamental principle of our constitutional law, but it has 
196 Ibid, at 397/8. 
197 Ibid, at 403. 
1 9 8 [1990] 2 CMLR 677. 
199 Ibid, at 580. 
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more recently been overlaid with qualifications of increasing impor-
tance to daily life stemming from the accession of the United Kingdom 
to the European Communities [emphasis added). [...] one thing may be 
taken as clear for the purposes of the present case; that i f there is 
a collision [...] between section 47 of the 1950 Act and Art. 30 EEC 
Treaty, the former must yield." 
Neither this nor the following judgment by Schiemann J. contained any 
reference to s. 2 ECA200! Instead, the restriction of the axiomatic 
(!) sovereignty of Westminster was derived from the fact of member-
ship, an approach which has a distinctly monist ring. 
The court also seems to accept that membership of the Community may 
limit the areas in which national legislatures can enact valid new 
legislation. This follows as argumentum e contrario from the fol lo-
wing statement201: "Pending the achievement of a homogeneous society 
by force of law, the European institutions recognise that there are 
fields in which national legislation and courts can legitimately 
apply their own norms." 
The boldest dictum yet to be made by an English court can be found in 
Stoke-on-Trent City Council v. B & Q pic 2 0 2, another Sunday trading 
case. When reading the following i t should be kept in mind that the 
case only Involved pre-accession legislation (s. 47 Shops Act 1950). 
The conflict could have easily been handled by simply applying s. 2 
ECA in the most orthodox of manners. As i t is, the ECA was not even 
mentioned. Instead Hoffmann J made the following remarkable state-
ment203: "The Treaty of Rome is the supreme law of this country, 
taking precedence over Acts of Parliament. Our entry into the \ 
Community meant that (subject to our undoubted right to withdraw from ' 
the Community altogether) Parliament surrendered its sovereign right 
to legislate contrary to the provisions of the Treaty on the matters 
of social and economic policy which i t regulated. The entry into the 
Community was in itself a high act of social and economic policy, by 
which the partial surrender of sovereignty was seen as more than 
compensated by the advantages of membership." 
2 0 0 This was certainly not for a lack of opportunity, as Mustill LJ 
delivered a detailed analysis of the effects of Art. 30 EECT. 
201 Op. cit., note 198, p. 585. 
2 0 2 [1990] 3 CMLR 31, High Court (Chancery Division). 
203 Ibid, at 34. 
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This goes way beyond Macarthys in more than one respect. The 
limitation of Parliament's powers is not seen as a result of the ECA, 
but as a necessary consequence (and precondition) of membership. This 
is no longer an adaptation of the traditional dualist view of 
international law; this position is clearly monist. If Hoffmann J is 
serious about this, then he would not even give effect to an Act of 
Parliament which intentionally and expressly repudiated the Trea-
ty . 2 0 4 The only step that could reverse this surrender of power would 
be i f the UK left the Community, which is something completely 
different from the form requirement for incoiistent legislation in 
Macarthys. Hoffmann J thinks that As long as the UK remains a member 
of the EC, the courts are in a similar position to courts in 
countries with a written constitution 2 0 3: "The power to review Acts 
of Parliament is new to the courts of this country but familiar in 
any country, like the United States, Canada and Australia, which has 
a constitution containing limitations on the powers of an otherwise 
sovereign legislation." 
Lord Denning has once remarked that "legal theory does not always 
march alongside political reality." 2 0 6 But i t is also true that 
"legal theorists have no option but to accomodate their concepts to 
the facts of political l i fe . " 2 0 7 
Apparently, this is what Hoffmann J attempted to do, thus drawing the 
consequences from the fact that the traditional view of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty has become increasingly detached from political reality. 
It may be objected that all this is overlnterpreting the dicta; that 
too much significance is accorded to minor details. After all, these 
are but a few cases and the majority of judgments stil l favours an 
approach which i f firmly based on s. 2 ECA and its interpretation in 
2 0 4 This coincides with an interesting new trend which can be observed 
both in the Court of Appeal's and in the Divisional Court's 
judgments in Factortame ([1989] 2 CMLR 392 at 374 (Div. Court) and 
401, CA): often when Lord Denning's statement in Macarthys is 
quoted, the passage about the possibility of an intentional 
repudiation of Community obligations is omitted. 
203 Ibid, at 49. 
206 Blackburn v. Attorney General, [1971] 1 WLR 1037 at 1040. 
2 0 7 See de Smith/ Brazier, p. 68. See also Winterton, p. 617. 
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Macarthys. 
There is, admittedly, a danger involved in trying to detect trends 
and tendencies which could in time lead to a major development in 
constitutional law. Perhaps the new tones will find no echo and share 
the fate of the Pigs Marketing Board case. 
On the other hand, a number of writers have observed that British 
constitutional development represents a triumph of gradualism208 
which often happens in "quantum-jump discontinuities occurring within 
convenient patches of intellectual fog." 2 0 9 If the novel approach 
demonstrated especially in the High Court but also in the Court of 
Appeal is continued and is found to be convincing by more judges 
(preferably in the House of Lords) then this could in retrospect well 
have been the beginning of a significant change of the rule of 
recognition and thus of the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
2 0 8 See R. Brazier, The Machinery of British Constitutional Reform, 
at p. 234; see also Howe, Sovereignty and Interdependence: 
Brltalns Place in the World, p. 680. 
2 0 9 Allott, p. 379. 
E. Summary and Outlook 
I . Summary 
This paper has analysed the impact membership of the European 
Communities has on the British doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
In the course of the examination, four main questions arose which had 
to be answered: 
What is the nature of Parliamentary Sovereignty? 
How does the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty adapt to 
changing historic conditions? 
In what ways is European Community law different from tradition-
al international law and why does membership of the European 
Community collide with Parliamentary Sovereignty? 
What concrete proof is there of changes to the doctrine since 
the United Kingdom entered the Community in 1973? 
The following represents, in simplified form, the findings of this 
thesis. 
(1) The doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty is a legal concept 
which describes the legislative powers of the United Kingdom 
Parliament and its relation to the judicature. It is not 
identical with the sovereignty of the United Kingdom as a state, 
nor does i t always coincide with the seat of effective political 
power. 
(2) Under the doctrine, the Queen-in-Parliament has unlimited power 
to make or unmake any law whatsoever. The courts of the UK are 
under a legal duty to apply every enactment which is identified 
as an Act of Parliament. There Is no rival legislative authori-
ty, nor a body or person with the right to set aside the 
legislation of Parliament. 
Acts of Parliament as the highest form of law prevail over 
international law and natural law. Their subject-matter is not 
confined to the people or the territory of the United Kingdom. 
(3) Opinion as to whether Parliament can limit its own power or bind 
its successors is divided. One view is that Parliament can 
establish new requirements for the manner and form of future 
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legislation. However, the prevailing view (and the one with 
better support from constitutional practice before Britain's 
accession to the European Communities) is that Parliament is 
unable to impose limitations, be i t on the substance or the form 
of future legislation. According to this orthodox view of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty, which is based mainly on the works of 
the Victorian constitutional lawyer Albert Venn Dicey, every 
Parliament enjoys the same powers as its predecessor and can 
expressly or impliedly repeal any prior enactment. 
(4) The doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty cannot be explained 
fully as a product of the common law although i t is there that 
we find evidence of its existence. 
The principle that every Act of Parliament has the force of law 
cannot derive its validity from a sti l l higher norm. It is a 
presupposed norm which forms the basis of the whole legal 
system. Therefore i t does not have a legal foundation of its 
own. As long as this (particular) grundnorm (Kelsen) or rule of 
recognition (Hart) is assumed to be valid, the concept of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty remains intact. 
(5) The special legal quality of the doctrine illustrates why i t 
cannot be altered by statute. However, the rule of recognition 
behind i t is not immutable. History shows that the seat of 
supreme legislative power (and, accordingly, the underlying rule 
of recognition) has changed several times. 
The present rule of recognition could be modified i f jurists 
(and especially judges) feel that i t adequately fails to re-
flect political reality. Even without taking into account mem-
bership of the Community, there is a striking discrepancy 
between the theoretical legal omnipotence of Parliament and the 
actual practical limitations of the late 20th century under 
which i t has to operate. 
(6) The best indicator for any changes to the rule of recognition 
are judgments of the UK courts. 
(7) The European Community stands out from other international 
organizations in the (still increasing) broadness and depth of 
its objectives and in the autonomy of its institutions. It 
already has some elements commonly found in federal systems. 
Chapter E. page 174 
(8) The challenge to the legal sovereignty of Westminster comes from 
the principles of direct effect and supremacy of Community law. 
Both concepts are seen by the European Court of Justice as 
indispensible elements of a functioning Community. 
(9) The principle of direct effect means that appropriate provisions 
of Community law can create rights which become part of the 
domestic legal systems of the member states without transforma-
tion by the national legislature and which must be enforced by 
the courts. National courts are thus made the primary instrument 
in the protection and enforcement of Community law. They have to 
recognize the Community as an independent source of law. 
This notion of the penetration of Community law into the 
national legal systems can more easily be accepted by member 
states with a monist view of international law. 
The principle of direct effect conflicts with the (dualist) rule 
under Parliamentary Sovereignty which forbids UK courts to 
recognize a legislative authority other than Parliament. 
(10) The principle of supremacy of Community law concerns all forms 
of national law, even the most fundamental constitutional rules. 
The lex posterior rule does not apply: Community law prevails 
over prior and subsequent national law. 
National courts are expected to set aside national legislation 
in the case of an irreconcilable conflict, even i f such a power 
is not provided for under their domestic legal system. 
(11) In effect, this requires a new rule of recognition or grundnorm 
in favour of the Community, as far as Community matters are 
concerned (and as long as membership lasts). 
(12) Community law is incorporated into the British legal system by 
the European Communities Act 1972. From a traditional point of 
view, Community law would cease to be binding i f Parliament 
chose to repeal the 1972 Act, which can therefore not be seen as 
an attempt to surrender legal sovereignty to the Community. 
Section 2(4) appears to recognize the principle of supremacy of 
Community law. However, the effectiveness of this provision is 
limited under the orthodox doctrine of Parliamentary Sove-
reignty. An Act of Parliament which is inconsistent with prior 
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Community law would have to be regarded as an implied repeal of 
s. 2 because i t is the latest expression of Parliament's 
sovereign will. I t would therefore override the conflicting 
Community provision. 
(13) The majority of judgments in the UK has so far affirmed that 
Parliament is the supreme legislative authority. Community law 
is not effective of its own right, but because of the European 
Communities Act 1972. If Parliament wishes to override Community 
law, i t has the authority to do so. 
However, the courts will only recognize such a repudiation of 
the Treaty of Rome i f Parliament says expressly in its Act that 
i t is to be applied notwithstanding Community law. This is the 
effect of s. 2(1) and (4) ECA 1972. One could say that 
Parliament in 1972 has impliedly bound Its successors by impo-
sing a form requirement for certain legislation, but i t could 
only accomplish this because the courts have slightly modified 
the old rule of recognition. 
(14) The theoretical concessions and adjustments in the UK on the way 
to a fu l l endorsement of the views of the ECJ have not gone as 
far as in some other member states. The reason for this is that 
on the political level, the UK Parliament has always strongly 
defended its extraordinary powers. 
(15) However, a number of judgments in recent years suggest that 
British courts might be prepared to take a substantial step 
forward. There are indications that Community law is accepted as 
binding not solely because of the ECA 1972, but because of UK 
memberhip of the Community. In cases of conflict, references to 
s. 2 ECA are becoming fleeting and noticeably less frequent. 
The arguments are rather based on the analysis of the relevant 
case law of the European Court. For the first time, the 'special 
nature' of the Community has been acknowledged. Generally, the 
language used signals an increasing willingness to accept the 
Community's view of itself and of the function of national 
courts In the European legal system. This would mean a new rule 
of recognition which points at Community institutions as the 
supreme legislative authority in all Community matters. 
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Should these trends continue, the consequences for the doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty wi l l be profound. The Westminster Parlia-
ment (like a l l the other national parliaments) has already given up 
a substantial share of political power to the Community. I f the B r i -
tish courts are going to adjust constitutional theory to these facts, 
Parliament would lose its theoretical legal omnipotence as well. 
II. Outlook 
As we have seen, membership of the Community in its present form has 
already made a deep impression on a principle of British consti tut io-
nal law which is older than many democracies in continental Europe. 
At the moment, the governments of the twelve member states are 
discussing proposals on the future of the European Community which 
are of the greatest importance for al l member states. 
This is not the place to discuss whether a federal Europe (whatever 
that means precisely), a common defense policy or a single currency 
are good ideas or not. I t is for the national governments to decide 
whether the political advantages of pooling sovereignty even further 
make up for the losses of power and control of the national 
parliaments. 
What would i t mean for the legal sovereignty of Parliament i f the UK 
decided to go along with all or some of these proposals? Many regard 
these plans as a direct threat to the sovereignty of Westminster. 
They are certainly right in a political sense. Important areas of 
policy which are at the moment under national control would probably 
be governed by centralized institutions. 
On the other hand, as far as legal sovereignty is concerned, there 
wil l be no direct challenge other than the one already posed by the 
principles of direct effect and supremacy of Community law. Whatever 
the future brings, the central question wi l l s t i l l be: what is the 
rule of recognition that is applied by the courts? 
The principles of constitutional change remain the same, regardless 
of the decisions that wi l l be taken in the Intergovernmental Confe-
rences. 
However, i f the negotiations result in a commitment to even closer 
integration, the judges in this country wi l l take notice. 
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